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The role of human rights in determining whether complainants of a sexual offence 
and/or defendants charged with an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
should receive anonymity 
By Laura Emily Taylor 
ABSTRACT 
A 2010 proposal to extend anonymity in rape cases to rape defendants underlined the 
continuation of a long running, highly politicised debate, centred on whether one or 
both parties in a rape case should receive anonymity. This research addresses the 
question of rape case anonymity from a human rights perspective with a rephrasing of 
the popular arguments enabling a better understanding of where the correct balance 
should lie.  
The specific rights addressed are those arising in the context of rape proceedings. 
Firstly, Article 3, the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. Analysis concludes that withholding anonymity would not violate the 
Article 3 right of either party in a rape case. Secondly, Article 8, the right to privacy and 
a family life. Discussions demonstrate that rape complainants require blanket 
anonymity to uphold their right to privacy and as an exception to open justice. Rape 
defendants do not require anonymity to protect their Article 8 rights. Thirdly, Article 
10, the right to freedom of expression and how it balances against a rape defendant’s 
Article 6 right to a fair trial. Discussions show that Article 10 will outweigh Article 6 in 
these circumstances, especially since the media’s right to freedom of expression 
facilitates open justice, and thus a fair trial.  Fourthly, the complementary Article 14, 
the right not to be discriminated against. Analysis concludes that rape complainants, 
but not rape defendants as a group, face discrimination and thus require blanket 
anonymity to uphold their Article 14 rights. 
 
In conclusion, rape complainants should continue to have anonymity whilst rape 
defendants should not be afforded it. A rape complainant’s Article 8 and 14 human 
rights are highly likely to be violated without anonymity. Lack of anonymity would not 
breach any corresponding human rights of a rape defendant.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The legal system within the UK is founded upon the principle of open justice.1 This 
principle ensures that in all but exceptional circumstances, legal proceedings are 
conducted in an open arena and that individuals involved in a specific case are 
publically identifiable.  
 
A rare exception to open justice is the right of complainants in sexual offence cases to 
have their identity concealed. This confers lifelong protection, commencing once the 
initial complaint has been made.2 This right is more commonly known as ‘anonymity’ 
and it is anonymity that will be the focus of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Anonymity: the popular debate 
In May 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government announced its 
intention to extend anonymity in rape cases to defendants.3 The proposal would have 
restored the position of rape defendants to that of the 1970’s when the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act (SOAA) 19764 first introduced anonymity for both rape 
complainants and defendants.5 Currently, only rape complainants have anonymity. The 
proposals might have received less public attention had their subject matter been on a 
less emotive topic, but instead they reignited a highly contentious and politically 
charged debate. Baroness Stern emphasised the reasoning behind this, stating that:  
 
‘[It] should be no surprise since rape is about sex, violence, power, 
intimate relationships between men and women or between men and 
men, society’s attitudes to what is acceptable behaviour and where 
blame and responsibility lie for non-consensual sex acts’.6 
                                                          
1
 See chapter 2.3 for further discussion of the principle. 
2
 Unless anonymity is withheld from the complainant in accordance with either of the reasons listed in  
the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s4(2).  
3
 Her Majesty’s Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (2010) 24.  
4
 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. 
5
 Jones. S, ‘Rape cases anonymity for defendants would be insult to victims say activists’ The Guardian 
(20th May 2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/may/20/women-against-rape-anonymity-
defendants> accessed 30th July 2012. 
6
 Home Office, The Stern Review: A report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an independent review into 
how rape complaints are handled by public authorities in England and Wales (March 2010) 
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Specific debates focusing on the relative merits of complainant and defendant 
anonymity in rape cases (‘the anonymity debate’) have ensued for over three decades. 
The underlying reason for the debate’s enduring quality has been the continual failure 
of interested parties to coherently examine the substance behind their arguments. It 
has therefore been extremely difficult to assess the merits of anonymity provisions in 
relation to each party in a rape case, with no widely acceptable legal position being 
reached to date. 
 
The most recent government proposals for rape defendant anonymity were no better 
reasoned and demonstrated little clear thinking on an issue not contained within 
either party’s pre-election manifestos.7 There was no elaboration on how the plans 
would work in practice and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) abstained from responding to 
questions about their proposed implementation. 8   Initially some media sources 
reported that anonymity provisions would be likely to be lifted once a rape suspect 
was convicted.9 Other sources suggested anonymity would be implemented on the 
same terms as awarded to rape complainants (lifetime anonymity from the time the 
rape complaint was made).10 Soon after these initial reports were circulated, David 
Cameron speaking in Prime Ministers Questions, confirmed that the proposed 
anonymity would only last until the time of conviction. 11  This stance reflected 
recommendations made in an earlier Select Committee on Home Affairs Report.12 
 
The nature of rape anonymity meant that large public debate generated a multitude of 
arguments both in favour of and against the proposals. It soon became evident that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<ebarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110608160754/http://www.equalities.gov.uk/PDF/Stern_Review
_acc_FINAL.pdf>  accessed 25
th
 January 2010, 12. 
7
 The Liberal Democrats had proposed anonymity for rape defendants until such time as they were 
convicted. The proposal was intended to help improve rape convictions generally as well as protecting 
potentially innocent defendants from the stigma associated with being a rape victim. See The Liberal 
Democrats, ‘Trust in People: Making Britain Fairer’ Conference Agenda, Liberal Democrat Conference 
(16
th
-21
st
 September 2006), F23, Rape Convictions Amendment One, 31-31. 
8
‘Rape defendants to be granted anonymity’ BBC News Channel (20th May 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8695367.stm> accessed 30th July 2012. 
9
 Jones (n5). 
10
 Doyle. J, ‘Cameron in U-turn on rape cases anonymity which could now only apply until suspects are 
charged’ Mail Online (2
nd
 June 2010) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1283435/Cameron-U-
turn-rape-case-anonymity-apply-suspects-charged.html> accessed 15
th
 October 2011. 
11
 HC Deb 27th May 2010 vol. 510 col. 288. 
12
 Home Office (n6). 
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the government was yielding to pressure to back down on its proposals when Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg reportedly said: 
 
‘I can confirm today that the government will not press ahead with 
any measure without listening to the full range of views, and if 
necessary, adapting and changing our approach to make sure we get 
it right’.13 
  
The statement only appeared to confirm that the government had not thought the 
proposals through adequately.14 
 
The Government then changed its position again to preservation of the status quo, 
albeit with a desire that a ‘non-statutory solution’ be found: no explanation of what 
the non-statutory solution might be was offered. 15  Whilst the MoJ would not 
definitively rule out anonymity between arrest and charge, Justice Minster Crispin 
Blunt said that he would rather put pressure on the media not to name suspects rather 
than bringing in a new law. He did make one suggestion, which was that current Press 
Complainants Commission guidance, recommending that the media did not identify 
someone charged with rape, might be strengthened. 16 Mr Blunt appeared to be trying 
to justify the government’s badly thought out proposals saying: 
 
‘Given that we had 21 criminal justice acts passed over the 13 years 
of the last administration, I am sure that Labour [MPs] will 
                                                          
13
 ‘Pressure grows over rape cases anonymity plan’, London Evening Standard’ (8
th
 June 2010) <http: 
//www.standard.co.uk/news/pressure-grows-over-rape-case-anonymity-plan-6478044.html> accessed 
26
th
 October 2011. 
14
 The government had previously commissioned Baroness Stern to conduct an independent review into 
how rape complaints were handled by public authorities in England and Wales. The report 
acknowledged arguments in favour of defendant anonymity on the basis that it protected innocent 
individuals from false allegations. The report made no recommendations for defendant anonymity but 
advised the government that an independent review into levels of false reporting in rape case should be 
conducted. See Home Office, ‘The Stern Review: A report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an 
independent review into how rape complaints are handled by public authorities in England and Wales’ 
(March 2010) <ebarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110608160754/http://www.equalities.gov.uk/PDF/ 
Stern_Review_acc_FINAL.pdf>  accessed 25
th
 January 2010,  41-41. 
15
 Hennessey. P, ‘Coalition U-turn over plan to ban identification of rape defendants’, The Sunday 
Telegraph (24
th
 July 2010) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7908485/ 
Coalition-U-turn-over-plan-to-ban-identification-of-rape-defendants.html> accessed 13
th
 October 2011. 
16
‘Rape charge anonymity pledge dropped’ BBC News Channel (26th July 2010), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10760239> accessed 31st July 2012. 
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understand why we loath to find even more statutes to put on the 
statute book’.17 
 
The opposition were clear to point this out. Acting Labour leader Harriet Harman 
attacked the coalition’s approach labelling it as ‘envelope politics’. She stated: 
 
‘[I]t [rape] is a very serious offence and they should not just dream up 
a proposal and bring it forward without thinking about it. Rape is too 
serious for that’.18 
 
Despite acting retrospectively, having already proposed a legislative change, the 
government asserted that it was conducting its own research into the need of 
defendant anonymity in rape cases. The results were to be published in autumn of 
2010.19 When the Government did finally conclude its own research, proposals for 
defendant anonymity in rape cases were dropped altogether. The report concluded 
that: 
 
‘[O]verall, this review of evidence on providing anonymity for rape 
defendants found insufficient reliable empirical findings on which to 
base an informed decision on the value of providing anonymity to 
rape defendants’.20 
 
The Government’s approach to the 2010 rape proposals could be heavily criticised for 
their hap-hazard, ill-thought out suggestions. Despite their failures they did provide a 
brief insight into the difficulties of assessing the merits of anonymity for both rape 
complaints and or defendants. Assessing the merits of anonymity for both rape 
complainants and or defendants is a key intention of this thesis. 
  
This brief introduction highlights the complex nature of the anonymity debate and the 
failure to reach popular consensus on whether rape complainants and/or rape 
defendants should receive anonymity.  
                                                          
17
 BBC News (n16). 
18
 BBC News (n16). 
19
 HC Deb 27th July 2010 vol. 514 col. 855.  
20
 Ministry of Justice Research Series 20/10, ‘Providing anonymity to those  accused of rape : An 
assessment of evidence’ (November 2010) 34 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/ 
research-and-analysis/moj-research/anonymity rape-research-report.pdf> accessed 1
st
 August 2012. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to consider the arguments in favour of and against 
anonymity for both parties in sexual offence cases from an alternative perspective, 
namely human rights. Whist this thesis addresses anonymity in relation to all sexual 
offences,21 the majority of public debate refers to the singular offence of rape. For 
purposes of continuity, this thesis refers to rape as a generic term encompassing all 
sexual offences. Whilst it is acknowledged that men can also be victims of rape, the 
majority of rape victims are female and thus for ease, this thesis refers to rape 
complainants as women and rape defendants as men. 
 
In addressing the anonymity debate from a human rights perspective, a better 
understanding of where the correct balance of rights should lie will be determinable. 
Subsequently, a legal stance in relation to anonymity in rape cases that is not widely 
contested may be able to be reached. 
 
1.2 Why address anonymity in rape cases from a human rights perspective? 
The basic principle underpinning the development of human rights is a noble one, 
because it ‘protects all of us, young and old, rich and poor’.22 That principle is equality, 
something that is now an integral part of most legal systems and international law.23 It 
is also ‘one of the building blocks of democracy and necessarily permeates any 
democratic constitution’.24 
 
When the United Kingdom (UK) Government presented the Human Rights Bill to 
parliament in October 1997,25 it contended that the reasons for doing so were largely 
practical in nature. Originally the UK had played an important role in drafting the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) several decades earlier. That 
convention enforced a number of human rights, some of which were absolute, 
whereas others were qualified (i.e. they had to be balanced against competing human 
rights). Previously when an individual suffered a violation of their human rights under 
the convention due to the effect of domestic law, or a decision of a state body, they 
                                                          
21
 As defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
22
 Liberty, ‘The Human Rights Act’,<http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/human-
rights/the-human-rights-act/index.php> accessed 11
th
 June 2012. 
23
 O’Cinneide. C, ‘The Right to Equality: A Substantive Legal Norm or Vacuous Rhetoric’, UCL Human 
Rights Review [2008] 1(1) UCL Human Rights Review 78. 
24
 Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, 109. 
25
 The Human Rights HC Bill (1997) [3782]. 
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had to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This process 
was neither speedy nor guaranteed.26 When a case did reach the ECtHR and the Court 
also found a violation to have occurred it could choose to award damages and/or costs 
to the applicant. Alternatively it could decide that a formal declaration of the violation 
sufficed.27  More importantly the decision did not technically have binding legal 
effect.28 
 
The purpose of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998,29 which followed the successful 
passage of the Human Rights Bill through parliament, was twofold. Firstly, it was to cut 
the time and cost of taking a case to the ECtHR (approximately five years and £30,000), 
thereby making an individual’s access to the Court easier. Secondly and more 
importantly it was to incorporate the human rights more fully into our legal system. By 
‘bringing human rights home’ and hearing cases in domestic courts, human rights 
would become more ‘real’ to individuals.30 This would be reinforced and reflected 
through a developing body of domestic human rights jurisprudence.31 At the same 
time the domestic courts would look to the decisions of the ECtHR in helping them to 
decide the outcome. This was ensured by the HRA 1998 s3 requirement that domestic 
legislation in England and Wales be compatible with. The requirement related to both 
primary and secondary legislation32 but notably did not affect the continuing validity or 
enforcement of any incompatible legislation.33 
 
With this in mind, the question asked is, of what use human rights can be in 
contributing to the rape anonymity debate. On the one hand it could be argued that 
                                                          
26
 An applicant was required to submit a petition to the European Commission of Human Rights who 
would decide whether the application was admissible or not. If the Commission did not agree with the 
admissibility of the petition, then cases would go no further. Alternatively where the Commission 
considered that a case was admissible and that a friendly settlement could not be agreed upon it would 
send a report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, stating its opinion that there had 
been a violation. The Committee would duly consider the report and may decide to refer the case to the 
European Court of Human Rights for consideration.  
27
 ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’, presented to Parliament by Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, (October 1997) <http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice 
/rights/chap1.htm> accessed 12
th
 June, para. 1.9. 
28
 However under Article 46 of the ECHR the contracting states undertake to abide by the decisions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
29
 HRA 1998 
30
 Rights Brought Home (n27). 
31
 Rights Brought Home (n27) para. 1.14. 
32
 HRA 1998, s3(2)(a). 
33
 Human Rights Act 1998, s3(2)(b), s3(2)(c). 
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human rights have done nothing to further the anonymity debate in rape cases since 
they only draw out the same arguments rephrased in different terminology. There is 
also a train of legal and feminist thought arguing that the effect of ‘human rights’ with 
a constitutional basis has had a negative effect on women in the legal process. This fact 
is attributed to failure of the HRA 1998 to dislodge gender-based disadvantage, 
politically, culturally, economically and socially: giving rise to arguments that the 
entrenching of human rights has not benefitted women but rather disadvantaged 
them further.34 Additionally, judicial discretion in the interpretation of these human 
rights has reinforced the gender bias, acting to the further detriment of women in the 
legal system.35 If these facts held true, one would assume that analysis from a human 
rights stance could not further the rape debate. 
 
However this thesis proposes that human rights can be highly valuable in assessing the 
anonymity debate in rape cases. Firstly it is true that women are disadvantaged in the 
legal process but the very purpose of human rights is to address inequalities of this 
nature. Secondly, whilst addressing issues from a human rights perspective, does ‘only’ 
seem to reformulate earlier arguments in new terminology, it is this reformulation 
which allows a clearer balancing of human rights. Such thinking supports the reasoning 
for addressing the anonymity debate from a human rights perspective.  
 
Not all human rights are relevant to the current discussion and the following chapters 
reflect this. Analysis focuses on Article 3 36 ‘Prohibition of Torture’, Article 837 ‘Right to 
Respect for Family and Private Life’, Article 1038 ‘Freedom of Expression’, and Article 
1439 ‘Prohibition from Discrimination’. I also consider Article 640 ‘Right to a Fair Trial’ as 
it relates to Article 10.41 
 
In order to effectively analyse anonymity from the viewpoint of specific human rights, 
it is important to first fully understand the background to the anonymity debate. 
                                                          
34
 Conaghan. J, Millns. S, ‘Gender Sexuality and Human Rights’ [2005] 13 Feminist Legal Studies 2. 
35
 McColgan. A, ‘Women and the Human Rights Act’ [2000] 51 NILQ 417. 
36
 HRA 1998, Schedule 1 Article 3. 
37
 HRA 1998, Schedule 1 Article 8. 
38
 HRA 1998, Schedule 1 Article 10. 
39
 HRA 1998, Schedule 1 Article 14. 
40
 HRA 1998, Schedule 1 Article 6. 
41
 Contained within the ECHR and enshrined into domestic law by the HRA 1998. 
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Chapter two begins with a discussion of the public, political and scholarly debates 
focused on anonymity in rape cases, before considering the difficulties of justifying 
anonymity provisions in relation to the principle of open justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Chapter 2 History and the law: why the 
need for anonymity? 
This chapter demonstrates how anonymity provisions in rape cases have changed 
during preceding decades and how they have been influenced by associated statutory 
and/or common-law legal developments. The latter part of the chapter focuses on a 
discussion of public, political and scholarly debates concerning anonymity in rape cases. 
 
The appropriate point to begin is to look at the ‘anonymity timeline’, identifying 
important and influential events that have propelled the current and long running 
debate on anonymity within rape cases. The debate’s catalyst came in the form of a 
well-known and highly contentious House of Lords (HL) decision.  
 
2.1 The anonymity timeline 
2.1.1 DPP v Morgan 197542 
The House of Lords decision in DPP v Morgan, held that a man could not be guilty of 
rape if he held an honest belief that the complainant was consenting, even if his belief 
was unreasonable. According to McGlynn ‘this judgment crystalised feminist concerns 
that the legal system did not treat women complainants fairly’.43Additionally it is 
submitted that in passing judgment, their Lordships reinforced judicial ambivalence 
towards female victims, as well as the notion that the law was made by men for the 
benefit of men. 
 
One of the presiding judges in the case, Lord Cross referred to the ‘definition’ of rape, 
as it then stood under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (SOA 1956).44 The Act under 
s1(1)45 provided that it was an offence ‘for a man to rape a woman’ but failed to define 
rape itself. In the absence of statutory definition it would be the role of judicial 
                                                          
42
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347. 
43
 McGlynn. C, ‘Feminist activism and rape law reform in England and Wales: A Sisyphean struggle?’ in 
McGlynn. C, Munro. V (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2010)139.  
44
 SOA 1956. 
45
 SOA 1956 s1(1). 
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interpretation in decided cases to provide the answer. Consequently His Lordship 
stated: 
 
‘[N]o one suggests that rape is an absolute offence to the 
commission of which the state of mind of the defendant with regard 
to the woman’s consent is wholly irrelevant. The point in dispute is as 
to the quality of the belief which entitles the defendant to be 
acquitted and as to the evidential burden of proof with regard to it’.46 
 
His Lordship considered the question of whether a man could be found guilty if he 
believed the woman was consenting. Lord Cross concluded such a defendant could not 
be guilty in those circumstances because ‘[R]ape to my mind imports at least 
indifference to the woman’s consent’.47Lord Edmund-Davies also voiced a similar 
opinion arguing: 
 
‘[H]onest belief, however foolishly formed, that the woman was 
willing seems to me incompatible with an intention to rape her. Here 
as in any other crime where knowledge is an essential ingredient, this 
should connote actual knowledge and not merely that the accused 
ought to have known’.48 
 
Ultimately all five of judges sitting in the Morgan appeal came to a unanimous decision, 
choosing to dismiss the appeal in light of the specific facts of the case. Notwithstanding 
this, it was held that a defendant in a rape trial, who held an honest but unreasonable 
belief in the complainant’s consent, could not be found guilty of rape. The precedent 
set in Morgan was to have highly damaging consequences on future rape trials. By 
requiring defendants to only hold an honest (if irrational) belief in a victim’s consent, 
as opposed to a reasonable belief, it instantly made a successful prosecution more 
difficult. The decision would allow more rapists to walk free whilst being highly 
detrimental towards rape victims. It would discourage rape victims from reporting a 
crime of a traumatic, invasive, personal nature, when their attacker could be acquitted 
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with comparative ease. It would also be detrimental to women generally because it 
took responsibility away from men for their own actions.  
 
The Morgan judgment caused public outrage, following which, the government 
decided to establish an advisory committee on the law of rape.49 Whilst the Morgan 
judgment would remain ‘good law’ for a further two and a half decades, the Advisory 
Committee’s final report, ‘The Helibron Report’ would make some important 
recommendations on the law of rape. 
 
2.1.2 The Helibron Report 
The Helibron Report50was the final report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, 
published in December 1975. The report advised that rape complainants be provided 
with anonymity and it is suggested that the proposal’s basis was to mitigate the 
anticipated consequences of Morgan. That refers to the potential discouragement of 
victims from coming forward to report a highly personal crime and endure the 
harrowing legal process. With this in mind the report stated: 
 
 ‘[W]e are fully satisfied that if some procedure for keeping the name 
of the complainant out of the newspapers could be devised, we could 
rely on more rape cases being reported to the police, as woman 
would be less unwilling to come forward if they knew there was 
hardly any risk that the judge would allow their name to be 
disclosed’.51 
 
The report also contended that: 
 
‘[P]ublic knowledge of the indignity which [the complainant] has 
suffered in being raped may be extremely distressing and even 
positively harmful and the risk of such public knowledge can operate 
as a severe deterrent to bringing proceedings. The balance of the 
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argument seems to us to be in favour of anonymity for the 
complainant other than in quite exceptional circumstances. Nor is it 
generally the case that the humiliation is anything like as severe in 
other criminal trials: a reprehensible feature of trials of rape is that 
the complainant’s prior sexual history may be brought out in the trial 
in a way which is rarely so in other criminal trials’.52 
 
The passage suggests the Advisory Group were basing their anonymity 
recommendations on both the highly personal nature of rape and the social stigma 
attached to being a rape victim.53 The implied ‘positively harmful’ effect primarily 
alludes to the psychological and emotional impact upon the rape victim. It could also 
extend to the detrimental effect a lower rape reporting rate would have on the CJS’s 
ability to deal with the crime effectively. There was one overriding principle that could 
be drawn from the recommendations so far as rape complainant anonymity was 
concerned: there was something fundamentally distinct about being a rape victim, as 
opposed to a victim of any other crime. The knock on effect was a structural inequality 
in rape prosecutions that needed addressing. Seemingly anonymity for rape victims 
was thought to be able to address both cause and effect. 
 
The Advisory Group had similarly considered the merits of anonymity for defendants in 
rape trials, but concluded that defendants should not be awarded anonymity. The 
report stated: 
 
 ‘[T]he reason why we are recommending anonymity for the 
complainant is not only to protect victims from hurtful publicity for 
their sake alone, but in order to encourage them to report crimes of 
rape so as to ensure that rapists should not escape prosecution. Such 
reasoning cannot apply to the accused. The reason for giving him 
anonymity is the argument that he should be treated on an equal 
basis. We think it erroneous to suppose that the equality should be 
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with her – it should be with other accused persons and an acquittal 
will give him public vindication’.54 
 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Helibron Report, the Government chose 
to grant both parties in rape cases anonymity. When the Bill for the SOAA 1976 was 
first introduced into Parliament however, it only provided anonymity for rape 
complainants. At Committee stage, a large majority voted to extend anonymity to 
defendants as well, a position the government duly adopted.55During subsequent 
Parliamentary debate on the proposed amendment, arguments focused on the effect 
that a rape accusation had upon an individual, even following their acquittal 56 and 
that being a rape defendant was indistinct from being a defendant in other crimes. 
Weight was also placed on the fact that rape complaints were commonly made on 
uncorroborated evidence, thus it was easy for an individual to make a complaint, but 
difficult for a rape defendant to prove his innocence.57Ultimately the Bill’s amendment 
was accepted by Parliament and the following year, anonymity was placed on a 
statutory footing in the SOAA 1976. 
 
2.1.3 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
The SOAA 1976 s458 prohibited disclosure or publication, within England and Wales, of 
the name, address or other material, which would lead to the identification of 
someone who had made a rape allegation. Under strictly limited circumstances, where 
necessitated in the interest of justice, the trial judge in a rape case had the discretion 
to remove the complainant’s anonymity. Similarly under s6 of the Act, defendants in 
rape trials were provided with anonymity from the time the accusation was made. The 
provision would cease to apply either following the defendant’s conviction in a crown 
court, or where the trial judge used his strictly limited discretion to remove a 
defendant’s anonymity where justice so required it. 
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The SOAA 1976 also limited the introduction or cross-examination of the rape 
complainant with regard their sexual history with someone other than the defendant. 
This was intended to ease the trauma of the courtroom process on rape complainants.  
 
However following a change of government the position relating to defendant 
anonymity shifted. Prima facie the new Conservative Government thought that their 
predecessors had made a mistake in acting contrary to recommendations of the 
Advisory Group of the Law on Rape. 
 
Only 12 years after defendant anonymity had been granted, the legal provision would 
alter again. The recommendations contained within the Fifteenth Report of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee59 were highly influential in this process. 
 
2.1.4 Fifteenth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC), on Sexual 
Offences, April 1984 
In April 1984 the CLRC, published its recommendations following a review of the law 
on sexual offences. They made a number of recommendations regarding anonymity 
provisions for complainants and defendants in rape cases. They also discussed the 
provisions enacted under the SOAA 1976 s260 that had been intended to limit cross-
examination of the complainant. 
 
Provisions relating to cross-examination of sexual history, prima facie had no direct 
association with anonymity provisions in rape trials. Their relevance lay in the fact that 
the restrictions were intended to ease the burden of the trial process on complainants. 
Restrictions on cross-examination implied the Government’s acknowledgement that 
the burden of the trial process, upon complainants, needed to be eased so far as was 
reasonably possible. In this way the provision also indirectly reinforced arguments in 
favour of continued complainant anonymity. 
 
The Committee also reviewed the controversial provisions of the SOAA 1976 that had 
granted defendants in rape cases anonymity, notwithstanding the Helibron Report’s 
advice against the amendment. Seemingly Parliament had extended anonymity to rape 
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defendants by way of ‘concessionary amendment’.61 The Committee made it clear they 
considered anonymity had been awarded to rape defendants, under the SOAA 1976, 
without there being adequate justification to do so. The report stated: 
 
‘[W]e endorse the reasoning of the Helibron Committee that led to 
complaints in rape cases being granted anonymity to encourage 
them to come forward….. [We] agree too, with the arguments of the 
Helibron Committee against giving anonymity to defendants in rape 
cases. We would add that rape is but one of many offences where a 
defendant who is acquitted may nevertheless suffer damage to his 
reputation……there is no reason in principle why rape should be 
distinguished from other offences in this respect. The “tit-for-tat” 
argument-that the man should be granted anonymity because the 
woman has it-is not in our opinion valid, despite its superficial 
attractiveness. We sense, however that as a matter of practical 
politics anonymity for defendants, introduced as recently as 1976 is 
unlikely to be abolished, although if it were possible we would for the 
reasons given by the Helibron Committee, favour its abolition as a 
matter of principle’.62 
 
The Committee pointed to a further difficultly that could be caused by defendant 
anonymity. It arose where a defendant was acquitted of rape but convicted of a 
different sexual offence arising from the same circumstances. If the defendant had 
anonymity resulting from the original rape charge then the newspapers would not be 
able to report on the other conviction for risk of breaching his anonymity. The 
Committee did not think that such an outcome should be able to occur.63 
 
Unsurprisingly the Committee were firmly of the view that defendants in rape trials 
should not retain their anonymity, nor should they be treated differently from 
defendants of other crimes. They should remain subject to the principles of open 
justice that the legal system values and upholds, in all but exceptional circumstances. 
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By comparison they considered that the position of rape complainants did fall into the 
category of exceptional circumstances. Despite an intervening period of several years, 
it is submitted that the 15th report of the CLRC, Sexual Offences Reportwas highly 
influential in the Conservative government’s subsequent proposals to legislate for the 
removal of defendant anonymity in rape cases. 
 
2.1.5 The Criminal Justice Act 198864 
Four years after the CLRC Sexual Offences Report, Parliament passed the Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) 1988. The CJA 1988 s15865repealed SOAA 1976 s666, the provision that 
had originally granted anonymity to rape defendants. S158 CJA 1988 also upheld 
anonymity for rape complainants. It meant that the law finally reflected the key 
recommendations contained within both the Helibron Report and the more recent 
CLRC Report. 
 
The parliamentary debates that preceded the CJA 1988 were no-less polarised in 
discussion of rape defendant anonymity. During the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill, 
Lord Monson, a former cross bench peer proposed an amendment clause that would 
have seen defendant anonymity remain in the CJA 1988.67 He based his arguments on 
the residual stigma faced by rape defendants, notwithstanding acquittal and the 
potential for every man to be a rapist. He said: 
 
‘[M]en are not generally envisaged by their neighbours as being 
capable of climbing a drain-pipe and robbing a flat on the tenth floor 
or forging a £50 note or manufacturing a complex bomb to go off in a 
public place. But it is acknowledged that most men, theoretically, are 
capable of committing rape in certain circumstances. Therefore the 
natural reaction of friends and neighbours when a man is accused of 
rape is to say there can be no smoke without fire. That is what 
worries me’.68 
 
                                                          
64
 CJA 1988. 
65
 CJA 1988 s158. 
66
 SOAA 1976 s6 
67
 HL Deb 3
rd
 November 1987 vol. 489 col. 965. 
68
 HL Deb (n67). 
26 
 
 
By comparison Lord Meston reiterated the view that arguments in favour of rape 
defendant anonymity on the premise of a need for equality were erroneous. He 
furthered that the provision contained within the SOAA 1976 was not a 
recommendation of the Helibron Committee. Rather, with reference to the words of 
Lord Hailsham, it was decided by a ‘chauvinist pig Committee stage in another place’.69 
 
The Earl of Caithness defended the Conservative Government’s proposal. He pointed 
out that the SOAA 1976 only correctly followed some of the Helibron Committee’s 
recommendations, of which anonymity for rape defendants was not one. He placed 
emphasis on the fact that the CLRC also favoured repealing the SOAA 1976, the 
enabling provision for defendant anonymity. The Earl was pointing out that two 
consecutive reports had deemed anonymity for rape defendants unnecessary.70 
 
Ultimately the stance of the Conservative Government drew enough support to see 
anonymity for rape defendants removed by virtue of CJA 1988 s158. Unfortunately, 
despite the recommendations of two successive committees, the removal of 
defendant anonymity in rape cases did not settle the debate on the topic. The Austen 
Donnellan case,71 a few years later would clearly demonstrate this. 
 
2.1.6 The Austen Donnellan acquittal  
Calls to provide defendants in rape trial with anonymity were voiced again following 
the much publicised Austen Donnellan acquittal in 1993. The defendant Mr Donnellan 
was a 21 year old student at Kings College in London. He was tried for rape following 
sexual intercourse with a fellow student after a Christmas party the previous year.72 
According to Mr Donnellan, he had kissed and petted the complainant heavily on 
previous occasions73 and on the occasion in question. On the night in question a 
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witness reported the complainant having drunk ‘a lethal cocktail of cider, vodka and 
Drambuie’. 74 
 
Due to her intoxicated state, Mr Donnellan claimed he had taken the complainant 
outside for fresh air, before escorting to her room in university halls.75 He maintained 
that the complainant had proceeded to have sexual intercourse willingly, even having 
grabbed him by his T-shirt, pulling him on her bed and repeatedly begging him to have 
sexual intercourse with her76. He contended that he had woken later to find the 
woman stroking his back and body, actions which if true would evidence the 
complainant’s reasonably conscious state. In response to her actions Mr Donnellan had 
reportedly undone her night clothes and climbed on top of her, but having realised the 
complainant’s eyes had closed, believed she had fallen asleep again. Moments later 
the complainant sat up saying ‘I can’t believe you just tried to screw me,’ and walked 
out of the room, following which Mr Donnellan made his own exit a few minutes 
later.77 
 
The complainant in her testimony, alleged having been ‘woken from a drunken stupor’ 
to find Mr Donnellan having oral sex with her, followed by sexual intercourse. If the 
complainant’s version of events were true then it is plausible that she was too 
intoxicated to give her consent and was therefore raped by Mr Donnellan. 
Nevertheless, Donnellan could still have raised a defence without too much difficulty: 
arguing that he held an honest belief in the complainant’s consent.78 The trial Judge 
Geoffrey Grigson acknowledged the complainant’s degree of intoxication. In his 
summing up he emphasised its relevance saying: 
 
‘[A] person who is drunk, and because she is so drunk consents to an 
act which she would not when sober, still consents. Drunken consent 
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is enough. But a woman who is so drunk that she needs no 
understanding of what is happening cannot consent’.79 
 
Following the incident, the young woman had made a complaint internally to the 
university disciplinary authorities.80 Following an investigation within Kings College 
University, Mr Donnellan was offered the opportunity to plead to a lesser charge in 
conjunction with dismissal from the University, in return for the original charge against 
him being dropped.81 Mr Donnellan, with the backing of his college tutor, insisted on 
going to the police and ultimately proceeding with the trial to clear his name.82 
Following the trial, on the 19th of October 1993, Mr Donnellan was acquitted by a jury 
of nine women and three men, at the Old Bailey in London. 83 
 
The trial’s outcome provoked uproar from the public, the legal profession and the 
government. Ironically, much of the reasoning as to why the trial received so much 
publicity was not related to anonymity in rape cases. Rather it was that the case 
involved students at a prestigious university and the fact that the defendant’s tutor 
was a leading Liberal Democrat peer, Conrad Russell.84Arguments in favour of re-
instating defendant anonymity in rape trials were soon being voiced. Equally, anger 
was expressed as to the damaging effect that the decision would have upon the ability 
of future rape victims to come forward and report the crime. There was general 
discontent as to why the case was allowed to proceed to trial in the first place.  One of 
the most notable calls coming from the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, was for 
reinstatement of defendant anonymity in rape trials, before conviction. It would have 
amounted to a return to the position prior to the CJA 1988. Lord Justice Taylor was 
quoted in one newspaper as having said:  
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‘I think it is unfair [Austen Donnellan] should be exposed to the same 
sort of embarrassment women were exposed to that led to 
anonymity being given to the complainant’.85 
 
Additionally, there was widespread support for Mr Donnellan who had been named 
while his accuser had anonymity throughout the process.86 In contrast women’s 
groups labelled the acquittal a ‘backlash’ against women. Siwan Hayward, founder of 
the ‘No Means No Campaign contended that ‘Women don’t lie about rape’.87 Concerns 
were aired that the Donnellan trial starkly illustrated the need to define a woman’s 
right to say no to sexual intercourse, and even more so when the parties are under the 
influence of alcohol.88 Gregory and Lees summarised the overall impact of the case as 
two-fold. Firstly it sent out the message that rape trials generally were unfair to the 
male defendant. Secondly, it discouraged women from reporting cases and pursuing 
them, a knock on effect of which would mean increased attrition levels in rape cases.89 
 
Nevertheless, the reality of the Donnellan acquittal was that alterations to anonymity 
provisions for one or both parties in rape cases were debated in Parliament yet again. 
The then, Home Secretary, Michael Howard, ordered a review of anonymity provisions 
with view to a possible change in the law. There were a number of proposals made 
including ‘leaving the situation as it is now, lifting the anonymity of the victim, the 
defendant or both, or granting the trial judge the discretion to make such decisions’.90 
 
Following the review, and having had time to consider offered proposals, Mr Howard 
concluded: 
 
‘I am satisfied, however, that the present law, that affords anonymity 
for complainants in sexual offences, but offers no special protection 
for defendants, strikes a proper balance between the principle of 
open justice on the one hand and the need to ensure that victims of 
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sexual offences are encouraged to come forward on the other. I 
therefore have no plans to alter the law in this area’.91 
 
On the issue of providing defendant anonymity, Mr Howard deemed it unnecessary, 
reporting: 
 
1. ‘[T]he law already allows for the prosecution of complainants 
whose accusations amount to perjury or an attempt to pervert 
the course of justice, and in those circumstances the rules 
relating to anonymity no longer apply.92 
 
2.  ‘[I]n a system of open justice93 some discomfort for defendants 
who are subsequently acquitted is inevitable….openness  is 
essential to the maintenance of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system and ensures that information that might 
encourage further witness to come forward is publicly 
available’.94 
 
Consequently, following the outcome of the review and Mr Howard’s comments, the 
issue of anonymity was briefly put to rest again. 
 
2.1.7 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA)199495 
One of the greatest difficulties in obtaining successful prosecutions in cases of rape has 
always been the ‘rape myths’ surrounding the crime. Rape myths are discussed in 
more detail in chapter2.2.3, however their relevance to legislative change that 
occurred in 1994, which in turn affected arguments relating to anonymity, requires a 
brief discussion. 
 
Rape myths are widely held beliefs about rape that ensure gender inequality in the law 
is maintained, that attrition in rape cases is high and conviction rates low. The 
effectiveness of rape myths in condemning rape victims to injustice is linked to 
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historical attitudes and beliefs that serve only to justify male power and aggression 
over women.96 Kennedy summarises, stating that ‘[Rape] myths are not the same as 
lies, in that they do not involve deliberate falsification. They endure because they 
serve social needs’.97 
 
A long standing problem in rape cases is the extremely low conviction rate. Arguably 
‘rape myths’ lay down unspoken criteria that should be satisfied in order for an offence 
to qualify as real rape. The majority of cases that fail to meet these criteria are unlikely 
to see a conviction in court.98 Rape myths and the unspoken expectations they place 
upon rape complainants only adds to a complainant’s traumatic courtroom 
experience. If rape myths were less prevalent, then rape complainants might be more 
willing to report the crime and endure the courtroom process. Prima facie the need for 
rape complainant anonymity would lessen. 
 
One of the most common myths is that rape complainants commonly make false 
allegations and therefore cannot be trusted to tell the truth in court.99 Until 1994 
judges had to give a corroboration warning as part of their summing up exercise in 
court. It included a warning to the jury to be wary before convicting a defendant on 
the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. 
 
The warning was telling the courtroom that women are prone to lie about rape in a 
way that men are not. Jurors were to look for some supporting evidence such as 
physical injury, which may or may not have been present. This made it extremely 
difficult for a jury to convict the defendant. The outcomes also perpetuated a long-
standing rape myth, making the legal process more traumatic and fortifying the need 
to mitigate the effect on rape complainants through anonymity.100 
 
The Public Order Act (POA) 1994 s33 removed the requirement of judges to give a 
corroboration warning. Prima facie the development was a welcome one and could be 
said to mitigate the need for complainant anonymity to some extent. Unfortunately 
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judges still retained discretion to give a corroboration warning in cases where they 
consider it appropriate: confirmed in R v Makanjuola.101 Thus the Act didn’t actively 
better the position of the rape complainant. Providing the trial judge with discretion 
still leaves residual doubt in the minds of the jury and the public that rape 
complainants are lying about being raped. Consequently, the arguments voicing the 
need for continued rape complainant anonymity were not countered to any significant 
extent by the POA 1994 s33.  
 
2.1.8 Crime and Disorder Bill (CDB) 1998 
During the passing of the CDB in 1998, it was the Liberal Democrats who next 
proposed defendant anonymity in rape trials. An amendment was also moved, which it 
is submitted, if accepted would have altered sexual history evidence in favour of the 
complainant.102 Despite the proposed amendments it was acknowledged by Lord 
Goodhart that the purpose of the debate was principally to raise the issue rather than 
to seek to immediate change.103 
 
The amendment proposed two alterations that were directly applicable to anonymity 
provisions. The first was based on removing the notion of an unreasonable but honest 
belief, as a defence to a rape charge.104 It would have been a welcome alteration but 
Lord Acker later refuted the proposal, contending that the SOAA 1976 s1(2)105 rectified 
the issue.106 It would appear that Lord Acker’s belief was erroneous because s1(2) 
states: 
 
‘when considering whether a man believed that a woman was 
consenting to sexual intercourse, the presence or absence of 
reasonable grounds for belief is matter to which the jury is to have 
regard, in conjunction with any other relevant matters, in considering 
whether he so believed’. 
                                                          
101
 R v Makanjuola [1995] 3 ALL ER 730. 
102
 An amendment was also proposed which would have altered the use of sexual history evidence in 
favour of rape complainants. See HL Deb 19
th
 March 1998 vol. 587 col. 854. 
103
 HL Deb 19
th
 March 1998 vol. 560 col. 853. 
104
 The principle was established in Morgan (n42). 
105
 SOAA 1976 s1(2). 
106
 HL Deb (n103) col. 856.  
33 
 
 
It has been suggested that the Morgan ‘unreasonable but honest’ belief did not impact 
negatively upon the law since a jury was unlikely to believe a defendant’s alleged 
mistake was genuine unless there were reasonable grounds for believing it. The Law 
Commission was even purported to have said that ‘Morgan is not, in practice, a 
problem’.107 However both these arguments are flawed because whether following the 
SOAA 1976 s1(2) or Morgan, it remained open to the jury to acquit a defendant that 
held an honest, but unreasonable belief, if they so chose. 
 
In response to the proposals the Solicitor-General, Lord Falconer agreed the 
amendments were ‘a valiant attempt to deal with a number of difficult problems in the 
law of rape’.108 He was not convinced they would provide a better alternative to the 
law as it then stood. Alterations to the defendant’s belief in consent would ‘mark a 
fundamental change in the law on rape’.109 His Lordship furthered: 
 
‘[A]t present a man can be convicted only if he has intercourse 
knowing or being reckless as to whether the alleged victim 
consented. The proposal would allow the jury to say subsequently 
that such a person did not have reasonable grounds for the actual 
belief that he had, and was therefore guilty’.110 
 
Most significantly in the context of the anonymity debate was the proposal under 
subsection four of the amendment (CDB 1998), providing anonymity for defendants 
once more. This anonymity would include protection of defendants from identification 
by the press and from broadcasting in the media, prior to and unless the defendant 
was convicted of the crime. 111 
 
Earl Russell supported the amendment and justified the proposals as a whole on the 
principle of ‘a level playing field’.112 The Earl contended that this was true for both 
sexual history evidence and anonymity. His focus was on a defendant’s right to 
anonymity and stated: 
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‘Where you face a charge of this kind, the mere publicity itself is a severe 
penalty. You are recognised on buses. Your relations find out about the 
case from finding your face pictured on paper used to wrap kippers. These 
penalties are severe. The recognition may continue for years. It is a severe 
handicap to normal human relations. It is the contention of the 
amendment that punishment should not be inflicted on those who are 
found innocent. If you are innocent you should not be punished. I think 
that is only justice’.113 
 
Undoubtedly there was substantial truth in this statement and there will always be 
sympathy for the wrongly accused defendant. Even so, discussions will analyse the 
merits of arguments such as this in more detail and will demonstrate that the simple 
‘level playing field’ arguments do not represent the complexity of the debate. For the 
purposes of discussing the historical and legislative developments, it suffices that Lord 
Falconer agreed that society did attach a stigma to those accused of rape and that 
those individuals would have had anonymity in a previous decade.  
 
Lord Falconer further asserted why anonymity was removed, contending that: 
 
‘[O]penness is a fundamental principle, defendants are generally 
named, even in the case of murder and other reprehensible crimes. 
Why should defendants in rape cases receive special protection?’114 
 
His Lordship argued that anonymity for complainants was not only given to 
complainants in order to protect them from embarrassing publicity but rather to 
ensure that reporting takes place and rapists do not escape prosecution. The same 
argument could not be applied to the defendant because ‘the arguments are about 
preventing personal hurt and embarrassment rather than improving justice’.115 He 
contended that defendant anonymity in order to promote a ‘level playing field’ was an 
erroneous argument since the defendant’s equality lies with other accused persons( 
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rather that the complainant) and it is an acquittal which will give him public 
vindication’.116 
 
His Lordship pointed out that whilst anonymity might help to ease the stressful 
consequences of a rape charge, some defendants would still experience the same 
difficulties even if anonymity were provided. This was because a rape defendant might 
still be identified by his local community,117although no further detail was provided as 
to under what circumstances that could occur. Furthermore, providing defendants 
with anonymity would do nothing to address problems surrounding the low rape 
conviction rates. His Lordship concluded that: 
 
‘[O]ften the naming of the accused can be used to provide the public 
with information they can pass onto the police. This can be vital in 
obtaining the necessary evidence against the accused’.118 
 
As Lord Goodhart had anticipated, following parliamentary deliberations the 
amendment was withdrawn119 and the anonymity debate was temporarily removed 
from the parliamentary arena. Even so, Lord Goodhart fulfilled the intended purpose 
of introducing the amendment: to rekindle active debate on the subject and ensure 
that deliberations would not lie dormant for long. 
 
2.1.9 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill (YJCEB) 1999 
Before long, the anonymity debate did return to Parliament. It was during the passage 
of the YJCEB in 1999, where a proposed new clause, to provide anonymity to rape 
defendants, was discussed. The clause would have restricted any reporting about 
persons accused or suspected of committing a sexual offence that would have resulted 
in the public identifying them prior to conviction. The only exceptions would be where 
the identity of the defendant was needed in order to secure their arrest or ‘is 
otherwise in the interests of justice’.120 
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Conservative MP Mr Greenwood urged the clause be taken to second reading whilst 
acknowledging the polarity of opinion on the matter. Some individual lawyers believed 
that the Government should extend anonymity provisions others including legal bodies 
such as the Law Society considered it to be the wrong move. Opinion was divided even 
within individual political parties.121 Mr Greenwood, without expanding, believed that 
the interests of rape victims were being provided for by the Bill: he may have been 
referring to proposed clauses restricting the cross-examination of victims in sexual 
offence cases.122 His concerns lay with the corresponding lack of provisions to protect 
the interests of rape defendants.123 
 
Supporting his argument Mr Greenwood made reference to the reasoning behind 
removing defendant anonymity in the CJA 1988: the most prevalent being that it 
encouraged victims to come forward. He referred to a number of incidents that he 
found disturbing and had led to a questioning of whether ‘in the interests of fairness 
and natural justice’ the ‘balance’ should be restored. The first incident concerned the 
suicide of a 21 year old man, Mark Jackson, who hanged himself following an 
accusation of rape by his former girlfriend. Despite his acquittal in Exeter Crown Court, 
the newspaper headlines in his home town of Wigan read ‘Jilted man, 21, raped ex-
girlfriend’. 124 The second incident involved the suicide of Dennis Proudfoot. He had 
inhaled exhaust fumes in the car following a charge of rape by his ex-girlfriend, 
reportedly through fear of the publicity it would attract. After the man’s death his 
parents received correspondence from the ex-girlfriend admitting the accusation was 
false.125 Mr Greenwood also pointed out that the discussion extended to female 
defendants, giving the example of a female doctor, who in 1997 was found not guilty 
of indecently assaulting a female patient. She received a verdict of ‘not guilty’ of 
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indecent assault but was nevertheless subjected to public scrutiny. Neither her career 
nor her private life ever recovered.126 
 
Mr Greenwood argued that, whilst there has been a significant reduction in the 
number of rape complaints that were later ‘no crimed’127, approximately 25% of 
crimes were still recorded as such. The most common reason cited was that the 
complaint was believed to be false or malicious, and in a third of such cases the 
complainant withdrew the allegation. The suggestion being that in such cases it is quite 
possible the defendant would have had their identity made public and would have 
been subjected to all the ramifications that that caused for themselves and their 
families.128 
 
Mr Beith MP was equally supportive of the new clause being taken to a second reading 
but based his argument on a less cited concept but one underpinned by good 
reasoning. He asserted that ‘the anonymity of the victim can be undermined when the 
defendant is known’. He correctly argued that the reality, in a number of rape cases, 
was that the identity of defendant and complainant are known to one another in some 
form. Through identifying one, it is feasible that the public could come to identify the 
other. Mr Beith reinforced his thoughts arguing that ‘[L]ack of anonymity for the 
defendant undermines our ability to protect the complainant’. He also raised his 
concerns over the more commonly cited social stigma and ramifications that could 
occur as a result of the rape allegation that lasted long after acquittal.129 
 
Mr Beth referred to an earlier House of Lords discussion that took place during the 
passage of the CDB and the amendment proposed by Lord Goodhart to restore 
anonymity to defendants in rape cases. He referred to the arguments that the then, 
Solicitor General, Lord Falconer had made for withholding anonymity for rape 
defendants and maintained the reasoning was not substantial enough to counter the 
reasoning he set out.130 
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By contrast Mr Boateng was in opposition to a re-introduction of anonymity, 
summarising the reasoning provided by the CLRC in 1988, before the CJA 1988 
repealed rape defendant anonymity.131 He acknowledged that ‘[B]alancing stigma and 
post-acquittal consequences [in a rape cases] involves arguments that are by no means 
clear-cut’ and that those proposing a return to the law prior 1988 lacked a convincing 
argument. Mr Boateng supported comments made by Lord Falconer, during the earlier 
deliberations that referred to the right of the general public to know what goes on in 
court. In his opinion the ‘public interest’ weighed heavily in the anonymity debate but: 
 
‘[T]he present law strikes a proper balance between the principle of 
open justice, in which the public has a wider interest, and the very 
important need to ensure that victims of sexual offences are 
encouraged to report such crimes’.132 
 
Mr Boateng said that while some argued sexual offences were particularly heinous, the 
same could be said for defendants of other serious crimes like murder. To give 
anonymity to rape defendants would pave the way for others to argue that they also 
suffer and therefore need protection from press and publicity.133 In agreement it is 
asserted that providing rape defendants with anonymity would be putting them at an 
advantageous position to defendants of other crimes: an outcome that would not 
promote a system of open and fair justice for all. 
 
Mr Boateng rightly acknowledged that under the Contempt of Court Act 1981,134 the 
court could order postponement of publications or legal proceedings for any period it 
deemed necessary. Where a court chose to withhold a name from the public during a 
trial, it also had the power to prohibit publication completely,135 thus if defendant 
anonymity were truly required then the court had the power to enforce it.136 
 
In counter support, Mr Heald MP contended that: 
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‘Since anonymity for the defendant has been scrapped, the 
suggestion has been lurking in the courtroom, in almost every rape 
case, that a false allegation may have been made under the cloak of 
anonymity. A man’s life may be ruined because of that anonymity. If 
both parties have anonymity, that suggestion cannot lurk in the 
background of the court. I suggest that that would make a 
difference’.137 
 
Interestingly, the suggestion was that by providing defendant anonymity, complainants 
were also protected from the stigma that they commonly make false complainants. 
There may be some truth in Mr Heald’s view. Some have noted that popular belief of 
false allegations would have been better dealt with through public education and 
accurate false allegation statistics. Providing defendant anonymity could come at the 
expense of higher attrition rates by complainants feeling less able to come forward 
and report their crime: an outcome wanted even less. Mr Heald reinforced his 
thinking, stating: 
 
‘[I]t is noticeable that since the scrapping of the anonymity of the 
defendant, the number of rape cases that have been successfully pursued 
and have resulted in conviction have fallen dramatically. Might not one 
reason for that be that the point is not lost on the jury that the person 
making the complaint is doing so anonymously, and is risking nothing?’138 
 
Yet the belief that by having anonymity the rape complainant loses nothing, seems to 
have been an ill-though-out response, made from a male perspective. As Caroline Flint 
MP reminded the House, a rape victim (who might be making a false complaint) has to 
stand up in court, facing the person she has accused of raping her, in front of judge, 
jury, and court officials and give evidence.139 
 
Once again parliamentary deliberations did nothing to provide any clarity on the 
anonymity debate but again demonstrated how divided opinion. Ultimately defendant 
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anonymity provisions were not included in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
(YJCEA) 1999 when it received royal assent later the same year. 
 
2.1.10 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
Notwithstanding a lack of defendant anonymity provisions, the YJCEA did include a 
new provision intended to restrict the use of sexual history evidence in sexual offence 
cases. YJCEA s41  prevented  a defendant  who was charged with an offence from 
cross-examining the complainant140 about their sexual history,141 or from adducing 
evidence of that type without leave to do so from the trial judge.142 
 
The new limitation was a welcome change for rape victims and those seeking to ease 
the courtroom pressure upon them. It would also make victims feel more able to come 
forward and report the crime in the first instance, knowing that the defendant could 
not simply cross-examine them or adduce any evidence he wished. In theory an 
indirect consequence of s41 was that it would also mitigate the need for complainant 
anonymity to some degree. Unfortunately any benefits achieved for rape 
complainants, by virtue of s41 were short lived. Only two years after the YJCEA was 
passed a landmark House of Lords decision in R v A (No 2)143 rendered the provision 
almost irrelevant.  
 
A (No 2) was a criminal appeal concerning the admissibility of sexual history evidence, 
or cross-examination of the complainant under YJCEA s41. The question posed was 
whether or not restricting a rape defendant’s right to cross-examine the complainant 
about their sexual history breached his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. 
According to Lord Steyn, s41 was most problematic when it prohibited cross-
examination of the complainant’s previous sexual relationship with the defendant. His 
Lordship reasoned that this was because: 
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‘[A]s a matter of common sense, a prior sexual relationship between 
the complainant and the accused may, depending on the 
circumstances, be relevant to the issue of consent’.144 
 
Lord Steyn provides no explanation of precisely where the causal link between consent 
during previous sexual relations and consent given during the sexual relations of the 
alleged rape lay. Without such an explanation the relevance of a prior sexual 
relationship evidently cannot be ‘common sense’. By contrast some onlookers would 
consider this statement to be entirely nonsensical and irrelevant to the actus reus of 
the crime in question.145 
 
Following their deliberations the five presiding judges answered the question 
unanimously. In future rape cases a test of admissibility should be applied. Where 
evidence, and the questions related to it are so integral to the question of consent, 
that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under Article 6, then that 
evidence should not be excluded.146 
 
Following A (no.2) judges are unlikely to refuse applications by the defendant to cross 
examine the complainant, or adduce evidence regarding previous sexual relations 
where it may be at all relevant to the case. To refuse permission would mean a 
potential onslaught of appeals based on a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 ECHR. When ascertaining what might be considered ‘potentially 
relevant’ evidence or past experiences, one only has to look to follow the ‘common 
sense’ approach employed by Lord Steyn. Doing so allows one to conclude that most 
evidence would fall within the ambit of potentially relevant evidence. 
 
The result was that complainants in rape cases were once again faced with a potential 
onslaught of potentially irrelevant questioning by the defendant regarding their 
previous sexual experiences. Such questioning implies to the jury that the complainant 
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is lying, making the courtroom process more traumatic for the victim and 
correspondingly increasing the need to protect rape complainants with anonymity. 
 
2.1.11 Proposed Amendment to the Sexual Offence Bill (SOB) 2003 by Lord Ackner 
The next call for statutory changes to the anonymity provisions in rape cases came 
during the passage of the SOB 2003. Lord Ackner moved a clause that would have 
provided anonymity for defendants in rape cases once again. The provision would read 
‘[A]nonymity of Defendants in Rape etc. cases shall enjoy the same right to anonymity 
as is enjoyed by the complainant’.147 
 
His Lordship explained this initial reasoning for proposing the clause, referring to a 
local GP, who had a one-man practice, and who was charged by the police of raping a 
girl under the age of 16. He was arrested in front of his family, and remanded in 
custody for over a week. He was later released on bail with the conditions that he left 
the country and went to live with his father, only able to return home for the purposes 
of gaining legal advice. Shortly before being due to return to court he was informed 
that all charges against him had been dropped. 148 Lord Akner turned the House’s 
attention to CJA 1988 s158, which had withdrawn anonymity provisions from 
defendants in rape cases, and consequently left an imbalance which ‘calls vociferously 
for an adjustment.’ He questioned the damage that must have been done to the 
reputation of the general practitioner and acknowledged that the man had not been 
able to commence practice once more. Lord Akner questioned why this protection has 
been removed. ‘[F]rom such enquires I have made, I can find no sensible justification 
for doing so’.149 
 
In answer to this question Baroness Kennedy contended that withholding defendant 
anonymity was based on the principle of open justice in our legal system. Anonymity 
provisions needed to be reserved for exceptional circumstances: a category that rape 
complainants fell into, due to the crime’s stigma and the difficulty of getting woman to 
come forward and report rape. She did accept the need to provide defendants with 
anonymity up to the point of charge, when high levels of speculation were involved 
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that would damage  lives. A ‘compromise’ of this sort would have been supported by a 
number of peers including Lord Cambell, Baroness Mallalieu and Baroness Blatch.150 
Baroness Kennedy also pointed out that in reality, particularly when serial rapists were 
involved, publication of the defendant’s details resulted in other victims coming 
forward to accuse the same man. Often this helped to secure a conviction,151 and it 
was important that this continued. 
 
It became evident from the House of Lords debate on defendant anonymity provisions 
that there was a firm level of support for the amendment from all sides of the House. 
Lord Bishop of Chester referred to the ‘issue of emotional frailty [which] cuts across 
both the accused and the victim’,152 whilst others highlighted the need to balance the 
rights of the defendant vis-à-vis the rights of the complainant.153 
 
On conclusion of the debates, Lord Akner remained certain that his proposed 
amendment should be voted upon. In reaffirming his favourable position to defendant 
anonymity in rape cases he said:  
 
‘[F]or 12 years this anonymity was enjoyed. I have heard nothing to 
suggest that during those 12 years there were occasions when it 
worked to the disadvantage of justice’.154 
 
The amendment was subsequently voted on in the House of Lords and then passed in 
favour of defendant anonymity: although the majority was marginal with those in 
favour only exceeding those against the amendment by 109 votes to 105 votes. 
 
Despite a favourable vote in the House of Lords, the amendment was removed by the 
House of Commons, following a vote whereby a far more substantial majority (338 
votes to 173) rejected the change.155 When the Bill was returned to the Lords once 
more Liberal Democrat peers made it clear that they would have proposed anonymity 
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once again, if it were not for fear that the entire Bill might fall apart.156 In asserting as 
much Baroness Noakes said: 
 
‘There have been many attempts to find a good legislative solution to 
the problem. All attempts have been comprehensively rejected by 
the Government. We continue to believe these issues are important. 
Defendant anonymity is important, especially in cases of sexual 
offences. We are genuinely disappointed that the Government have 
failed to find a solution with us to those very real issues. If the 
government had wanted to find a technically competent solution one 
could have been found, but they did not’. 157 
 
Despite intense discussions that took place during the passage of the SOB 2003 and 
the substantial support for Lord Akner’s proposed amendment for rape defendant 
anonymity, when the Sexual Offences Act (S0A) 2003 was eventually passed there 
would no anonymity provisions for rape defendants within it. 
 
2.1.12 Select Committee on Home Affairs Fifth Report, June 24th 2003158 
The SOB was entered into the House of Lords in early 2003, its purpose being to 
reform and modernise law on sexual offences that was considered out of date.159 In 
addition to the Bill’s standard passage through both Houses of Parliament, the Home 
Affairs Select Committee produced a report on the Bill, focusing on its most 
controversial provisions, making recommendations accordingly. Lord Akner’s proposed 
amendment was one of the issues upon which the report focused. 
 
The Committee began by comparing the lack of defendant anonymity in rape cases, 
compared with the anonymity provision for complainants and asked ‘whether this was 
a significant omission from the Bill?’ It was acknowledged that at the time, the 
Government was planning to reverse the amendment proposed by Lord Akner.160 
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Taking these factors into account, the Committee proceeded to analyse arguments for 
and against providing defendant anonymity in rape cases and sexual offences more 
generally. 161 
 
The Committee identified four main arguments against the extension of anonymity 
provisions to defendants. The first was the commonly cited principle of open justice 
‘with free and full reporting of what goes on in our criminal courts’, meaning that 
anonymity should be the exception and not the general rule. Secondly, whilst the 
reasons for complainant anonymity were compelling enough to require an exception 
to the rule, the same could not be said for defendants.162 Thirdly there was a need to 
treat defendants of sexual offence crimes in the same way as defendants of all other 
crimes. Finally it was contended that defendant anonymity hampered the police’s 
ability to investigate sexual crimes.163 On the latter point, reference was made to the 
successful conviction of serial rapist John Worboys, arguably only possible following 
public disclosure of his details which resulted in a number of other victims coming 
forward.164 
 
Notwithstanding the reasons as to why defendant anonymity should be withheld, the 
Committee also identified a number of counter arguments. It was noted that the 
Metropolitan Police were supportive of a limited anonymity for defendants in cases 
involving young children.165 The first argument was based on equality and the fact that 
only the complainant had anonymity, created an uneven playing field.166 Secondly, 
reference was made to the particularly devastating nature of being accused of a sexual 
offence such as rape, even when the defendant was found to be innocent.167 The 
suggestion being made was that being a rape or sexual offence defendant did amount 
to an exception to the principle of open justice.  Thirdly, the Committee made 
reference to the Metropolitan Police who stated that ‘current research indicates that 
between 5% and 7% of persons arrested for child abuse related offences commit 
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suicide’. The accuracy of that statement cannot be confirmed as no further explanation 
was given.168 Finally, the Committee considered whether complainant anonymity 
increased the risk of false allegations, and therefore merited protecting rape 
defendants with anonymity as well. Following consideration of the competing 
arguments the Committee concluded: 
 
‘On balance, we are persuaded by the arguments in favour of extending 
anonymity to the accused. Although there are valid concerns about the 
implications for the free reporting of criminal proceedings, we believe that 
sex crimes do fall “within an entirely different order” to most other crimes. 
In our view, the stigma that attaches to sexual offences-particularly those 
involving children-is enormous and the accusation alone can be 
devastating. If the accused is never charged, there is no possibility of the 
individual being publicly vindicated by an acquittal’.169 
 
The Committee also assessed, from when and until when the anonymity should 
operate. The options set out were firstly to restrict the provision to the pre-charge 
period (as suggested by the Metropolitan Police), secondly to apply the provision from 
charge to conviction (as had been the position following the SOA 1976, or thirdly it 
could apply from when the allegation was made until the time of conviction.170 Only 
the third option would provide the defendant with the adequate level of protection. 
However the Committee also acknowledged that this would restrict the principle of 
free reporting upon which our legal system is based.171 The extent to which the public 
had a right to know that an individual had been charged, but not convicted of any 
crime was also questioned.172 
 
Thus having taken all the competing arguments into account the Committee concluded 
that rape defendants should only be protected for a limited time between the 
allegation and official charge. This would allow ‘an appropriate balance between the 
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need to protect potentially innocent suspects from damaging publicity and the wider 
public interest in retaining free and full reporting of criminal proceedings’.173 
 
The Committee provided a generally detailed and coherent explanation as to why rape 
defendants should have limited anonymity but the government still chose not to 
accept its findings. The SOA 2003 would still receive royal assent later the same year, 
however it would not contain a section providing anonymity to rape or sexual offence 
defendants. 
 
2.1.13 The Sexual Offences Act 2003 
Whilst the SOA 2003 did not alter anonymity provisions in rape cases, it did reform the 
law on sexual offences in various ways. The majority of changes require no elaboration 
for the purposes of the current discussion. There was one reform that could be said to 
have eased the trial process for rape complainants to some degree: thus technically 
mitigating their need for anonymity. Following the earlier decision in Morgan, a 
defendant could raise a defence to rape if he was able to demonstrate that he held an 
honest, if irrational belief in the complainant’s consent. The belief was based on the 
defendant’s subjective viewpoint rather than what a reasonable person would 
objectively think in the same circumstances. The subjective nature of the defence 
meant it was difficult for prosecuting counsel to prove what the defendant claimed to 
have believed. The effect prima facie was that securing convictions became more 
difficult. 
 
The SOA 2003 s1(2) altered subjective belief in consent. The provision stated that that 
‘[W]hether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the 
circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents’.174 
The outcome of s1(2) is that belief now has to be based on an objective test, the 
theoretical benefits of which are twofold. Firstly it removes the possibility of a rape 
defendant successfully raising a defence to a rape charge based on his own subjective 
belief in the complainants consent, making it more difficult for a rape defendant to 
successfully raise a defence to a rape charge. Secondly, it eased the traumatic trial 
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experience on rape complainants to a small degree through the knowledge that there 
was an increased chance of seeing a guilty rapist convicted. Additionally, as suggested 
above, while SOA 2003 s1(2) only has a very limited impact on the anonymity debate, 
it does lower the merits in favour of rape complainant anonymity, if only to a negligible 
degree. 
 
2.1.14 The Independent Stern Report: A report of how rape complainants are 
handled by public authorities in England and Wales 
In March 2010 the Government commissioned Baroness Stern to report into how rape 
complainants were handled by public authorities in England and Wales.  This was in 
response to on-going concern over the percentage of rape cases resulting in 
convictions.175 The report did not contain a section dedicated to the subject of 
complainant and/or defendant anonymity in rape cases, but did discuss matters 
relevant to anonymity of each party. 
 
The Stern Report did not specifically discuss, review, or recommend any changes for 
complainant anonymity. Even so the report highlighted some important points which 
echoed and reaffirmed earlier concerns as to the vulnerability of complainants. By 
doing so it is argued that the Report highlighted the need to continue to maintain 
complainant anonymity in rape cases.  
 
The report stated that ‘[W]e heard from a wide range of experts that many of the 
victims of rape come from the most vulnerable groups in society’.176 It continued that: 
 
‘[I]n dealing with rape there is a range of priorities that needs to be 
balanced. Support and care for victims should be a high priority. The 
obligations the State has to those who have suffered a violent crime, 
and a crime that strikes at the whole concept of human dignity and 
bodily integrity, are much wider than working for the conviction of a 
perpetrator’.177 
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These statements were important since they focus on the need to protect vulnerable 
rape victims as a priority. One of the ways by which the complainant can be protected 
is through anonymity provisions which facilitate a more bearable journey through the 
court process. It therefore provides support for the continuing need to maintain 
complainant anonymity in rape cases.  
 
The subject of defendant anonymity arose during the Report in the context of 
complainants who made false rape allegations. Reference was made to a Court of 
Appeal decision where an appeal by a former nurse was dismissed. The sentence was 
passed after the defendant had falsely accused a man she met online of raping her. 
The Court of Appeal had rightly said that false allegations ‘damage conviction rates and 
are “terrifying” for innocent victims’.178 The Court had also referred to the speech of 
Lord Chief Justice Judge, in an earlier case involving a false rape allegation: 
 
‘It makes the offence harder to prove and, rightly concerned to avoid 
the conviction of an innocent man, a jury may find itself unable to be 
sufficiently sure to return a guilty verdict’.179 
 
Having acknowledged that false allegations of rape do exist, the report returned to an 
analysis of precisely how prevalent false allegations were. It was accepted that 
establishing an exact figure on the percentage of false allegations was extremely 
difficult due to discrepancies between data sets. Some research, suggested that 
around 8% to 10% of rape allegations were false. The legal profession was generally of 
the opinion that false allegations were very few. The Report quoted a Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer who said ‘I have been prosecuting for 20 years, and 
have prosecuted for a false allegation once’. The judiciary reported a similar very low 
frequency of cases occurring, whilst one senior police officer was said to have had 
come across two cases of false allegations in 15 years.180 
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The Stern Report examined the issue of false allegations and the need to provide rape 
defendants with anonymity in order to protect them.181 It was acknowledged that 
there had been calls to provide defendants in rape cases with anonymity until 
conviction182, and that the proposal was supported by the Home Affairs Select 
Committee in 2003. The most compelling reason the Report published was that if a 
defendant’s details were made public at the beginning of a trial, but upon completion 
of that trial the defendant was acquitted, then the case was considered no longer 
worthy of reporting.183  In such a case the defendant’s reputation was publicly 
tarnished at the outset, but he would not receive the public vindication at the end of 
the trial. On the other hand, it was suggested by those against awarding defendants 
anonymity, that acquittal at the end of the trial was vindication enough and that 
defendants of other crimes do not receive anonymity. 
 
Following a review of the arguments the Stern Report refrained from recommending 
rape defendant anonymity but did recommend that a full examination of the issues 
would be helpful. The Report suggested that the MoJ should publish an independent 
report detailing the frequency of false rape allegations in comparison to the 
prevalence of other false allegations in other crimes.184 
 
2.1.15 The Coalition Government proposed to extend anonymity in rape cases, May 
2010 
It is following the Stern Report that one arrives back at the most recent coalition 
proposals for defendant anonymity in rape cases in 2010. As the introductory analysis 
demonstrated, these proposals lacked well thought out reasoning by the Government. 
They also came before the Government had conducted the research into false 
allegations as recommended by Baroness Stern. Ultimately they offered no more 
clarity on the subject than any earlier proposals or deliberations and were duly 
dropped. The debate as to whether complainants and or defendants in rape cases (and 
potentially sexual offences more generally) should be provided with anonymity 
remains one of the most prevalent in recent decades. There are valid arguments both 
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in favour of and against anonymity for both parties. Some of these arguments were 
highlighted within the anonymity time-line.  
 
In the next section, the popular arguments pertaining to anonymity for rape 
complainants and defendants is clarified. Arguments in favour of rape complainant 
anonymity are given more discussion that those relating to defendant anonymity, due 
to their complexity. This does not necessitate that the arguments in favour of 
defendant anonymity, are of less merit. It will be this thesis submission that the crucial 
issue comes down to the need to balance the rights of each party. Until the 
Government, the legal profession, and society as a whole are able to reach a consensus 
on precisely where that balance should be, the topic of anonymity will repeatedly 
reappear as a contentious and unsolved legal problem. In order to address these 
difficulties a different approach must be taken when assessing the merits of party 
anonymity in rape cases.  
 
2.2 Rape anonymity: the arguments examined 
2.2.1 Complainant Anonymity 
Rape is a particularly heinous crime and the stigma attached to public knowledge of 
being a rape victim discourages women from reporting the offence and conviction 
rates are low. The argument of ‘making women feel more able to report the crime’ has 
often been cited during parliamentary debate by those in favour of rape complainant 
anonymity. Recent MoJ statistics also show that the number of rapes recorded has 
increased significantly during the last decade, a rise that some will attribute directly to 
complainant anonymity.185Yet notably there has been no corresponding rise in 
conviction rates. Evidence shows that conviction rates for rape have fallen significantly, 
from a conviction rate of 33% in 1977.186 They now remain exceptionally low despite 
an increase in rape allegations year on year.187 In 2009 conviction rates for rape were 
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found to be the lowest in Europe,188 or to emphasise the gravity of this statistic, 
bottom of 33 states.189 Conviction rates stood at 5.6% in England and Wales and 2.9% 
in Scotland,190 whereas by comparison France had a conviction rate of 25%.191 
 
These figures suggest that the arguments in favour of complainant anonymity are 
considerably more complex than simply ‘encouraging rape complainants to report the 
crime’. Arguments favouring rape complainant anonymity is actually based on a 
number of interrelated factors, with historical roots, but which continue to 
discriminate against rape complainants and women more generally today. Seemingly, 
the most damaging of these factors is the existence of ‘rape myths'. Rape myths are 
widely held societal expectations as to what is considered appropriate behaviour for 
women, what type of woman is capable of being a real rape victim and in what 
circumstances the rape should occur to be classed as rape. Temkin notes: 
 
‘[T]here is probably no other criminal offence that is intricately 
related to broader social attitudes and evaluation of the victim’s 
conduct as sexual assault. When confronted with an account of an 
alleged rape, individuals tend to respond to it against the backdrop of 
their personal beliefs and understandings about gender relationships 
in general, appropriate behaviour for men and women, and the rules 
and rituals of consensual interactions’.192 
 
With this in mind arguments are grouped in favour of rape complainant anonymity 
into two groups. The first focuses on the historical developments that have taken place 
and effected gender relations, whilst the second focuses on the rape myths. 
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2.2.2 Rape as violence and male power 
According to Brownmiller, the human species have developed a complex psychological 
system structured around the experience of pleasure.193 A man can potentially arouse 
the sexual interest of a woman at any time since his ‘psychological (sexual) urge’ is not 
dependent on her physiological readiness to mate. Brownmiller furthers that ‘[W]hat it 
all boils down to is that the human male can rape’.194 When a man realised his own 
ability to rape, his penis was established as a potent weapon of force against 
women.195Additionally a new power relationship, defined by sexuality was established 
between the sexes, where the male was dominant sex.196 
 
Rape and sexual violence have therefore reinforced gender inequality more 
generally.197 Rape is ‘nurtured’ in societies where the power struggle between the 
sexes remains prevalent.198 Biological differences, exemplified by man’s superior size 
and strength have only compounded the effect. To protect themselves from a man’s 
weapon of rape, women have been forced to submit to a male family member for 
protection and to guard her chastity.199 
 
A second consequence of men’s dominant position is that patriarchal legal systems 
have emerged. Laws were designed by men in the interests of men: the early law of 
rape being one example. Rape of a woman was considered a violation of her chastity 
and monogamy and an offence against the estate of the man whose charge she was 
under.200 
 
Today, the UK’s legal system has progressed beyond many such archaic laws, yet it is 
no less patriarchal or discriminatory towards women. Kennedy contends that the 
debate surrounding anonymity for rape defendants is one stark example of women’s 
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current legal inequality. She argues that whilst society would like to think that our law 
is a neutral set of rules, the reality is that the law is made by men and therefore could 
only ever become gender neutral if revised.201  Revision would need to include 
substantive equality, entailing treating people as equals while taking individual 
differences into account. Kennedy is implying that it is incorrect to base calls for 
defendant anonymity on the basis of a neutral legal system where parties receive 
equal treatment. This is because rape complainant anonymity does not place rape 
complainants in an advantageous position to rape defendants but only makes them 
substantially equal. This will be explained in more detail when arguments in favour of 
defendant anonymity are addressed. 
 
The link as to why gender discrimination and sexual violence per se amounts to an 
argument in favour of rape complainant anonymity may appear tenuous. A valid 
counter argument, often cited during the course of the anonymity debate is that many 
crimes are committed on the basis, of violence, discrimination and inequality.202 Why 
provide anonymity for rape victims but not victims of other crimes? It is conceded that 
the gender inequality and discrimination factors alone do not set rape complainants 
apart from victims of other crimes. However the distinction is made by the effect that 
the aforementioned factors have had in cultivating the rape myths that are so 
prevalent. Women become seen as subordinate, chaste beings, who are the objects of 
male sexual desire.  In particular, rape myths lay down unspoken criteria which must 
be satisfied in order for an offence to qualify as real rape.203 
 
2.2.3 Rape myths 
The effects of rape myths are multi-fold. Society stigmatises the majority of rape 
victims who do not conform to a given myth, degenerating and blaming them for what 
has happened.204 The victim’s behaviour before, during, and after the assault is 
analysed in order to evaluate her responsibility.205 A 2005 report prepared for Amnesty 
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International found that 29% of the people asked said women who failed to say no, 
were at least partially responsible for being raped, whilst 8% considered the victim 
totally responsible, 28% believed that a woman who acted in a flirtatious manner was 
partly responsible for being raped and 6% totally responsible, 26% believed that a 
woman who was drunk was at least partly responsible for being raped and 4% 
considered her totally responsible.206 The consequence of societal prejudice is that it 
discourages rape victims from reporting crime: it affects the victim’s experience of and 
treatment throughout the judicial process and adversely affects the chances of a 
(guilty) defendant being successfully convicted in court.207 It can also be linked to the 
disproportionately high attrition rates in rape cases, 208the consequence of which is 
that only about 6% of reported rapes will secure a conviction in court.209 
 
Rape myths are compounded by ‘social scripts’: mental representations that allow 
individuals to explain certain outcomes through logical sequences of events.210 This 
includes the belief that if a woman dresses in a certain way, or exhibits certain forms 
of behaviour then she is likely to get raped, rather than accepting that a fellow human 
being is capable of such a crime. Kennedy reinforces this argument stating that [M]yths 
are not the same as lies, in that they do not involve deliberate falsification. They 
endure because they serve social needs’.211Ironically, by supporting rape myths, 
individuals are putting themselves at greater risk of becoming rape victims themselves, 
whilst some rapists remain at large. Worryingly individuals involved in all areas of the 
legal process, are no less susceptible to rape myths and social scripts. 
 
2.2.3.1 The real rape scenario   
The first rape myth concerns the scenario required for a rape to be considered ‘real’. It 
involves an attack by a violent stranger, in a dark street, late at night, where a chaste 
lady struggles to defend herself. She receives bodily injury and reports the offence to 
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the police immediately afterwards.212 This is the typical scenario imagined when 
people think of rape attacks and any deviation acts against the victim. Research has 
suggested that the likelihood of a rape defendant being charged with the crime of rape 
increased with the extent to which a rape victim and attack conformed to this 
stereotypical ideal.213 The individual components of this scenario all act adversely on 
the decision of a victim to report the crime, or for a reported crime to end in a 
conviction. 
 
The situational context of this first rape myth is at odds with the more common setting 
for a rape: somewhere private such as the home. The defendant is likely to be 
someone known to the victim, a husband, boyfriend, work colleague or ex-partner. 
However it is estimated that in approximately 80% of rape cases the defendant is 
known to the complainant.214 Unfortunately the closer the relationship between the 
defendant and victim, the less likely a conviction is to occur.215 In court the familiarity 
of a relationship is considered to be a mitigating circumstance, making the offence less 
serious. The Court of Appeal was of this opinion in R v Diggle (1995) where Evans LJ 
referred to : 
 
‘The two extremes of violent rape or attempted rape between 
strangers, and intercourse without a girl’s consent on a particular 
occasion after she had consented previously or indicated that she 
might consent’.216 
 
The second component refers to the type of individual a real rape victim is. She should 
be a ‘chaste, sensible, responsible, cautious (and) dependant’ woman.217 This notion 
reinforces the aforementioned construct of a woman as naturally vulnerable and 
physically weak compared her male counterpart. The real rape victim foresees any 
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level of risk of sexual assault and takes all precautions to avoid an attack. She modifies 
her behaviour to avoid unwanted sexual encounters with men, fearing she may 
become ‘out of control’ whilst anticipating the male’s natural ‘sexual domination and 
prowess.218 
 
When the woman does not conform to this ideal, whether that be dressing, or acting 
in a particular way, or having consumed alcohol or drugs prior to the reported event, 
she is seen as responsible for her own rape.219 Whilst society has modernised in many 
ways, views of what is considered appropriate behaviour for females is still reminiscent 
of those held in previous centuries. Non-conformity instantly poses problems for a 
successful prosecution in court. Barristers representing both the defence and 
prosecution in rape trials often view rape complainants in a very negative light. 
Defence barristers in particular tended to be of the opinion that non-stereotypical rape 
complainants sabotaged their own efforts in court. They distinguished between 
women who were outwardly respectable and those who were not, at times using very 
uncomplimentary language to describe these individuals. When questioned, one 
barrister said ‘It would be useful if they could sit down without showing their knickers’. 
Another commented that juries ‘were not very good (at convicting) when somebody 
can be depicted as a slut’.220 
 
A woman who is intoxicated through alcohol or drugs attracts particular stigma. 
According to Lee, drink and drugs are considered especially potent factors used to 
discredit the complainant, whilst in parallel demonstrating the double standards of the 
judicial system. She states: 
 
‘The use of alcohol and drugs carries different meanings for men and 
women. For men heavy drinking serves to enhance their male status, 
it signifies “real manhood”. For women, on the other hand, alcohol 
carries the taint of immorality and promiscuity.’ 221 
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A previously promiscuous victim is also likely to face difficulties when being cross-
examined in court. Her previous sexual encounters will be used to suggest she 
consented to sexual intercourse at the time of the alleged offence. Jurors set a low 
threshold for what they consider promiscuous behaviour222, as have senior members 
of the jury. In R v Brown (1989) the Court of Appeal found that on the facts of the case 
the complainant‘s behaviour was ‘near the borderline’ of promiscuous, since she had 
had sex with her boyfriend as well as having had a child with another man.223 As 
discussed in the previous section, whilst legislation was implemented to restrict the 
use of cross-examination regarding sexual history evidence in sexual offence cases,224 a 
subsequent House of Lords judgment has effectively rendered that legislative provision 
ineffective.225 (See chapter 2.1.10 for further discussion). 
 
The real rape scenario includes a requirement that the attack should have resulted in 
physical injury in order to amount to ‘real rape’, which is equally counter-intuitive. 
However victims of rape and sexual violence often don’t respond in this manner. Many 
remain still and quiet because they are too shocked and fearful to cry out. Others 
remain unresponsive as a means of self-preservation, where resisting could result in 
greater physical harm being inflicted upon them.226 
 
Any deviation from these requirements will be used to contend that the victim was 
actually consenting. 227  If in these circumstances a rape case does reach the 
circumstantial requirements, then the potential to argue that a complainant was not a 
‘real rape victim’228 is facilitated through criminal burden of proof. The prosecution 
must persuade the jury that the defendant is guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, in 
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order to find him guilty.229 Proof beyond all reasonable doubt is inherently difficult to 
demonstrate if there are no witnesses to the act. It makes it easier for defence counsel 
to plant doubt in the minds of the jury, as to the defendant’s guilt, when conducting 
their examination in chief. Jurors are no less susceptible to rape myths than other 
member of the public. Ellison and Munro acknowledge that this is especially 
problematic: 
 
‘In rape trials in England and Wales, it is largely a matter for the jury-
applying their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of 
human nature and modern behaviour to determine the absence of 
complainant defence and to assess the reasonableness of any belief 
in consent harboured by the defendant, which constitute the key 
grounds for criminal liability’.230 
 
Finally a victim of the ‘real rape’ scenario will be hysterical and tearful in the aftermath 
of a rape and they will make a complaint to the police at the earliest possible 
opportunity. In fact, victims are often deeply affected by the rape and may suffer from 
what has been termed rape trauma syndrome. In contrast to the expected reaction a 
rape trauma syndrome sufferer may actually mask their feelings, appearing calm and 
even relatively composed. 231 Even when a rape victim does demonstrate an outwardly 
acute reaction to being raped it might be a period of time before they feel able to 
report the rape to the police, if at all. Furthermore, a rape victim may feel a range of 
emotions following an attack. These include feelings of fear of reprimand by the rapist, 
shame, guilt, self-blame, humiliation and degradation.232 All of these can act to further 
forestall a victim’s decision to report a rape to the police. Our judicial system is so 
concerned with the need to evidence a recent complaint that a special rule has been 
made. Usually evidence of a previous statement is not admissible in court since it 
serves no purpose. Yet the rules in rape cases are different, and if the victim tells 
someone at the earliest opportunity, then it is deemed admissible. The effect of the 
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special rule is to suggest that a woman who makes an early complaint is likely to be 
telling the truth, whereas a victim, who only complains later due to the trauma of the 
event, is more likely to be under suspicion of having made a false allegation.233 
 
2.2.3.2 All women secretly want to be raped  
A second prevalent rape myth focuses on the erroneous idea that all women secretly 
want to be raped and fanaticise about the situation:234 that women have a secret 
desire to be ravished.235  It is reinforced by male notions of power and superiority, and 
is in the male’s interest to rape and therefore it is in the male psyche that it should 
naturally be in the name of femininity that women also want to be raped. This myth 
has its roots in the gender power imbalance and according to Brownmiller ‘is more 
than arrogant insensitivity, it is the belief in the supreme rightness of male power’.236 
 
As Meyer points out, there is a stark contrast between situations of fantasy and of 
reality. Whilst any individual, male or female may have sexual fantasies, they are in 
control of every aspect, ranging from the circumstances to the seducer’s 
characteristics. By comparison in rape the victim has no control.237 Rape is not an 
enjoyable situation but a terrifying and degrading experience.238  By expounding the 
myth that all women want to be raped the blame is refocused from the defendant 
onto the victim, reinforcing societies’ belief that a rape victim is somehow ‘guilty’ for 
being raped. 
 
2.2.3.2 Women commonly make false allegations  
The final myth is that rape complainants make numerous false allegations and can’t be 
trusted to tell the truth. Common reasons given as to why complainants make false 
allegations include revenge, fearing parents, or having cheated on a husband or 
partner. 239 Bourne argues, there are a number of embarrassing and intrusive personal 
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reasons to deter a woman from making false allegations.240 They include personal 
examination, questioning by the police, and subjection to potentially humiliating cross-
examination in court. In 1982 a fly-on-the-wall series of documentaries was broadcast, 
following the work of the Thames Valley Police. In one episode ‘a Complaint of Rape’, 
viewers were shocked over the brutality of police officers being filmed interrogating 
rape victims. One woman who had suffered from psychiatric illness in the past alleged 
she had been raped by three men. The response of the three male offices present was 
to bully the woman before dismissing her story completely: one of the officers even 
telling her that ‘This is the biggest bollocks I’ve ever heard’. 241  Another example, 
whilst coming from a 1982 case, aptly demonstrates some of the judicial attitudes 
towards rape. Judge Richards considered that a woman was contributory negligent for 
her own rape on the basis that she had been alone at night and a hitchhiker. In those 
circumstances the judge considered that a fine was a suitable punishment for the 
rapist.242 
 
Actual figures showing the number of false reports in rape cases have varied 
considerably between research studies. This has been attributed to their being no 
‘official’ definition of rape. Consequently police forces and prosecutors have employed 
different criteria to define what amounts to false allegations. 243 There was a tendency 
to equate complainant withdrawals and retractions with evidence of false 
allegations.244 On this point Kelly et al. acknowledge that ‘a culture of suspicion 
remains within the police’ and consequently ‘this reproduces an investigative culture 
in which elements that might permit a designation of a false complaint are 
emphasised’.245 Using fluid definitions, false complaint rates are estimated to be 
around 12%.  Evidence used of a false complaint for statistical purposes includes, the 
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absence of physical injury, forensic evidence, witnesses to corroborate with the 
complainant246 and intoxication of the complainant. These definitions only reinforce 
and reflect the other rape myths, so damaging to rape victims and inhibit the process 
of rape cases through the CJS.  There has been a misunderstanding that ‘no criming’ of 
an offence indicates that it is a false complaint.247 By comparison, using a much 
narrower definition based only on malicious complaints, the estimated level is 3%248 
 
Discrepancies between estimated figures for false allegations render it difficult to 
accurately compare false rape allegations to false allegation statistics for other types of 
crime. One comparison that can be made is with grievous bodily harm (GBH),where 
false allegations were estimated at 2%. Whilst this is lower than both estimates for 
rape (and considerably lower than the higher estimate of 12%) it has been pointed out 
the differences in crime type could account for these differences. GBH is a crime where 
physical injuries are usually present, in combination with other evidence and witnesses. 
The presence of varying forms of evidence forms the basis for prosecution in the 
majority of crimes. Rape is unusual since physical injury may be absent and there are 
often no witnesses to corroborate what the complainant is saying.249Seemingly since 
these elements are often seen as indicative of false allegations it should not be 
unexpected that false allegation levels in rape cases appear inflated. As with any crime, 
some level of false allegations in rape cases are inevitable. It should not be assumed 
that such allegations are necessarily made maliciously but rather, as some evidence 
has suggested, could be indicative of underlying problems meaning the individual 
actually requires additional support.250 
 
It is through a combination of these factors that the need for rape complainant 
anonymity has arisen and has guided the development of related legislative provisions 
in recent decades. By comparison the granting of defendant anonymity has 
undoubtedly been the more openly contested element in the anonymity debate.  
                                                          
246
 The compulsory corroboration warning was abolished by the POA 1994, s33 but the discretion to 
provide a corroboration warning remains as confirmed in R v Makanjuola[1995] 3 ALL ER 730. 
247
 MoJ (n 20) 14: No criming an offence literally means that the incident is recorded as no offence 
having been committed.  
248
 Burton (n243).  
249
 Burton (n243) 21. 
250
 MoJ (n20). 
63 
 
 
2.2.4 Defendant anonymity 
Whilst arguments in favour of defendant anonymity are less numerous and rape 
defendants do not have anonymity at present, they do not have have less merit. 
 
2.2.4.1 Rape is more severe than other crimes 
The first argument in favour of rape defendant anonymity is that rape as a crime is 
more severe than other crimes. Consequently defending a rape allegation is more 
severe than defending allegations in other crimes.251 If and to what extent this is so 
remains contested. On the one hand Dominic Grieve argued that ‘precisely because 
the issues [of a rape allegation] may be so difficult to resolve it leaves a taint [against a 
defendant] that may be as damaging as it is undeserved’.252 Support can be found 
through reference to the aforementioned instances where rape defendants have taken 
their own lives following the accusation. It is questioned to what extent the same is 
applicable to defendants in a number of other serious crimes such as murder or fraud. 
Caroline Flint MP said that she found no credibility in the argument that: 
 
‘Rape is uniquely devastating,  [to defendants] in a way that being 
accused of domestic violence, murder, sexually abusing children, or 
even defrauding a popular charity are not’.253 
 
Baroness Walmsley contended the very reason rape defendants were different was 
because of the media coverage involved. ‘Murderers and shoplifters unless they are 
movie stars do not have the same amount of coverage from the press as possible 
rapists’.254The strength of Baroness Walmsley’s reasoning appears weak, seemingly 
made on the basis of personal opinion and not evidentially substantiated. 
 
An alternative approach which furthered the position for defendant anonymity was 
put forward by Michael Ellis MP, who advocated that providing defendants with 
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anonymity would not mean they were treated differently in a number of respects. In 
the first instance he stated that defendant anonymity was withheld in numerous 
criminal cases involving minors on a daily basis. He accepted that the principle related 
to young people but that nevertheless it did exist.255 The implication was that 
providing defendant anonymity per se would not mark a fundamental change in the 
law. Notwithstanding this point he also added that rape was different from other 
offences on the basis that the allegations revolved around a question of consent. In 
contrast to other offences there often lacked additional physical evidence to support 
an allegation.256 Similar reasoning was given in a recent MoJ report which considered 
why false rape allegations appeared inflated. By analogy, the suggestion in relation to 
rape defendants is that lack of physical evidence makes rape allegations harder to 
disprove. 
 
2.2.4.2 Equality with rape complainants  
A second argument in favour of defendant anonymity in rape cases is one of equality 
before the law. The law should be ‘tit for tat’, 257  and rape complainants and 
defendants should receive equal treatment in the legal process. Anonymity provisions 
for one party should be matched by anonymity provisions for the other. This argument 
has been put forward on a number of occasions during parliamentary debates, 
including when Mr Burley said ‘[I]f we are singling out this particular area of the 
criminal justice system for special treatment, why should it not apply equally to both 
men and women?’258 
 
Televised research involving mock jury deliberations has suggested that 
notwithstanding anonymity provisions, it is the rape defendant who is at a legal 
disadvantage compared with the rape complainant. The view of one juror was 
summed up by Rape Crisis Scotland who reflected that: 
 
‘[A] wrong decision would be more serious if found against the 
defendant as it would destroy a young man’s future, whereas if the 
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decision was the wrong one and found him to be innocent, the wrong 
committed against the woman is already in her past and therefore 
somehow less of a consideration’.259 
 
Assessing the merits of an argument on the basis of whether the harm is prospective 
of retrospective is erroneous. Doing so would fail to take into account factors including 
the interests of justice, public safety and public interest. Added to which, as long ago 
as the Helibron Report it was argued that the rape defendant’s equality was with 
defendants in other crimes and not with the rape complainant.260 
 
Even if the defendant’s equality did lie with that of the complainant, women’s legal 
inequality combined with the severe stigma faced by rape complainants means formal 
equality would not ensure justice was done. Baroness Kennedy reinforced the point 
stating: 
 
‘We have come to understand that formal equality does not do 
justice. To create formal equality and not take account of the 
inequalities in our society beyond the courtroom door creates 
greater injustice. To treat as equal those who are unequal only 
creates further injustice’.261 
 
Effective equality requires equal treatment whilst taking into account differences.262 In 
terms of sexual offence laws, that may require anonymity for rape complainants but 
not rape defendants. 
 
2.2.4.3 Innocent Until Proven Guilty 
The final argument in favour of rape defendant anonymity is based on the idea that all 
defendants have the right to be innocent until proven guilty: a fundamental principle 
of our domestic legal system. This was reinforced by Rehman Chrishti MP who stated: 
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‘the concept that “mud sticks” is alive and kicking [in relation to being 
accused of rape]….[defendants] deserve some measure of protection, 
as I believe we still have a system of justice in this country, of which 
we are justly proud, in which the accused is innocent until proven 
guilty’. 
 
Indeed one would assume there are few individuals who would disagree with this 
statement. This right still has to be balanced against other competing arguments, both 
those in relation to rape complainant anonymity and those against rape defendant 
anonymity. Prima facie the aforementioned arguments suggest a need to limit this 
principle, whilst mitigating negative impact on an innocent rape defendant, through 
acquittal at trial. The positive outcome of withholding defendant anonymity is most 
notable in cases of serial rapists, such as John Worboys. It is sometimes following the 
arrest of a rape defendant that his name is publicised and other women come forward 
to make their own complainants against the same man, resulting in a conviction.263 
This is particularly beneficial where the original complainant lacks sufficient evidence 
to ensure a conviction in court.  
 
Analysis of the arguments in favour of and against party anonymity in rape cases 
suggest that the balance falls in favour of maintaining complainant anonymity whilst 
withholding it from defendants. Nevertheless the arguments overlap significantly, 
consequently lacking in clarity, and ensuring that opinion on the anonymity debate 
remains divided. One important issue that does arise in any debate involving 
anonymity is why these provisions should be deemed necessary when they directly 
conflict with a fundamental principle of our legal system: the principle of open 
justice.264 
 
2.3 The ‘need’ for anonymity: justifying a circumvention of the principle of open 
justice 
The meaning of ‘open justice’ was recently given by Lord Neuberger when he said: 
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‘[W]e live in a country which is committed to the rule of law. Central 
to that commitment is that justice is done in public – that what goes 
on in court and what the court decides is open to scrutiny’.265 
 
His Lordship added the importance of open justice was reflected in the role it plays in 
supporting the rule of law. By allowing public scrutiny of the judiciary it ensures that 
judges ‘do justice according to the law,266 and that public confidence in the domestic 
court system is preserved.267 In turn this supports our liberal democracy.268 Open 
justice is an equally important principle under the ECHR Article 6(1)269 as incorporated 
into UK domestic law via the HRA 1998.270 
 
How then could any discussion relating to anonymity in a rape case become anything 
more than a moot point? The answer is found in that despite the importance of open 
justice, it is not an absolute principle.271 To make it so would potentially undermine 
effective administration of justice and the UK’s legal system in certain cases. For 
example, in cases where state security is concerned or cases involving vulnerable 
witnesses.272 Instead in given circumstances, the principle of open justice may be 
limited and public access to legal proceedings denied.273 This principle was upheld in a 
recent case where the UK Supreme Court held that (in limiting open justice) ‘it is for 
the legislature to consider and introduce, as it has done in certain specific classes of 
case, where it considers it appropriate to do so’.274 
 
It should be noted that discussions relating to open justice refer specifically to the 
courtroom process. When there is a compelling need to limit the principle of open 
justice the limitation could extend outside the confines of the courtroom. In some 
instances not imposing limitations would prevent justice being administered effectively. 
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It would include the pre-trial stages of the legal process and even extend after formal 
legal proceedings had finished. The latter instance refers more to the situation where 
media reporting on aspects of a specific case, could inhibit effective justice being done 
in future cases of a similar class. These considerations will become integral to later 
discussions relating to anonymity in rape cases. 
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Chapter 3 Article 3 Rights and anonymity 
3.1 Introduction 
Article 3 of the ECHR, as enshrined in domestic law by the HRA 1998275 states that 
‘[N]o one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. Article 3 is one of the most succinct provisions contained within the 
convention, a fact detracting from its true complexity276 and scope to apply in wide 
ranging situations.277 It is also an absolute human right and places strict obligations 
upon the state to protect citizens from potential breaches. The state must ensure this 
by taking preventative measures and/or positive steps, such as implementing effective 
domestic legislation, as is necessary.278 Article 3 cannot be derogated from under any 
circumstances, 279 as affirmed by the ECtHR in the Chalal case. It was held that: 
 
‘[I]n cases such as the present the Court’s examination of the 
existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous 
one, in view of the absolute character of art 3 and the fact that it 
enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe’.280 
 
The focus of this chapter is to analyse whether withholding anonymity from either 
party in a rape case could breach their human rights under Article 3. Prima facie it 
appears that the Article’s wording excludes all but a rare class of heinous acts.281 It has 
been argued that the threshold necessary, to amount to a breach of Article 3, should 
not be set at such a low level that it renders torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
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‘commonplace’.282  Therefore something as comparatively common as being subject to 
public scrutiny during legal proceedings for rape would be unlikely to amount to a 
breach of Article 3. In furtherance of this argument it is conceded that to date, there 
have been no specific ECtHR cases concerning a similar factual scenario.    
 
Nevertheless the potential for an increase in the scope of Article 3’s ambit is evident. It 
has been posited that Article 3 represents a ‘pre-existing European legal tradition 
against torture’ that is imbedded within national legal systems.283 The ECtHR has 
stated that the convention should be interpreted in a vibrant, progressive manner, 
capable of reflecting changing social norms, such as fluctuating standards of 
acceptable behaviour.284 Guidance of a corresponding nature, intended to assist the 
judiciary and prosecutors in the correct implementation of human rights, also 
establishes that Article 3 encompasses a wide range of assaults on human dignity and 
integrity285 with emphasis being placed on the concept of dignity,286 especially where 
institutional force is used.287 
 
The requirement that the convention is interpreted in a vibrant, progressive manner 
has been reinforced specifically in relation to Article 3.288 In Pretty v UK the court said 
that: 
 
‘in light of the fundamental importance of Article 3, the court has 
reserved itself sufficient flexibility to address the application of that 
article under other situations that might arise’.289 
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One of the most prominent examples of Article 3’s ability to adapt to changing social 
norms was when the ECtHR first found that rape could amount to torture.290 
 
It is proven that Article 3 can adapt to address new circumstances. Thus it is suggested 
that if the requisite criteria were met, there is no reason preventing the ECtHR from 
finding that being the subject of public scrutiny during criminal legal proceedings for 
rape, breached an individual’s Article 3 human rights. This chapter analyses the 
possibility of such a ruling by the ECtHR in relation to both rape complainants and 
defendants. The analysis draws upon earlier debates in chapter two, particularly those 
focused on the psychological effect that being a rape complainant or defendant could 
have on an individual.291 
 
3.2 The distinct components of Article 3 
Article 3 is composed of five distinct elements: torture, inhuman, degrading, treatment 
and punishment.292 The former three are distinct but related components,293 referring 
to the gravity of the Article 3 breach and representing a hierarchy of the harm suffered 
by an individual.294 There is some difficulty in ascertaining where the ‘entry’ threshold 
for Article 3 is and where the distinguishing factors for each of the components sit.  295 
 
A finding of torture constitutes the greatest severity and inhuman or degrading 
relatively less so.296 The latter two elements refer to the type of act/omission inflicted 
upon the individual. Notably most acts breaching Article 3 concern ‘treatment’ but 
there are some circumstances that would more correctly be termed as ‘punishment’. 
An example is where an individual is repeatedly punished and prosecuted for the same 
offence297 or punishment is arbitrary and disproportionate.298 For ease of discussion, 
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this thesis refers to ‘treatment’ as a generic term for both treatment and punishment 
throughout this chapter.  
 
When any Article 3 breach is alleged, the first criterion to be met is that the treatment 
is of great enough severity to breach Article 3.299 This is known as the de minimis 
rule300 and will vary depending on whether it is torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment that is being alleged. The criteria are actually less clear than one might at 
first assume since there is no clear threshold of severity that is universally applicable in 
all Article 3 cases. The European Commission emphasised this in the Greek Case when 
it held that each case had to be decided on its own facts since what would be 
considered cruel or excessive would vary between societies and even within different 
sections of them.301 
 
The second point is that Article 3 consists of both objective and subjective 
components.302 The potential utility of a subjective component, in the context of the 
current debate is important as it focuses attention on the victim’s interpretation of the 
alleged breach. 303  Prima facie this allows greater scope for extending the 
circumstances where an Article 3 breach may arise.  
 
The subjective element will be important in the context of a rape case, for both rape 
complainants and defendants. The suffering caused to the individual may not include 
physical damage but has the potential to cause severe psychological suffering 
throughout the course of legal proceedings. 304 However in parallel to the landmark 
decision of the ECtHR that first held that rape could amount to torture, 305 the Court 
has become been more explicit and restrictive in its criteria for what can constitute 
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torture.306 To some extent this will have a limiting effect upon any extension of Article 
3’s ambit to include anonymity for either party in a rape case.   
 
In ascertaining whether or not the requisite threshold has been met, the ECtHR in 
Ireland v UK, stated that: 
 
‘[Any assessment on the level of severity] depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as nature and context of the 
treatment, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some 
circumstances, the sex, age, and state of health of the victim’.307 
 
The authority of Ireland correlates with the subjective component of the Article 3 
ambit and leaves further flexibility in the context of anonymity in rape cases for the 
purpose of individual differences. 
 
One should not forget that an individual must also satisfy an objective component of 
Article 3 in order for a breach of that Article to be found. It is submitted that the 
‘objective’ element is the act or omission, that, when considered together, any 
requisite subjective element, has the potential to amount to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Below the individual elements of Article 3 are analysed briefly in 
turn. The purpose of doing so is twofold. It enables the reader to understand the 
threshold’s necessary to constitute a breach of Article 3 and will provide a point of 
reference, against which a rape complainant’s and defendant’s Article 3 rights, in 
relation to the anonymity debate, can be discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Torture  
The most severe form of an Article 3 breach is torture, as confirmed by Article 1 of the 
United Nations Convention on Torture and partly endorsed by the ECtHR in the case of 
Akkoc v Turkey.308 
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There is no set definition of torture but rather an ‘approach’ which it has been argued 
is equally applicable to ‘inhuman and degrading’ treatment or punishment.309 When 
considering what amounts to torture, the ECtHR has made reference to the definition 
contained within Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture310. This 
definition asserts that torture contains three essential components: ‘severe [mental or 
physical] suffering’, that the pain is ‘intentionally inflicted’ and that the act or omission 
is carried out for a specific purpose.311 
 
In deciding whether a particular type of action amounts to torture, emphasis has been 
placed on both the intensity and purpose of the act/omission in question. The court in 
Selmouni furthered the principle stating that ‘the convention should, by means of this 
distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very 
serious and cruel suffering’.312 Whilst an assessment of the act/omission would always 
be dependent upon all the circumstances of the case, there are always some acts that 
would be shocking and degrading for anyone, irrespective of their condition.313 The 
purposive nature of the act might include the intention to adduce information through 
confession, or the infliction of punishment.314 
 
One may question how the excerpt from the ECtHR’s judgment in Seloumi translates in 
practical terms to findings of torture. In the Greek Case, acts that included mock 
executions, threats to kill victims, heavy beatings, falanga beatings,315 electric shock 
treatment and threats to kill victims amounted to torture.316 In Aksoy v Turkey the 
victim had been subjected to a ‘Palestinian hanging’ (stripping the victim naked, tying 
arms behind their backs, and then hanging them by their arms),317 whilst in Aydin v 
                                                          
309
 Evans (n295) 365, 369. 
310
 See for example Selmouni v France [1999] ECHR 25803/94 para. 97; Akkoç (n308); Salman v Turkey 
(2002) 34 EHRR 17, para. 114. 
311
 United Nations convention on Torture, Article 1, which came into force on 26
th
 June 1987. 
312
 Selmouni(n310) para. 96: Notably this statement reflects the wording of Resolution 3452 (xxx) of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations which states that torture is ‘any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted’. 
313
 Selmouni(n310) para. 103. 
314
 Reidy (n285) 14. 
315
 An act involving beating the soles of a victim’s feet repeatedly. 
316
 Greek Case (n 93). 
317
 Aksoy v Turkey (2000) 34 EHRR 1388. 
75 
 
 
Turkey318 the victim was raped whilst in police custody. In both of these cases the 
ECtHR concluded that torture had occurred. 
 
In order to avoid further unnecessary explanation, it is asserted that by analogy to the 
aforementioned cases, being a rape complainant or defendant in legal proceedings for 
rape would not amount to the finding of torture in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
It is accepted that an unfortunate consequence of our domestic legal process, is that 
both victims and defendants in any criminal case may suffer humiliation as a result. 
That humiliation may be exacerbated where there is publicity surrounding the case. 
Yet it cannot be said that it is the purpose of our domestic, judiciary, the executive, or 
the legislature to inflict such suffering. Rather it is the opposite, to ensure that legal 
proceedings are open, impartial, and that justice is done for the parties involved.319 For 
these reasons, it is unnecessary to consider a possible finding of torture further in 
relation to the anonymity debate. That does not mean, that lack of anonymity for 
either party in a rape case, could not still be found to be inhuman or degrading 
treatment in breach of Article 3: this is due to the relatively less serious nature of those 
elements of Article 3. 
 
3.2.2 Inhuman 
Treatment or punishment may amount to a finding of ‘inhuman’ treatment where it 
causes ‘intense physical or mental suffering’.320 As was acknowledged earlier in this 
chapter, the overall threshold of severity is lower for inhuman treatment than 
torture. 321  Notwithstanding the relatively lower threshold, an extreme level of 
suffering is still required in order to meet the de minimis rule for a finding of inhuman 
treatment in breach of Article 3. Examples of cases where the threshold has been met 
include where a detained suspect has been subject to kicking, biting and slapping by 
police, 322  the individual has been caused severe psychiatric disturbances during 
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interrogation, 323 or the individual has been subjected to intense and purposeful 
violence when arrested and in the period directly following arrest.324 
 
3.2.3 Degrading treatment 
Alternatively, treatment may breach Article 3 because it is degrading. It has been 
asserted that treatment is degrading if it: 
 
‘[A]rouses in the victim a feeling of fear, anguish and inferiority, 
capable of humiliating and debasing the victim and possibly breaking 
his/her moral resistance 325whether the object of the treatment was 
to debase, and whether it adversely affected his or her personality in 
a manner incompatible with Article 3’.326 
 
In order for treatment to become degrading, the level of humiliation must go distinctly 
beyond the level inherent in any form of punishment,327 although the ECtHR will 
consider all the circumstances of the case when formulating its judgment.328 Examples 
of behaviour amounting to degrading treatment include racial harassment,329 forcing a 
suspect to remain in clothing soiled by his own defecation,330  and the forced 
administration of emetics to an individual suspected of having swallowed bagged 
drugs.331 
 
In the context of the current debate it is interesting to note that the majority of cases 
that come before the ECtHR and concern inhuman and degrading treatment are 
decided on a fact specific basis. This is as opposed to the ECtHR basing its’ decisions 
upon points of general applicability 332  and evidences the Courts own previous 
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assertion that it retains the flexibility to apply Article 3 to new situations.333 It has also 
been demonstrated in practical terms by recent judgments such as X v Turkey:334a 
highly significant case as it was the first time in which the court found treatment that 
was based upon the applicant’s sexual orientation to be inhuman and degrading, 
contrary to Article 3. It is suggested that there are practical implications for the proven 
flexibility of Article 3’s application in relation to the anonymity debate. Namely that 
there is no bar per se to the ECtHR concluding that lack of anonymity for either rape 
complainants or defendants, throughout the legal process could amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. The likelihood of the ECtHR making such a 
finding is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
3.3 The complainant’s Article 3 human rights 
The question to be considered now is whether, if anonymity were withheld from rape 
complainants, it would be likely to cause them inhuman or degrading treatment in 
breach of their Article 3 human rights. In light of previous discussions, it is not 
proposed to consider a possible finding of torture in relation to a rape complainant’s 
(or defendant’s) Article 3 human rights due to the purpose and exceptional intensity 
required.335 That is not to detract from the suffering that being a rape complainant 
may cause but rather an acknowledgement that ‘torture’ is reserved for rare acts/ 
omissions of an exceptionally grave nature, rather than being ‘commonplace’.336 By 
comparison any stress and suffering caused through being a rape complainant in legal 
proceedings is a common event. 
 
Precisely what the impact of being a rape complainant in legal proceedings, could have 
on an individual, was considered in chapter two.337 It is suggested that the most 
important of those impacts, in relation to a rape complainant’s Article 3 rights are rape 
myths. More specifically it is societies’ perception of the majority of rape complainants 
who do not conform to the widely held rape myths and the psychological impact that 
this can have on rape complainants as a result. The problem is summarised by the 
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statement of Temkin, who as previously noted states that ‘there is probably no other 
criminal offence that is intrinsically related to broader social attitudes and evaluation 
of the victim’s conduct as sexual assault’.338 
 
The impact upon rape complainants has been shown to potentially affect that 
complainant from the time the complaint was made, during legal process and in its 
aftermath. Some victims have suffered from rape trauma syndrome as a result of the 
act against them.339 A frequently cited result of having been subjected to rape, is that 
victims will experience a ‘second assault’.340 The second assault is the means through 
which rape complainants are ‘embarrassed, doubted and abused by the institutions 
that process them’. It is argued that this can include all aspects of the legal process, 
ranging from how the complainant is treated by police officers investigating their 
complaint, through to their treatment during examination in the courtroom. 341 
Complainants may also feel isolated from their wider communities, making 
psychological recovery difficult.342 
 
It is argued firstly, that there are virtually no other crimes where the potential impact 
upon a complainant can be so severe. Secondly, that it is precisely this heightened 
treatment or degradation that a rape complainant may feel that sets them apart from 
complainants of other crimes. Partial support from this thesis submission is inferred 
from the fact that rape complainants have had anonymity for more than 30 years, 
whereas victims of other crimes have not.343 It is however acknowledged that suffering 
of complainants is only part of the reason that anonymity was provided.344 
 
To further compound the difficulties faced by rape complainants, the nature of a rape 
offence means that it usually occurs in private, where there are rarely witnesses to 
collaborate different versions of events. Therefore in a rape case, where the central 
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issue is one of consent to sexual intercourse, that consent must be one person’s word 
against another’s. Despite the POA 1994 s33 having removed the requirement for 
judges to give a corroboration warning against the complainant,345 it is inevitable that 
lack of corroboration causes evidential and burden of proof issues. In a criminal case 
the prosecution have to prove the defendant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt to 
secure a conviction. As a consequence the jury acquits many defendants due to lack of 
evidence, even when they may well be guilty. Regardless of the reasons for acquittal, 
all too often it makes the complainant feel like she is being called a liar and this only 
seeks to enhance her sense of humiliation and distress.346 
 
It is conceded that anonymity alone cannot prevent in absolute terms the humiliation 
and degradation that a rape complainant might feel. However it can reduce those 
feelings to a degree by protecting them from the public element of any scrutiny they 
would otherwise be subjected to. With this in mind it is argued that the heightened 
humiliation or degradation a rape victim could feel is considerably beyond the usual 
level of humiliation or degradation encountered by other victims of criminal offences. 
It therefore satisfies, at least, the threshold level of humiliation necessary to amount 
to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.347 
 
Having ascertained that without anonymity the treatment a rape complainant could be 
subjected to, may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment, weight should also be 
given to the firmly established principle that both the ECHR and Article 3 are dynamic 
in nature.348 Article 3 therefore has the potential to adapt and expand to meet 
changing norms and encompass new sets of facts349 such as lack of anonymity in rape 
trials. Additionally the principle established in UK v Ireland should be taken into 
account. That principle states that in order to ascertain whether any Article 3 threshold 
                                                          
345
 See chapter 2.1.7 ‘Criminal Justice and Public Order Act’. Note that the judge retains a discretion to 
given a warning in cases where they consider it to be appropriate as confirmed in R v Makanjoula[1995] 
3 ALL ER 730.  
346
 Lees (n99) 115-116. 
347
 Tyrer (n284) para. 30. 
348
 See for example Tyrer v the United Kingdom(n284) ; Seloumi  [n288) 26; Pretty (n 288). 
349
 The decision of X (n334) is but one example. 
80 
 
 
has been met, all the circumstance of the individual cases should be taken into 
account.350 This includes the victim’s (or complainant’s) own vulnerability.351 
 
Therefore if a rape complainant in legal proceedings were withheld anonymity it is 
possible that the psychological effect on them, when considered in light of all the 
circumstances of the case, could be so severe as to amount to either inhuman or 
degrading behaviour contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Whether the breach of Article 3 
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment would be dependent upon the relative 
seriousness of the treatment.  
 
However there is a potential problem with the likelihood of the ECtHR making such a 
finding. For a finding of ‘torture’ there must be a clear intention or purpose behind the 
treatment.352 By comparison the level of intention required, amounting to a finding of 
inhuman and degrading treatments is less clear. It has been held that the absence of a 
specific intent will not be decisive in ruling out a finding of inhuman and degrading 
treatment.353 What it does suggest is that lack of intent is a factor that will be taken 
into account when assessing whether or not there has been a breach of Article 3.  
 
Intention in relation to rape complainants as a factor is highly relevant. This is because 
it cannot be said that if the UK Government chose to withhold anonymity from rape 
complainants that their intention in doing so would be to debase or humiliate those 
individuals. Rather, the reason for doing so would arguably be the opposite. It would 
be to uphold the principle of open and fair justice, as a cornerstone of our legal 
system.354 The implications for rape complainants are that this lack of intention would 
be likely to act as a partial bar to a finding by the ECtHR, that their Article 3 rights had 
been breached.   
 
Due to individual differences, not all rape complainants will suffer the same level of 
humiliation and debasement if they lacked anonymity during the legal process. Indeed 
a significant proportion would be unlikely to meet the required threshold to amount to 
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a breach of Article 3. As a result blanket anonymity to rape complainants, on the basis 
that it is required to prevent breaches of Article 3 is unnecessary. Anonymity could 
adequately be provided to rape complainants under current legislation where 
protecting the impact upon the victim, and the interests of justice so required.355 
 
Notably Article 8, right to a private life, also provides a viable, alternative human rights 
avenue where the suffering encountered by an individual does not meet the severity 
threshold to amount to a breach of Article 3. It is suggested that a consideration of a 
rape complainant’s Article 8 human rights may yield a more forceful human rights 
argument in favour of complaint anonymity. It is this Article that will be the focus of 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.4 The rape defendant’s Article 3 human rights 
As with rape complainants, it is not disputed that rape defendants face a level of 
humiliation and debasement by virtue of their being subjected to open and public legal 
proceedings. In contrast to rape complainants, defendants currently receive no 
anonymity, despite a significant body of support in favour of them doing so.356 What 
this means in practical terms is that the actual effect of being a rape defendant in 
publicised legal proceedings is evident. By comparison one can only hypothesise about 
the effect on rape complainants who did not benefit from anonymity. 
 
Those in favour of defendant anonymity have sought to distinguish defendants of rape 
from those of other crimes. In doing so they have attempted to demonstrate a level of 
debasement and suffering which is distinct from that experienced by defendants of 
other crimes. If this is demonstrated to be the correct assertion then, as with rape 
complainants, the superior level of humiliation or degradation a rape defendant 
experiences, could prima facie satisfy the threshold level of humiliation necessary to 
amount to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.357 
 
A couple of examples of the severe suffering that rape defendants could experience 
were highlighted during the course of public debate. The first concerned a 21 year old 
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man named Mark Jackson who hanged himself following an accusation of rape by his 
former girlfriend. He had been acquitted of the offence at the Crown Court in Exeter. 
Nevertheless a newspaper headline in his home town of Wigan, more than 250 miles 
away read ‘jilted man, 21, raped ex-girlfriend’. A second man Dennis Proudfoot 
committed suicide by inhaling exhaust fumes in his car shortly before Christmas 1996, 
following a charge of rape. A few days later the man’s parents received 
correspondence from the complainant admitting she had not been raped.358 
 
In situations, such as the first of those highlighted above, the defendant’s suffering 
may be exacerbated by a feeling that he is assumed to be guilty even though he has 
not been proven to be. Public debate has highlighted this concern. Dominic Grieve 
stated that ‘precisely because the issues [of a rape allegation] may be so difficult to 
resolve it leaves a taint [against a defendant] that may be as damaging as it is 
undeserved’.359 In a similar manner Rehman Chishti MP contended that: 
 
‘[T]he concept that “mud sticks” is alive and kicking’ [in relation to 
being accused of rape]… ‘[defendants] deserve some measure of 
protection, as I believe we still have a system of justice in this country, 
of which we are justly proud, in which the accused is innocent until 
proved guilty on conviction by his peers’.360 
 
The question posed is whether there is substantive evidence to demonstrate that the 
humiliation and debasement suffered by rape defendants is distinct from that of 
defendants of other crimes. It is argued that there is not the evidence to provide a 
positive answer to that question. It was submitted above, that specific aspects of being 
a rape complainant, including rape myths and social stigma, set those complainants 
apart from complainants of other crimes. By comparison no evidence has been 
adduced to show that there are any distinct and specific aspects of being a rape 
defendant, such as ‘rape defendant trauma syndrome’ or ‘rape defendant myths’, that 
set rape defendants apart from defendants of other crimes.  
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It is actually suggested that jurors in criminal trials view rape defendants in a 
comparatively sympathetic light. This is due to the serious implications that being 
convicted of rape could have upon an individual.361 It is furthered that the prevalence 
of rape myths and the societal perception that women commonly lie about rape362also 
act in the rape defendant’s favour. This is because through casting doubt on the truth 
of a rape complainant or suggesting that an alleged rape was not a real rape, it attracts 
a level of public sympathy for the defendant. Whilst either of these factors would 
undoubtedly not prevent the defendant feeling humiliated during public proceedings it 
should mitigate the level of suffering to some degree.  
 
There remains a lack of evidence demonstrating that rape defendants suffer a level of 
humiliation and debasement distinct from the normal level of humiliation and 
suffering. There also lacks evidence to suggest that the defendants in rape cases suffer 
adversely in comparison to defendants of other serious crimes. For these reasons it is 
submitted that a rape defendant, who was withheld anonymity during legal 
proceedings, would be very unlikely to satisfy the threshold level of humiliation 
necessary to amount to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.363 It is posited that 
blanket anonymity for defendants in rape trial is unnecessary to protect their Article 3 
human rights. 
 
It is important to note that this position may alter in the future, particularly in light of 
recent high profile historic sexual offence cases, involving public figures such as Jimmy 
Savile,364 Rolf Harris365 and Max Clifford366. It may be that in light of the highly 
publicised nature of such cases public opinion changes significantly, thereby having an 
adverse effect on defendants in rape cases. Specifically it may significantly enhance the 
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humiliation and debasement that rape defendants experience during the legal process. 
If that did occur then it would be prudent to re-evaluate a rape defendant’s article 3 
human rights. 
 
In relation to a rape defendant’s Article 3 human rights, as the arguments currently 
stand there is one final point to consider. It is a question of whether a lack of 
anonymity in legal proceedings is actually necessary despite the potential humiliation 
and debasement suffered by defendants. To further this point reference is made to the 
controversial question of whether torture could ever be justified in exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
The question has been raised both by academics367 and by the case of Gäfgen v 
Germany.368The submission made is that whilst the routine use of torture, in breach of 
Article 3, is never justifiable a state may be justified in employing a limited amount of 
torture in exceptional circumstances.369 Circumstances might include where there was 
an impending risk of a terrorist attack 370  and where the torture could yield 
information capable of saving lives.371 
 
Indeed these are the terms by which arguments in the UK have been conceptualised. 
Domestic courts have noted the need, when balancing competing human rights, to find 
in favour of the least detrimental alternative.372 
 
The most prevalent objections to this train of legal thought is that if a limited amount 
of torture were allowed then the difficulties would arise in knowing where to draw the 
line, in terms of acts that were or were not permissible.373 Some torture would be the 
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beginning of a ‘slippery slope’ therefore requiring a total ban on torture to be 
maintained.374 
 
A detailed discussion of correctness of these Article 3 arguments is outside the scope 
of this thesis. However it is submitted that to a much lesser extent the arguments are 
analogous with the suffering and humiliation that a rape defendant might experience 
during the legal process. This is despite the fact that the humiliation a rape defendant 
experiences is highly unlikely to meet the threshold level and amount to a breach of 
Article 3. It is also accepted that being a rape defendant is comparatively common 
compared to any exceptional circumstances when torture might be permitted. 
Nonetheless the basic principles of the aforementioned argument are still applicable. 
 
The suggestion is that, as with arguments in favour of torture, the humiliation rape 
defendants experience is a necessary ‘by-product’ of something which is required for 
the greater good: namely open justice. The harm suffered becomes justifiable to a 
degree because open justice is necessary for the greater good. Open justice both helps 
to further the principle of a democracy and ensures that rape defendants receive a fair 
trial. Both of these aims are achieved through a public and transparent legal process. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Evidentially anonymity in rape cases is not a factual scenario that has been deliberated 
upon by the ECtHR. Any arguments suggesting that lack of anonymity would amount to 
a breach of Article 3 are reliant on established principles and the dynamic nature of 
Article 3. Of particular importance is the potential for Article 3 to adapt and encompass 
new factual scenarios. 
 
A careful assessment of the composite elements of Article 3 establishes that lack of 
anonymity for either party in a rape case could not amount to a finding of torture due 
to the purpose, intensity and exceptionally heinous quality required. It is possible that 
the humiliation and suffering caused to a rape complainant who lacked anonymity, 
would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. This was due 
to the level of humiliation and debasement they experienced which was far higher 
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than that experienced by complainants of other offences. Whether or not the suffering 
experienced reached the threshold level to breach Article 3 would depend on all the 
circumstances of the case. It was suggested that in many cases the threshold level 
would not be breached. For these reasons it was furthered that blanket anonymity 
provisions in order to protect a rape complainant’s Article 3 human rights was not 
necessary. Rather anonymity could more appropriately be invoked, under existing 
statutory provisions, on a case by case basis, where it was deemed absolutely 
necessary to do so.  
 
By comparison it is asserted that withholding anonymity from a rape defendant would 
be unlikely to breach his Article 3 human rights. This is because there lacks the 
evidence to suggest that the humiliation or debasement experienced by a rape is 
superior to that faced by defendants of other crimes. The recent, highly publicized, 
historic sexual offence cases could alter that in the future. If public opinion of rape 
defendants is negatively influenced by these cases then the level of suffering 
experienced by rape defendants could increase, thereby necessitating a review of the 
rape defendant’s Article 3 rights.  
 
Finally it is suggested that Article 8, right to a private life might offer both rape 
complainants and defendants a more substantive human rights argument in relation to 
their needing anonymity. Article 8 could be particularly influential where the suffering 
an applicant experienced did not reach the threshold level required to amount to a 
breach of Article 3.   
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Chapter 4 The right to a private and a 
family life: questioning anonymity 
provisions and Article 8 
4.1 Introduction 
Article 8 ECHR 375 governs an individual’s right to a private and family life and to their 
home and their correspondence.376 Unlike the Article 3 human rights, discussed in 
chapter 3, Article 8 is qualified.377 It is not a human right that is guaranteed in all 
circumstances but one that must be balanced against other competing human rights: 
most frequently the media’s Article 10 human right to freedom of expression.378 The 
qualified nature of Article 8, differing European standards as to what constitutes a 
breach of an Article 8 human right379 and individual differences in how members of the 
ECtHR judiciary apply the balancing exercise to individual cases,380 has led to significant 
disparities in the Article 8 jurisprudence.381These inconsistencies were noted by legal 
scholars more than two decades ago and evidenced by the Court needing to proceed 
on a ‘case-by-case’ basis.382 
 
It is submitted that the forthcoming discussion of relevant case law in this chapter will 
demonstrate that these inconsistencies still remain today. This fact may entail some 
difficulties when considering the anonymity debate in relation to a rape complainant’s 
and rape defendant’s Article 8 human rights. It has been suggested that since people 
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disagree as to the precise ambit of the protection awarded by Article 8, it provides 
scope for ‘creative advocacy’ to bring interests not previously found to fall within 
those protected by Article 8, within its auspice.383 This factor should be considered 
together with the established principle that the ECHR’s dynamic, flexible nature, 
enables its interpretation and the scope of substantive rights it covers, to develop over 
time. In doing so the convention is able to adapt to the views and needs of a changing 
society.384 
 
For these reasons it is suggested that prima facie, there would be no bar per se, to a 
future finding by the ECtHR, that the UK, by withholding anonymity from either rape 
complaint or defendant during the legal process, was not in breach of that individual’s 
Article 8 human rights. Without prior consideration of relevant jurisprudence and 
scholarly debate, one might think that a right to a private and family life would 
automatically extend to the right not to have personal and highly intimate details 
regarding a sexual act disseminated in the public domain. The issue of suspect 
anonymity and competing Article 8 and 10 human rights has recently been debated 
before the English courts in relation to terrorist suspects, who had been the subject of 
freezing orders.385 However it has not yet, been specifically addressed in relation to 
anonymity provisions for parties in a rape case. 
 
This chapter considers whether withholding anonymity provisions from rape 
complainants and/or defendants during legal proceedings could amount to a breach of 
their Article 8 human rights, in a way not permitted by the qualified component of 
Article 8.386 The chapter begins by defining the right to a private and family life as set 
out in Article 8 ECHR, followed by some exemplary instances where the ECtHR has 
found that an individual’s Article 8 human rights have been interfered with. 
Consideration is then given to the obligations that are placed on the member state in 
relation to ensuring an individual’s Article 8 human rights are upheld. In doing so 
reference is made to the requirement to balance an individual’s Article 8 human rights 
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with the media’s Article 10 human right to freedom of expression. However, Article 10 
human rights, in relation to the anonymity debate will form the focus of chapter 5 and 
therefore discussion of Article 10 in the present chapter is limited to where it is 
necessary for clarity. Finally, due to the qualified nature of Article 8, discussions 
relating to the Article’s applicability to the anonymity debate overlap to a greater 
degree than they did in chapter 3. Therefore, rather than being self- contained within 
separate subsections, discussions of how Article 8 could apply to parties in a rape case, 
who lacked anonymity, are integrated throughout the chapter. 
 
4.2 Defining the right to a private and family life 
As a qualified right, Article 8 is defined in two parts. The ‘right protected’387 is set out 
in Article 8(1) whilst the exceptions when a state may justify restricting an individual’s 
Article 8 rights is set out in Article 8(2).388 The Article reads: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Evidentially Article 8(1) defines the substantive rights to which respect must be given, 
namely private and family life and home and correspondence. Cases proceeding under 
the ‘private and family life’ heading generally relate to highly personal matters389 such 
as divorce proceedings,390 family relationships,391 or the right of public figures to 
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protection from media publications regarding their personal lives.392 By comparison 
Article 8 claims proceedings under the home and correspondence heading usually 
relate to issues such as seizure.393 It is submitted that both the protected interests 
falling within the ambit of Article 8, when taken together with the wide range of 
circumstances in which a breach of Article 8 has been found,394 demonstrates that the 
article offers wide-reaching protection.  
 
Article 8 has been held to encompass the physical and psychological integrity of an 
individual,395 the right to personal development396 and the right to develop external 
relationships with other people.397 It incorporates personal features including gender 
identification, sexuality, sexual life398 and person’s name.399 The protection of Article 8 
can extend to business related activities400 and activities which are in the public 
domain.401 Equally wide ranging are the factual scenarios where a breach of Article 8 
has been found. These vary from retention by state authorities of the DNA or 
fingerprint samples of non-convicted people without their consent,402to a local 
authority’s disclosure of photographs and closed circuit television footage, showing a 
mans attempted suicide on national television, without putting in place adequate 
safeguards to protect his identity.403 In light of the extensive reach of Article 8 it is 
again suggested that there would be no bar per se to a future finding by the ECtHR that 
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the UK, if it withheld anonymity from either rape complainants or defendants, were 
violating their Article 8 human right.404 
 
Analysis of the full range of interests protected by Article 8 is outside the scope of this 
thesis. It is the ‘private and family life’ (hereafter ‘privacy’) elements of Article 8(1) that 
will be focused on in this chapter and for the purposes of the anonymity debate. This is 
because a rape complainant or defendant becomes party to those legal proceedings 
due to their involvement in an act of a highly personal, intimate and private nature. 
Prima facie sexual intimacy is a ‘highly personal matter’ which falls under the auspice 
of the privacy heading.   
 
In order to assess the merits of an Article 8 complaint, the ECtHR employs a three-
stage test.405 Whilst many of the cases discussed in this chapter are actually domestic 
cases decided before English courts, the same general principles apply.406 
 
4.3 Stage one: Is the information private? 
The first stage of the test is for the court to ask whether an individual’s Article 8 right 
to privacy is engaged.407 The court has held that the information must be private in 
that it is in principle protected by Article 8.408 
 
In assessing what information is prima facie private, UK courts have focused on 
whether an individual has a ‘reasonable expectation to privacy’.409  In turn this 
reasonable expectation to privacy is derived from the judgment of Glesson CJ in an 
Australian case.410 The respondent in that case sought an interlocutory injunction 
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preventing the broadcasting of a documentary showing his procedures at a possum 
processing factory: in particular filming the stunning and killing of possums. Glesson CJ 
was firmly of the opinion that information relating to the respondent’s slaughtering 
methods, whilst being filmed on private property, was not shown to be private for any 
other purpose.411 In turning to when information may be considered private, Chief 
Justice Glesson stated that: 
 
‘An activity is not private simply because it is not done in public. It 
does not suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on 
private property, it has such measure of protection from the public 
gaze as the characteristics of the property, the nature of the activity, 
the locality, and the disposition of the property owner combine to 
afford. Certain kinds of information about a person, such as 
information relating to health, personal relationships, or finances, 
may be easy to identify as private: as may certain kinds of activity, 
which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of 
morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be 
unobserved. The requirement that disclosure or observation of 
information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful 
practical test of what is private’. 
 
There are two principles that have been taken from this judgment and applied in cases 
before the UK courts. Firstly that there are some forms of information that are easily 
defined as private: health, personal relationships, or finances 412  being given as 
examples. Secondly, in cases where it is not obvious whether the information is private 
or not, a good gauge of whether information is private is whether a person of 
‘reasonable sensibilities’ would find it offensive. Domestic courts in subsequent cases 
have applied these two principles.413 
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The question to be posed in relation to the anonymity debate is whether the 
information, on which a rape case is based, and relates to the individual rape 
complainant and or defendant in an individual case, is private for the purpose of 
Article 8(1). To answer the question posed, emphasis is placed on the type of 
information upon which legal proceedings in a rape case are based: namely 
information of an intimate, sexual nature. One of the forms of information that has 
been held to be ‘easily identified as private’ was personal relationships.414 Information 
relating to sexual activity goes directly to the heart of what today’s society regards a 
personal relationship. Furthermore it is an established principle that sexual life falls 
within the ambit of privacy for the purposes of Article 8.415 These principles are directly 
applicable to defendants and complainants in a rape case. Namely, that where either a 
rape complainant or defendant lacked anonymity during legal proceedings, it would, 
due to the sexual nature of the information involved, engage their Article 8 right to 
privacy. 
 
4.3.1 The obligations upon a state in relation to the Article 8 human rights of its 
citizens 
In upholding an individual’s Article 8 human right, specific obligations are placed upon 
states. The first is a negative obligation not to cause arbitrary interference into an 
individual’s private life. 416 The second is a positive obligation upon the state to protect 
the individual from any arbitrary interference into the private sphere. By doing so, the 
state allows the individual to enjoy their Article 8 human rights.417The European Court 
has acknowledged that the boundaries between positive and negative obligations may 
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be difficult to define, but in any event the principles applied remain similar in both 
instances.418 
 
It has been ascertained that Article 8 human rights of both rape complainants and 
defendants who lacked anonymity during the legal process would be engaged. Prima 
facie the UK would be under a positive and negative obligation to ensure those Article 
8 human rights were protected by ensuring that information relating to the sexual act 
and the rape charge, remained private. The negative obligation would be to prevent 
the media from reporting on the rape case and from imparting information to the 
general public. The positive obligation would be to provide both parties in a rape case 
with anonymity in order to ensure they remained unidentifiable during the legal 
process and in any later published case reports. 
 
The assertions made in the previous paragraph would be most likely to form the 
conclusion to this chapter if Article 8 was an absolute right and if Article 8(1) 
constituted the wording of the complete Article. However the ECtHR has also found 
that when considering obligations placed upon a state by Article 8 ‘regard must be had 
to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the 
individual and of the community as a whole’.419 It is at this juncture that Article 8(2) 
comes into play. 
 
4.4 Stage two: Limiting Article 8 human rights under Article 8(2) 
As was considered previously in this chapter, Article 8(2) prescribes circumstances 
when Article 8 human rights may be limited. This is the second stage of the test for 
assessing the merits of Article 8 human rights. The limitations are that the interference 
must be in accordance with the law, must be necessary in a democratic society, and 
must be necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others.420 These limitations 
may have direct applicability to complainants and defendants in rape cases. This 
proposition will be analysed further in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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4.4.1 Interference must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society 
The ECtHR held that when considering whether limiting an individual’s Article 8 human 
rights are justified, a court must first consider whether the interference with the 
applicant's right to respect for his private life is in accordance with the law. Firstly this 
requires that the measures concerned must be in conformity with domestic law and 
secondly that the law itself does not fail to show respect for the individual's private 
life.421 The legislation, or equally the common law principle, must be both precise and 
non-arbitrary in nature.422 The legislation in question must be sufficiently precise so 
that an ordinary person can understand in what circumstances their right to privacy 
under Article 8(2) would occur.423 A state will have difficulty arguing that a given 
measure has a legal basis where there is no clear legislation to confirm that is so.424 
Reformulating this question to address the anonymity debate, one would ask whether 
withholding anonymity from either party in a rape case is in accordance with UK 
domestic law. 
 
In answering the aforementioned question it is posited that the relevant law is the 
principle of open justice.425 This common law principle underpins our legal system and 
our system of justice.426 It is a principle with an ‘extensive pedigree’427 holding that 
proceedings should generally be conducted in public with the media being fully and 
freely able to report on those proceedings: the importance of this principle having 
been reiterated by senior courts on many occasions. 428  Advancing the acute 
importance of open justice, it has been argued that public confidence flows from the 
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knowledge that courts of law proceed openly, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
individuals taking law into their own hands.429 
 
The principle of open justice is not an arbitrary legal principle, failing to take into 
account the private lives of individuals and lacking in precision, but one with which 
society generally is familiar. Citizen’s living in the UK are used to seeing court cases and 
legal proceedings reported in the media and comprehend that this is a normal part of 
the UK’s justice system. A citizen would also be likely to appreciate that in a legal 
system where justice is open, the privacy of an individual who is a party in legal 
proceedings, may be limited in order to uphold the principle of open justice. On this 
basis it is suggested that a restriction by the UK government, of the privacy rights of 
either party in a rape case, on the basis of ensuring open justice would be ‘in 
accordance with the law’ for the purposes of Article 8(1). 
 
Whilst this is true, it does not necessarily mean that either party in a rape case would 
automatically be refused the protection of anonymity provisions in order to protect 
their Article 8 right to privacy. Notwithstanding its fundamental importance, open 
justice in itself is not an absolute principle. The fact was emphasised by Lord Haldane 
LC in the case of Scott v Scott.430 He stated that when confronted with the need to 
depart from the principle, the question had to be treated ‘as one of principle, and as 
turning, not on convenience, but on necessity’.431 
 
The view that derogations from the principle of open justice should be based on 
necessity overlaps with the second limiting factor set out in Article 8(2): namely that 
any restrictions on Article 8 human rights must be necessary in a democratic society. 
One should appreciate that ‘necessity’ does not imply an absolute need432 but rather 
that it ‘implies a pressing social need and, in particular that it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued’.433 If open justice is a fundamental principle of our legal 
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system, and thus necessary in a democratic society can it ever be limited to provide 
anonymity to parties in a rape case?  
 
Firstly, as discussions in chapter 2 illustrated, witness anonymity in legal proceedings is 
not a new concept per se.434 It has been contended that anonymity during legal 
proceedings is one of three areas that is placing pressure on open justice.435 Whether 
anonymity itself become necessary during the legal process will depend on whether 
the human right it is protecting, which in relation to the anonymity debate is the right 
to privacy, overrides the need for open justice and other competing human rights. 
Competing human rights are considered in chapter 4.4.2. In this section, the relative 
strength of a rape complainant’s and defendant’s right to privacy can be addressed in 
relation to the corresponding need for open justice being necessary in a democratic 
society.  
 
4.4.1.1 Open justice and the rape defendant’s right to privacy 
Recent academic comment has raised the valid question of whether withholding any 
defendant’s right to privacy, in favour of open justice really is necessary.436 These 
concerns have arisen in light of particularly invasive media reporting in today’s modern 
society. In principle the media play an important role in upholding the principle of 
open justice through their ability to report on all the majority of legal proceedings and 
impart that information to the public.437 However there is an apprehension that the 
media are becoming more focused with furthering their commercial interests rather 
than upholding the principle of open justice.438Albeit in a non-legal context, a recent 
example highlighting this problem was the topless pictures of the Duchess of 
Cambridge taken while sunbathing with her husband in a private villa in France in 
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September 2012.439 One can ask what the specific intention of revealing these pictures 
to the public was other than enhancing sales. A full enquiry into the malpractice of 
some sectors of the media became necessary in the UK in 2011. This followed the 
‘phone hacking’ scandal which affected the privacy of both private individuals and 
individuals in the public eye.440 
 
In relation to defendants of criminal cases it has been stated that: 
 
[F]rom breakfast to bedtime there is an unrelenting barrage of 
institutionalised public gossip on the radio, TV, in tabloids etc. about 
the evil deeds and character of fellow citizens’.441 
 
In some cases, identity, place of residence and other personal details of defendants are 
published in the media shortly after they have been charged. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that their lives may be adversely affected as a result, regardless of whether 
they are later acquitted or not.442 To give a specific example of the effect that media 
reporting may have had on one rape defendant, the reader may recall the 
aforementioned newspaper article entitled ‘Jilted man, 21, raped ex-girlfriend’. The 
article regarded the acquittal of a 21 year old man of his ex-girlfriend at Exeter Crown 
Court but was published in the man’s home town of Wigan more than 250 miles away. 
This young man subsequently hanged himself.443 
 
One may therefore question whether any media reporting of defendants in any 
criminal case should be allowed, especially where the article produced provides an 
excessively embellished view of events to make it more appealing to read and thus 
commercially profitable.444 Bohlander argued that the problems lie not in the legal 
principle itself but rather in the misunderstanding by the media of their correct role in 
society. He draws comparison to the German media where names of victims or 
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offenders are not generally disclosed in newspapers.445 Non-disclosure of names in the 
German media is representative of the German media’s attitude to reporting, as 
evidenced in the Press Code of Conduct.446 Bohlander suggests that whilst the German 
public love to hear gossip as much as the English public, newspapers do not fail to sell 
through not having disclosed names.447 It is asserted, on account of Bohlander’s 
arguments that a more effective and ethical self-regulation of the press, rather than 
blanket anonymity provisions for all defendants would be the most effective means of 
balancing a defendant’s right to privacy with(in) the principle of open justice.  
 
The final question to pose is whether rape defendants should be equated with 
defendants of other crimes, or whether as a group they should amount to an exception 
who require anonymity during legal proceedings. The court in Guardian News and 
Media Ltd, Re [2010] held that whilst an anonymity order cannot be made for the 
benefit of the comfort or feelings of defendants’, publishing of material that could lead 
to a defendant suffering substantial harm can be restricted’.448 When considered 
together with the principle that anonymity is an exception to open justice, the term 
‘substantial harm’ suggests the need for harm which is more severe than that 
experienced by defendants of other offences. In the previous chapter the proposition 
was made that rape defendants do not experience a level of harm that is distinct from 
that experienced by defendants of other crimes.449 It is posited that blanket anonymity 
provisions for rape defendants would not be considered necessary in order to protect 
their Article 8 right to privacy, thereby overriding the principle of open justice. 
 
It is accepted that a specific rape defendant, or any other defendant, in a given case 
may experience a greater level of harm than is normally experienced. In such 
circumstances the UK High Court retains the jurisdiction to make any orders it deems 
necessary in order to carry out the balancing exercise between competing human 
rights.450 
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4.4.1.2 Open justice and the rape complainant’s right to privacy 
Seemingly the position regarding a rape complainant’s Article 8 right to privacy, when 
balanced against open justice and corresponding need for open justice to be necessary 
in a democratic society, is comparatively straight forward. There is no dispute that 
open justice is an important part of an effective and fair criminal justice system. 
Ensuring that complainants of criminal offences come forward and report the crimes 
against them is equally important. Indeed chapter 2 detailed the severe consequences 
that being a rape victim could have upon an individual.451 
 
In chapter 3 analysis focused upon whether being a rape complainant could amount to 
inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 human rights. Emphasis was 
placed upon the social stigma associated with being a rape victim by virtue of rape 
myths. In particular some rape victims experienced the legal process as a ‘second 
assault’ upon them or suffered rape trauma syndrome as a consequence of their 
experiences. Other practical factors also act to enhance the trauma experienced by 
rape victims during the legal process. These include the difficulties of proving consent, 
or lack thereof, to participate in what is usually a private sexual act, and the residual 
jurisdiction of a judge to provide a corroboration warning to juries, against the 
complainant. When taken together, these distinct difficulties render the experience of 
being a rape complainant more severe than being a complainant of other crimes. 452 
 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, difficulties arose in terms of rape complainants 
meeting the threshold level of humiliation or degradation required to amount to a 
breach of Article 3 human rights. Whilst it was conceded that individuals in specific 
cases may reach that threshold it was argued that the majority of rape complainants 
probably would not do so due to the exceptional level of suffering required.453 Herein 
lies the potential utility of Article 8. 
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Prima facie information of a sexual nature engages an individual’s Article 8 human 
rights. 454 When those Article 8 human rights relate to criminal proceedings they will 
be balanced against the principle of open justice as well as any other competing 
human rights. Both derogations from Article 8 human rights and derogations from the 
principle of open justice must be necessary in a democratic society. 455  The 
aforementioned discussions demonstrate the level of suffering that rape complainants, 
face during the legal process, which is distinct from the suffering experienced from 
complainants of other crimes.  
 
Upholding their Article 8 privacy rights by providing rape complainants with anonymity 
would have a number of benefits. Firstly it would encourage rape complainants to 
report their crime in the knowledge that they would not be publicly exposed to the 
stigma of being a rape complainant. Secondly, in preventing rape complainants from 
public identification, it ensures that the humiliation experienced by complainants 
during the legal process is mitigated to a degree and more rape complainants are able 
to endure the legal process. This in turn would assist in lowering rape.456 Thirdly, 
through a combination of factors one and two it is hoped that the number of 
successful convictions will rise and more guilty defendants will be brought to justice for 
their actions.  
 
It is asserted that ensuring a rape complainant’s Article 8 rights are upheld is necessary 
in a democratic society. In these circumstances a rape complainant’s Article 8 human 
rights would be likely to supersede the principle of open justice. This conclusion 
corresponds with the assertion made by Baroness Kennedy during the course of public 
debate, as was acknowledged in chapter 2. She was of the opinion that anonymity 
provisions needed to be reserved for exceptional circumstances: a category that rape 
complainants fell into, due to the crime’s stigma and the difficulty of getting woman to 
come forward and report rape. 
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Taken alone, this finding appears to demonstrate that rape complainants should have 
anonymity in order to protect their Article 8 human rights. However due to the 
qualified nature of Article 8 there remains an additional balancing exercise that must 
be undertaken to ensure that any limitation of Article 8 human rights is necessary to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter 
the predominant competing human right to be balanced against an individual’s right to 
privacy is the media’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression. This balance will now 
be addressed. It has already been accepted that the principle of open justice would be 
likely to outweigh a rape defendant’s Article 8 human rights in the legal process, 
thereby legitimising their lack of anonymity. The current balancing exercise of Article 8 
and 10 human rights will nevertheless be considered in relation to both parties in a 
rape case for the purposes of completeness.    
 
4.4.2 The Article 8 limitation must be necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others 
Article 10 has a similar structure to Article 8 in that it is a qualified human right.457 
When a case arises where these two human rights directly conflict with one another, a 
fair balance must be struck between the interests of the public in receiving information 
and the requirements of an individual’s right to privacy.458 Ascertaining whether one of 
these two human rights should generally take precedence over the other has been 
difficult, particularly when both Article 8 and Article 10 are fundamentally important in 
a democratic society.459 
 
Attention has been drawn to the fact that the media are in a prime position to cause 
damage to an individual’s right of privacy, the state’s interests of administering an 
effective justice system and the public generally, through dissemination of socially 
damaging information. The media can do this by virtue of its wide-ranging powers of 
investigation and its ability to deliver information to a wide audience.460 Nonetheless 
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the Court have frequently reaffirmed the importance of the press to political process. 
461 The ECtHR in Castells v Spain (1992) commented that freedom of press ‘constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic 
conditions for its progress’.462 More recently the Court in Yordanova v Bulgaria463 
restated the media’s role as public watchdog in a democratic society.464 
 
It is submitted that jurisprudence considering how Article 8 and 10 human rights 
should be balanced has been inconsistent: as will become apparent from the 
forthcoming analysis. There has been some jurisprudence suggesting that Article 10 
rights to freedom of expression prevail over the right to privacy. The suggestion has 
been mooted that when competing privacy and freedom of expression claims arise, 
freedom of expression should prevail. For example in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd 
and Others the court stated: 
 
‘The starting point is now the right of freedom of expression, a right 
based on a constitutional or higher legal order foundation. 
Exceptions to freedom of expression much be justified as being 
necessary in a democracy. In other words, freedom of expression is 
the rule and regulation of speech is the exception requiring 
justification’.465 
 
Legal scholars have also debated whether the meaning of s.12466 of the HRA 1998 is to 
place freedom of expression as a right of greater importance than other competing 
human rights.467 
 
At the same time, domestic courts have been keen to uphold an individual’s right to 
privacy. In recent years the Court of Appeal has held that the law now recognises and 
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will protect as necessary, an individual’s right to privacy.468 Specifically domestic courts 
appear to have developed a common law remedy for invasion of an individual’s privacy 
in the form of a tortuous ‘breach of confidence’.469 In Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] the 
court stated that: 
 
‘The law of confidence should protect from disclosure private 
information where its publication has a real potential to adversely 
affect a person’s health or mental well-being’.470 
 
Until very recently, judgments of the European Court have inadvertently tended to 
favour the right to privacy, notwithstanding a lack of intention to favour Article 8 
rights.471Justification for decisions, have been based primarily upon the margin of 
appreciation awarded to states when deciding whether there is justification for 
restricting either of the two human rights.472 
 
Some examples can be provided to contextualise how the courts have placed the 
balance. In Peck v UK the court held that disclosure of closed circuit television footage 
and images, on national television, showing events surrounding an attempted suicide 
by the applicant, violated the applicants Article 8 privacy rights. They failed to place 
adequate safeguards in place to protect his identity.473 Notably, the applicant’s right to 
privacy was violated even though the images and footage were recorded in a public 
street because he was a private individual and was not there for any specific purpose 
such as a publicised event. 474 
 
In Von Hannover v Germany (2005) Princess Caroline of Monaco, who undertook no 
official functions, had unsuccessfully applied to the German courts to obtain an 
injunction. This was to prevent the German media from publishing various pictures of 
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her and her children. On application to the ECtHR the Court acknowledged that whilst 
it should not overstep a specific remit, especially in relation to the rights of other 
people, the media did have a duty to impart ‘information and ideas on all matters of 
public interest’.475 The Court drew a distinction between circumstances where public 
figures were participating in official functions and facts relating to the private lives of 
individuals such as the Princess, who undertook no official duties. In the former case 
the press would be acting in its role as ‘”watchdog” in a democracy’ while in the latter 
case it would not.476The Court held ‘that the decisive factor in balancing the protection 
of private life against freedom of expression is the contribution of the photos and 
articles to a debate of general interest’.477 The Court drew a distinction, holding that 
images of the Princess undertaking activities such as horseback riding or playing tennis, 
where she could expect her privacy to be respected could be contrasted with those 
where she was undertaking activities in a public place such as grocery shopping. 478 The 
former group of images violated her Article 8 right to privacy. 
 
However a couple of very recent judgments by the ECtHR have suggested a definite 
shift towards favouring of Article 10 human rights. Whilst the Court has not altered the 
factors employed when undertaking the Article 8 and 10 balancing exercise, the 
judgments seemed to have used a wide-ranging interpretation of what amounts to 
debates in the public interest and individuals who are considered to be public 
figures.479 
 
In Von Hannover v Germany (No2) (2012),480 the case involved further pictures of 
Princess Caroline. This time the Princess was photographed with her husband Prince 
Ernst August and the pictures were taken while the couple were on holiday together. 
The case involved three pictures, two of which showed the couple walking together 
whilst one pictured them both travelling on a chair lift. The German courts had 
prevented publication of the walking pictures. The third picture had been used as a 
background image for an article reporting on the ill health of the Princess’ father and 
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publication had been permitted. Upon application to the ECtHR the decision of the 
domestic court was upheld. While the walking photos concerned the intimacies of the 
couple’s private holiday the third picture, which accompanied the article related to an 
event of ‘contemporary society’ on which it was in the public interest for the press to 
report. The ECtHR therefore held that the media’s right to freedom of information 
prevailed.481 It is submitted that by comparison to the 2005 Von Hannover decision this 
more recent judgment has taken too lenient a view of information that is said to be in 
the public interest. The third photograph, publication of which was allowed, was the 
same type of picture as the walking images. All three photographs showed the couple 
on a private holiday undertaking private activities. The ‘public interest’ element that 
arose in relation to the third photograph was tenuous at best: by linking a ‘holiday 
snap’ to an entirely separate holiday step of another member of the Von Hannover 
family. 
 
In Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) the case concerned an actor, known in Germany 
for his role in a detective series. 482 The application before the ECtHR related to an 
article that was published by the German media. The article referred to the applicant’s 
confession to the German court that he had smoked cannabis on occasion, as well has 
having taken cocaine. It also reported the fact that the applicant was fined and showed 
a picture of the applicant.483 In giving its’ reasoning as to the correct balance between 
Articles 8 and 10, the court held that there was an element of public interest in being 
informed about criminal proceedings. This principle was increased in relation to the 
applicant, due to his character on the detective series being a police superintendent, 
‘whose mission was law enforcement and crime prevention’.484 Furthermore the 
applicant had previously sought media attention on other occasions and as such he 
could not expect the same level of privacy as someone who had avoided the 
limelight.485 Ultimately the court held that the media’s right to freedom of expression 
should be favoured over the applicant’s right to privacy.486Again it is suggested that 
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the court’s finding that the nature of the applicant’s role in the detective series 
increased the public interest element involved, was a tenuous link. The court may have 
been inferring that the public would consider that the applicant’s drug use affected his 
suitability to undertake a fictional role as a police superintendent. Otherwise it seems 
that this factor would only seek to be of interest to the public rather than in the public 
interest per se. 
 
Whilst these cases do suggest that the ECtHR is moving towards favouring Article 10 
rights, it is submitted that the domestic courts in the UK may be less willing to follow 
this trend. This assertion is made due to the current political climate in the UK and the 
negative attention the press has received following the phone hacking scandal of 
recent years and the consequential Leveson inquiry.487 
 
It is important to understand, these are but examples of many cases where the 
exercise of balancing Articles 8 and 10 has been undertaken by the courts.488 
Regardless how these two rights are balanced in a given case neither right should 
automatically be favoured. The court in Campbell v MGN [2004] acknowledged that: 
 
‘Since neither article 8 nor article 10 has pre-eminence over the other 
the court has to consider the proportionality of the proposed 
interference with each right in turn, weighing those features which 
enhance the importance of each right in the particular case.489 
 
The courts have tended to employ a common set of principles when undertaking the 
balancing exercise, regardless of the facts of a specific case.490 These principles were 
helpfully reaffirmed by the ECtHR in the recent decision of Axel Springer AG v Germany 
(2012).491 
 
The court initially outlined some ancillary matters relevant to the balancing exercise, 
reaffirming that both Articles 8 and 10 are of equal importance and that the margin of 
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appreciation, that is the element of latitude given to states in their implementation of 
these rights, should be equal for both Articles.492 It also noted that freedom of 
information allows for a degree of embellishment by the media when imparting 
information. It is not for the Court to ascertain what particular style of reporting is 
appropriate in a given case.493 
 
In relation to the substantive balancing exercise the court stated that the ability of any 
photographs or articles published by the media in contributing to a debate of general 
interest, was an essential criterion.494 Indeed the court has actually gone further on a 
number of occasions in stating that public interest is the decisive factor in the 
balancing exercise.495 Furthermore, a factor of particular relevance in relation to the 
anonymity debate interest is that the court has considered there to be a public interest 
in the full reporting of criminal proceedings.496 
 
Emphasis must also be placed on the role of the person concerned and which activities 
they were undertaking when their right to privacy was violated. In furtherance of this 
principle a distinction will be made between private and public individuals, such as 
politicians, celebrities, or royalty. An individual unknown to the general public may 
have their right to privacy upheld in the same circumstances where a public individual 
may not.497 It is submitted that this factor would fall in favour of rape defendants and 
rape complainants who are generally individual’s unknown to the general public.  
 
Consideration should be given to how the individual claiming privacy acted prior to the 
publication of the information or whether the picture or information had already 
appeared in earlier publications,498 whether the information was obtained honestly by 
the media and ‘in accordance with the ethics of journalism’.499 The court should also 
focus on what lead to the information being published and whether the information 
was disseminated to a wide or a limited audience. The Court in Springer then asserted 
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that attention should be given to the sanctions imposed by virtue of the right that was 
interfered with.500 
 
One final factor which it is submitted should be taken into account when undertaking 
the balancing exercise, is whether the dissemination of information included 
photographs. This is because the photographs can be particularly intrusive to an 
individual’s privacy. The Court in Theakston v MGN Limited [2002] acknowledged that:  
 
‘Courts have consistently recognised that photographs can be 
particularly intrusive and have showed a high degree of willingness to 
prevent the publication of photographs, taken without the consent of 
the person photographed’.501 
 
The recent shift of the Court’s jurisprudence, suggesting a tendency to favour freedom 
of expression, brings an element of uncertainty when assessing how the Article 8 and 
10 balance would be likely to fall in relation to rape complainants and defendants. 
However prima facie neither right should automatically be favoured: cases turning 
instead on how their specific facts relate to the factors set out in Springer. For these 
reasons, a relatively accurate assessment can still be made for the purposes of the 
current debate. 
 
4.4.2.1. Rape complainants, rape defendants and the balance of Articles 8 and 10 
The anonymity debate is undoubtedly an issue of public interest, as evidence by the 
ongoing debate, resulting in the questions posed in this current thesis.502Additionally 
the information imparted, upon which a rape complainant or defendant’s claim to 
privacy is based is criminal proceedings in a rape case. The Court has clarified that 
there is a public interest in the full reporting of criminal proceedings503 and that this 
factor should be decisive in the Article 8 and 10 balancing exercise. Both of these 
factors are therefore favourable to the media’s Article 10 human rights, as opposed to 
the privacy rights of either party in a rape case. 
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In all but exceptional circumstances rape complainants and defendants are both 
private individuals and thus could expect a higher degree of privacy than public figures 
could in the same situation. Nonetheless, the situation surrounding which, any media 
publications derive, is the public legal process. It is posited that it is the public legal 
process element that corresponds to the aforementioned principle of open justice: a 
principle which earlier analysis demonstrated, carries substantial weighting against 
providing either party in a rape case with anonymity. 
 
The factor concerning how the individual claiming a breach of privacy acted before the 
relevant information was published, raises an interesting issue in relation to the 
current debate. It is suggested that how a rape complainant and defendant acted 
before the information was published relates to the act of rape. The ECtHR have held 
that an individual cannot complain about an impugnation to their reputation, which is 
a foreseeable consequence of their own actions, such as embarking upon criminal 
activity.504 The Court may take the view that both complainant and defendant have 
done nothing wrong until the defendant is proven to be either innocent or guilty. If 
that is the view taken, it is likely that the innocent prior conduct of both parties would 
be likely to increase the weight given to their right to privacy. 
 
However in Guardian News and Media Ltd Re [2010] the applicant, upon being 
suspected of involvement in, or facilitating, terrorism was the subject of an asset 
freezing order. The applicant wished to remain anonymous during proceedings. In 
support of an anonymity order in his favour the applicant argued that if his name were 
publicly disclosed for being suspected of terrorism, some members of the public would 
treat him as if he was guilty of the offence, as opposed a mere suspect. Yet the Court 
were unsupportive of this particular line of argument, maintaining that the public were 
able to distinguish between suspects and conviction criminals.505 This train of thought 
could be applied to a case involving a rape defendant who argued that lack of 
anonymity during legal proceedings would cause some members of the public to treat 
him as a convicted rapist rather than a rape defendant. Considering the strength of the 
Court’s assertion, reference is once again made to the example of Mark Jackson. This 
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man was acquitted of rape at Exeter Crown Court. Even so one newspaper headline 
250 miles away in his hometown read ‘Jilted man, 21, raped ex-girlfriend.506 This 
headline may imply that in actual fact some members of the public would be likely to 
assume a defendant’s guilt in some circumstances, even without a conviction. 
However it is submitted that it is equally likely to simply be the product of newspapers 
writing headlines for commercial gain. If the latter assertion is true then it is submitted 
that the appropriate remedy would be more ethical self-regulation by the press, rather 
than anonymity provisions. Both of these assertions are of course speculative to a 
degree, but it is suggested that by virtue of his at the very least being a suspect, a rape 
defendant will have a slightly lowered expectation of privacy. 
 
In relation to the circumstances under which the information was obtain by the media, 
the court would probably accept that in the majority of rape cases much of the 
information would be obtained from legal proceedings themselves. This factor relates 
directly to the principle of open justice and the media’s role as public watchdog in a 
democratic society.507As such the court would be hesitant to unnecessarily restrict the 
media’s freedom of expression in pursuance its vital role in society. This factor may 
however be afforded less weight when publications relate to highly embellished or 
distorted articles such as the above Mark Jackson article,508 with additional pictures 
and imparted to a wide audience, hundreds of miles from where the proceedings took 
place. 
 
Finally the court would take into account the impact that the media’s reporting on the 
legal proceedings would have on both rape complainants and rape defendants who 
lacked anonymity. It is unnecessary to discuss the potential impact that lack of 
anonymity could have on both rape complainants and defendants once again, the 
issues already having been having been addressed in a number of other places in this 
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thesis509 However whilst undoubtedly there is potential for both parties to suffer 
psychological harm through being either rape complainants or defendants, the 
distinguishing factor is that rape complainants usually suffer disproportionately to 
complainants of other crimes. By comparison, no such statement can be made about 
rape defendants. For these reasons it is submitted that more weight would be 
attributed to the impact that upholding the media’s Article 10 rights would have on a 
rape complainant, rather than a rape defendant.  
 
When all of these factors are taken together it is suggested that, in relation to the 
Article 8 and 10 balancing exercise alone, the media’s right to freedom of expression 
would be favoured over the rape defendant’s right to privacy. Whether freedom of 
expression would be favoured over the rape complainant’s Article 8 human rights is 
debatable, due to the significant harm that rape complainants as a group tend to 
suffer. For this reason it is suggested that it would be more appropriate to consider 
whether a specific rape complainant’s Article 8 rights should be upheld in a given case, 
rather than providing blanket anonymity to all rape complainants.   
 
4.5 Stage 3 - The margin of appreciation 
When deciding whether or not to uphold an individual’s Article 8 right to privacy, and 
when the required balancing acts have been undertaken, there is third element that 
the ECtHR will consider. This is the margin of appreciation afforded to states when 
assessing whether limiting an individual’s Article 8 human rights is necessary in a 
democratic society.510 The margin of appreciation refers specifically to the discretion 
that the ECtHR affords to national authorities in their exercising of certain actions such 
as balancing competing human rights.511 It is unnecessary to conduct a detailed 
analysis of this principle for the purposes of the anonymity debate. However it is 
important to briefly consider how wide a margin of appreciation would likely be 
afforded to the UK with regards to any limitations imposed on a rape complainant or 
defendant’s Article 8 human rights. 
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Ultimately the ECtHR will look to see whether a state, when interpreting and balancing 
competing human rights has struck a proportionate balance between any limitation of 
those rights and the end goal pursued.512 Furthermore the margin of appreciation 
afforded to states when interpreting rights that relate to a highly personal area of an 
individual’s life, is significantly reduced.513 It was earlier posited, that rape and sexual 
intimacy, which lie at the heart of the anonymity debate, amount to such highly 
personal areas of an individual’s life. The court in Dudgeon v UK (1982) reinforced this 
principle stating that when rights involve a highly personal area of a person’s life ‘there 
must exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of the public 
authorities can be legitimate for the purposes of Article 8 (2)’.514 Notably this case also 
related to an individual’s sexual life, although in the context of criminalisation of 
homosexual activities. On this basis it is suggested that the UK would only be afforded 
a narrow margin of appreciation in relation to its interpretation of a rape complainant 
or defendant’s Article 8 human rights. This would also  be true when the UK 
undertakes a balancing exercise of Article 8 and 10 human rights. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the balancing act between Articles 8 and 10 is by 
no means simple. Prima facie legal proceedings in a rape case relates to a highly 
personal and intimate matter, namely sexual intimacy. The fact entails that both rape 
complainant and rape defendant’s Article 8 human rights are engaged. However there 
are two specific means by which the UK could possibly impose restrictions on these 
Article 8 human rights. The first is the fundamental principle of open justice and the 
second is the need to balance the media’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression. In 
light of the need for open justice and the public interest element involved, the media’s 
right to freedom of expression would carry a heavy weighting in the balancing exercise 
of the media’s Article 10 rights against the Article 8 rights of both parties in a rape 
case. This is despite the narrow margin of appreciation that would be awarded to the 
UK in relation to the area of sexual activity.  
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Whilst it is not disputed that a rape defendant may experience a level of distress or 
harm during their legal process, there is nothing to distinguish rape defendants as a 
group from defendants of other crimes. Furthermore whilst a defendant is a private 
individual, and as such, can expect a greater level of privacy than a public figure 
generally would, he has at least been suspected of some unlawful activity. This acts to 
limit his legitimate expectation to privacy to a degree and further pushes the Article 8 
and 10 balancing exercise unfavourably against his right to privacy. Furthermore it has 
been held that there is a legitimate public interest in reporting on legal proceedings. 
For all of these reasons it is submitted that blanket anonymity in order to protect a 
rape defendant’s Article 8 right to privacy is unnecessary.  
 
By comparison, the balance of Article 8 and 10 rights may lie more favourably towards 
rape complainants due to the specific stigma of being a rape complainant, which is 
distinct from complainants of other offences. Nonetheless it is furthered that when 
balanced solely against freedom of expression, a rape complainant’s right to privacy 
would not have sufficient weight in most cases to prevail: therefore not warranting 
blanket anonymity for all rape complainants. However when the inherent difficulties of 
being a rape complainant are also balanced against the principle of open justice it is 
suggested that their right to privacy would necessitate a derogation from open justice. 
On this basis it is suggested that anonymity provisions for rape complainants are 
necessary in order to uphold their Article 8 right to privacy.  
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Chapter 5 The right to freedom of 
expression: questioning anonymity 
provisions and Article 10 
5.1 Introduction  
Article 10515 ECHR governs the right to freedom of expression.516 Whilst Article 10 is 
important in its own right, it is also closely associated with other substantive rights.517 
Examples include the right to freedom of assembly518 under Article 11 ECHR519 and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion 520  under Article 9 ECHR 521 . The 
importance of Article 10 has been reinforced through both European and domestic 
jurisprudence 522  and academic discussion by reference to its integrity to social 
progress, democracy and even to the personality of state citizens.523  It is argued that 
‘[W]ithout a broad guarantee of the right to freedom of expression protected by 
impartial and independent courts, there is no free country, there is no democracy’.524 
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Equally, it is indisputable that freedom of expression underpins a cornerstone of our 
legal system, the principle of open justice.525 One of the most efficient means of 
achieving open justice is by ensuring that the popular media can freely report on all 
nature of legal proceedings and that the information can be imparted to the public. For 
these reasons the media are considered to play a fundamental role in furthering the 
realisation of Article 10 rights and there is a positive obligation imposed upon the state 
to ensure that the right to freedom of expression is upheld in all but the most limited 
circumstances.526 When the ECHR was enshrined into domestic law by the HRA 1998 
there was a general understanding that domestic courts would find in favour of 
freedom of speech.527 Termed the ‘free speech principle’, it was based on the premise 
that liberty was best ensured through unrestricted speech, regardless of content, 
because ‘in a free market of ideas and opinions the good will triumph over the bad’.
528 
 
With this in mind, the question to be answered in the immediate chapter is how Article 
10 affects the anonymity debate. The question has already been addressed to some 
degree in the preceding chapter when considering how a rape defendant and 
complainant’s Article 8 right to privacy should be balanced against the media’s Article 
10 right to freedom of expression. This feature of Article 10 human rights will not be 
repeated in this chapter, apart from where necessary for the purposes of clarity. 
Instead there will be a great focus placed upon Article 10 as a substantive right, the 
circumstances in which the state can justify limiting this right and how freedom of 
expression may impact upon the anonymity debate. When addressing potential 
limitations, consideration will be given to any rights against which freedom of 
expression must be balanced. In the context of this chapter it will be the rape 
defendant’s Article 6 human right to a fair trial.  
 
An appropriate starting point is to acknowledge that for the purposes of the anonymity 
debate, in addition to rape complainants and defendants, Article 10 necessarily 
requires the rights of two additional parties to be taken into account: the popular 
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media and the general public.529 As will duly become apparent, the media, as ‘speakers 
of information’ prima facie have a right to collect and impart information, and the 
general public as ‘hearers of information’, a corresponding right to receive that 
information.530 For ease of discussion the ‘media’ will be referred to generically when 
discussing Article 10 human rights throughout this chapter. Naturally that right would 
extend to the reporting of legal proceedings and the legal process in rape trials. In 
addition the right to impart and gain knowledge of the legal proceedings falls directly 
under the auspice of the open justice principle, the fundamental importance of which 
has been emphasised by Zuckerman.531 
 
Nevertheless Article 10 is a qualified right, subject to limitations
532
 and as such may be 
balanced against other competing human rights where necessary.
533
 For the purposes 
of the anonymity debate it is asserted that potential conflicts arise in relation to the 
rape complainant and defendant’s right to a private and family life534, the rape 
complainant’s right not to be subject to inhuman and or degrading treatment535, the 
rape defendant’s right to a fair trial536, and more generally the right of both parties in a 
criminal rape case not to be subjected to discrimination.537 Thus when freedom of 
expression conflicts with any of the aforementioned rights, the court must balance the 
competing rights against one another to assess which right should prevail in a given 
circumstance. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is split into two distinct parts. The first considers the 
definition and scope of Article 10 human rights, including practical examples of how 
both the ECtHR and domestic courts have interpreted freedom of expression. The 
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second focuses on the specific way in which the right to freedom of expression may 
conflict with the competing human rights of either party in a rape case.  
 
5.2 Defining freedom of expression 
Article 10 ECHR provides: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions or 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
 
Article 10(1) defines the substantive human right to be protected whilst 10(2) details 
the limitations that may be imposed upon freedom of expression and the 
circumstances in which a state may legitimately interfere with the exercise of an 
individual’s Article 10 rights. Notably Article 10(1) places specific duties and 
responsibilities upon an individual in exercising their freedom of expression.538 This 
positive duty is absent from the wording of all other ECHR human rights.539 It is argued 
that the specific reasoning behind this requirement is to acknowledge the ‘distinctive 
identity’ of freedom of speech and to ‘prevent the irresponsible uses of democracy.’ 
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Indeed this later need is, in part, protected by the role of the media as ‘public 
watchdog’ in a democratic society.540 
 
5.2.1 Explaining the ambit of Article 10 (1) 
When considering whether the right to freedom of expression will prevail over other 
rights in a given circumstance, the necessary starting point is to assess whether the 
substantive human right contained within Article 10(1) is engaged. This asks the 
question whether the form of expression and the person either imparting, or receiving 
freedom of expression falls under the auspice of Article 10(1). It is asserted that the 
current bank of jurisprudence demonstrates that Article 10(1) is engaged with relative 
ease.541 
 
Notably Article 10(1) provides that everyone is entitled to freedom of expression. This 
wording suggests Article 10 is fully comprehensive and intended to uphold the rights of 
all citizens. It is a suggestion substantiated through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and 
has been found to extend both to legal542 and natural persons.543 Examples of persons 
who have fallen within its scope, have included legal personalities,544 lawyers,545 
members of the civil service,546 people partaking in military covert operations547 and 
the media.548 However, a state may restrict an individual’s freedom of expression 
when it relates to the political activity of aliens.549 
 
The forms of expression covered by Article 10(1) have been construed in an equally 
generous manner. This is assisted by the fact that the convention provides for three 
forms of free speech as opposed to one:550 the freedom to hold opinions, to impart 
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information and ideas and a corresponding right to receive information and ideas. 
Whilst the ECtHR has failed to define an exhaustive list of activities that would fall 
within Article 10(1) previous arguments on behalf of the contracting state arguing that 
a specific form of expression doesn’t fall within 10(1) are usually met with failure.551 
 
The reach of Article 10(1) has extended to forms of expression as diverse as sending 
pornographic images, 552  partaking in political protest, 553 holding political 
opinions, 554 internet ‘blogging’, blasphemous films, 555  posting leaflets 556  and 
newspaper articles.557  Notably there is no specific test that a specific form of 
expression must satisfy in order to be afforded the protected of Article 10(1).558 
 
One should also appreciate that freedom of expression covers both imparting and 
receiving information and has potential implications for the anonymity debate. If rape 
complainants and or rape defendants received blanket anonymity it would severely 
restrict or prevent in their entirety the media’s publication of information surrounding 
the legal process in rape cases. Prima facie this would engage both the media’s Article 
10(1) right to disseminate the information and also the general public’s right to receive 
that information. The two-pronged reach of Article 10(1) was confirmed in Open Door 
Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre v Ireland (1992). This case involved the 
implementation of an injunction that prevented a counselling centre publishing leaflets 
about abortion. The Court allowed two women of childbearing age to become party to 
the proceedings. Whilst neither of the women were pregnant, as hearers of the 
information, they could both be affected by implementation of an injunction 
preventing publication of the leaflets. Their Article 10(1) right to freedom of expression 
was therefore engaged.559 
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That said, the right to receive information under the ECHR does not currently impose a 
positive obligation upon the state to release particular government information to the 
public,560 although this situation is on the cusp of changing.561 Rather it covers the 
situation where a willing information giver such as the media, is prevented from 
imparting that information to a receiver such as the general public.562 This may, 
subject to the limitations set out in Article 10(2), be a violation of the receiver’s right to 
receive information. By application of these principles to the anonymity debate it can 
be said that both the media and the general public in a rape case could claim that by 
allowing parties in a rape case to have anonymity, the UK may be violating their Article 
10 right to freedom of expression. At the very least it is submitted that the media and 
general public’s rights to freedom of expression would be engaged, thus satisfying 
Article 10(1). 
 
5.2.2 The special position of the media in relation to article 10 and the margin of 
appreciation 
Before addressing the factors set out under 10(2), when a state may legitimately 
curtail freedom of expression, it is important to briefly consider why the media’s 
freedom of expression is of particular importance. This is because of the significant 
weight that the media’s freedom of expression may have in the context of the 
anonymity debate, when balanced against any competing rights of either rape 
complainants or defendants. Because the margin of appreciation awarded to states 
when balancing Article 10 against other competing rights is influenced by the 
importance of the media, this point is addressed here for ease of understanding. 
 
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society.563 
The media therefore plays an important role as ‘public watchdog’564 through its 
utilisation of freedom of expression to impart information to the general public. 
Additionally a significant proportion of the information received by society from the 
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media, is of political value, thereby assisting in an individual citizen’s relationship with 
the state.565 
 
The media also plays an important role in furthering the principle of open justice.566 
This role was considered in the previous chapter.567 The necessity of open justice was 
confirmed by the court in Donald v Ntuli [2010], acknowledging that open justice 
should not be circumvented in circumstances, other than those strictly necessary in 
ensure the correct administration of justice.568 Furthermore, a key attribute of open 
justice is that courts administer justice publicly, ensuring that the process is 
transparent and visible to all.569 As such, the right to a public and fair hearing, is at 
least in theory, ensured through the media’s role in reporting on the legal process.570 
This factor it is submitted, will be a key point of discussion when addressing the 
balancing exercise of the rape defendant’s Article 6 human right to an open and fair 
trial, against the media’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression.  
 
It is perhaps for all of the aforementioned reasons that ECtHR has held that the duty to 
impart information extends not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb’.571 Information regarding legal proceedings in a rape case 
may fall under the latter category of offensive, shocking or disturbing information due 
to the intimate and unpleasant nature of the offence. Subject to the limitations set out 
in Article 10(2) the media’s ability to report on such proceedings may engage 
competing human rights of rape complainants and or rape defendants who lacked 
anonymity during the legal process. 
 
Journalistic freedom of expression also takes into account the possibility that ‘a degree 
of exaggeration or even provocation’ may be involved in the publication produced,572 
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although acceptable limits must still be maintained.573 This fact when taken together 
with the qualified nature of Article 10 naturally requires a margin of appreciation to be 
applied when states balance Article 10 with other competing human rights.574 When 
considering the margin of appreciation in relation to Article 10575 specific focus has 
been placed upon the subject matter of the information.576 Additionally the court in 
Handyside v UK (1979-80) offered some valuable guidance. The Court opined that state 
authorities were generally in a better position than European judges to make the 
appropriate balance of Article 10 with other competing rights.577 Whilst this did not 
provide national authorities with an unfettered discretion: 
 
‘Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for 
the development of every man…. Such are the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 
'democratic society'. This means, amongst other things that every 
'formality', 'condition', 'restriction' or 'penalty' imposed in this sphere 
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.578 
 
The paragraph suggests that due to the importance of the media’s freedom of 
expression, states should only be prepared to limit those rights when it is justifiable, 
being proportionate to the aims pursued.579 This interpretation has subsequently been 
confirmed in more recent judgments.580 Undoubtedly the margin of appreciation is 
one element favourable to the media in considering whether to uphold their freedom 
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of expression. However the current focus is freedom of expression in relation to the 
anonymity debate. The reader may recall from the previous chapter, where the 
balance of the media’s freedom of expression against the rape complainant and 
defendant’s right to privacy was considered. In assessing the margin of appreciation 
awarded to a state when balancing the rape complainant and defendant’s Article 8 
human rights, it was argued that the margin of appreciation would be a narrow one. 
This was due to the narrow margin awarded to states when interpreting rights linked 
to a highly personal area of someone’s life.581 Sexual activity and sexual offences were 
asserted to be one such area.582 As with freedom of expression, the privacy of the 
parties in rape cases is also a circumstance when states should only limit rights when  
is truly necessary and proportionate. If a case arose where privacy rights for parties in 
a rape case conflicted directly with the media’s freedom of expression to report on 
those legal proceedings, it is submitted that the states would have similar margin of 
appreciation in each case, due to the importance of both rights. Ultimately in assessing 
which right prevailed, a delicate balancing exercise would be conducted.583 
 
Notwithstanding the evidential importance of upholding the media’s right to freedom 
of expression in all but the most necessary of circumstances, the list of ‘restrictions’ 
whereby a state may legitimately derogate from or withhold Article 10 rights is actually 
longer than it is for any other Article within the ECHR.584 These represent the 
‘qualified’ aspect of Article 10 set out in Article 10(2). 
 
5.2.3 The limits set by Article 10(2) 
The number of factors set out in Article 10(2) is substantial and a detailed analysis of 
each one is outside the ambit of the current debate. Rather it is proposed to address 
the potential limitation contained within Article 10(2) by using the same approach as 
taken by the ECtHR.585 This requires a state to pass a three-fold test when assessing 
whether limitations imposed by Article 10(2) are permissible. 586  Firstly, the 
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interference must be prescribed by law, secondly the interference must have been 
implemented to uphold one of the aims contained within Article 10(2) and thirdly the 
interference was necessary in a democratic society.587 Due to the focus of the current 
debate, the second criterion of the test will be whether the restriction is necessary to 
protect the rights of others: namely the rape defendant’s right to a fair trial.  
 
5.2.3.1 ‘Prescribed by law’, 
The requirement that any limitation to freedom of expression under Article 10(2) must 
be prescribed by law means that any proposed restriction on Article 10 rights must 
have a clear basis in domestic law. Often this requires a statutory law enacted through 
Parliament,588 but regardless the law in question must have enough precision to allow 
the general public to know how to regulate their actions.589 Furthermore, as was 
previously acknowledged in the context of Article 8 human rights, a state will have 
difficulty reasoning that a particular derogation of rights under Article 10(2) had a legal 
basis where there is no clear legislation to demonstrate that is so.590 
 
Even so, as long as an applicant’s Article 10(1) right to freedom of expression is 
engaged it is rare for the ECtHR to find that the Article 10(2) limitation is not 
prescribed by law. 591 What is ‘prescribed by law’ has even extended to Article 10(2) 
limitations on grounds such as offensiveness, public sensitivity and decency. In 
upholding this principle the court in R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting 
Corpn[2002] stated: 
 
‘[T]he Strasbourg court accepts that laws whose subject matter 
touches areas of subjective judgment where public opinion may shift, 
cannot be expected to be rigid or over-precise’.592 
 
Notably the form of expression involved in this case was the television screening of 
aborted fetuses during a party political broadcast.  
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Rare examples of where Article 10(2) restrictions have been found to not be prescribed 
by law do exist. In Hasham v UK (2000) the applicants had disrupted a foxhunt by 
shouting at the dogs and blowing a horn. A hearing at the magistrates court found that 
whilst the applicants were not guilty of breach of the peace, due to fact that they had 
not acted violently or threatened violence, they had acted contra bono mores or 
‘against good morals’. The applicants were duly bound over to behave well for the next 
year.593 However, when the case came before the ECtHR the Court considered that 
there had been a breach of the applicant’s Article 10 human rights. This was because 
the term ‘to be of good behaviour’  (defined in domestic law as ‘behaviour which was 
wrong rather than right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow 
citizens) was not sufficiently clear to ensure the applicants knew how they should 
behave in the future, and therefore could not be prescribed by law.594 
 
It is submitted that the requirement for a case to be prescribed by law can be applied 
to the anonymity debate with relative ease. Currently rape complainants have 
anonymity during the legal process and for the remainder of their lives. The legal 
provisions both providing anonymity595 and detailing the limits upon the media’s 
freedom of expression596 is clearly set out in the SOAA 1979. If journalists remain 
unclear on the restrictions imposed upon them then, further clarity can be gained from 
the Editors Code of Conduct (ECC)597 s11 ‘Victims of sexual assault’, which essentially 
paraphrases the wording of the SOAA 1979.  Thus unlike the exception contained 
within Hasham, it is submitted that limits on freedom of expression, required to 
provide rape complainants anonymity does have a basis in domestic law that is clear 
enough for individuals’ working in the media to understand, particularly when 
reinforced through the EEC. It would therefore meet the ‘prescribed by law’ criteria. 
Evidentially, it is not possible to speculate on the wording of future legislation. 
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However it is suggested that, were it deemed necessary at a future point in time to 
provide rape defendants with anonymity, a provision similar in nature to that providing 
anonymity to rape complainants would also meet the ‘prescribed by law threshold’. 
 
5.2.3.2 The restriction is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
The second criterion that must be considered when assessing whether a state can limit 
the media’s freedom of expression under Article 10(2) is that the restriction is 
necessary in a democratic society. This encompasses three interlinked components, as 
Lord Hope in R v Shayler [2002] inferred. Firstly under Article 10(2), ‘necessary’ had to 
be read in light of Article 18 HRA 1998. Article 18598 only permits restrictions for the 
limitations specifically listed within qualified Articles. Secondly, to be necessary a 
limitation had to be proportionate to the ends to be achieved. Thirdly the limitation 
had to be ‘necessary’ a per se.599 Each of these elements is briefly addressed in turn.  
 
The first requirement is that the restriction imposed on freedom of expression is for 
one of the specific reasons listed within Article 10(2). In the context of the anonymity 
debate the proposed limitation is the rape defendant’s Article 6 human right to a fair 
trial. It is submitted that this right is non-contentious and would fall squarely within 
the Article 10(2) limitation ‘for the protection of the reputation or rights of others’. In 
support of this assertion some examples can be provided. In Otto-Preminger Institute v 
Austria (1994) the Court held that the protection of an individual’s Article 9 ECHR right 
to peaceful enjoyment of their religion pursued a legitimate aim under Article 10(2) for 
the protection and rights of others’.600 In the case of Lehideux v France (2000)601 
criminal proceedings were taken against the applicants, for a publication that, contrary 
to French legislation, was deemed to defend crimes of collaboration with the enemy 
during World War II. The applicants claimed that their criminal conviction was contrary 
to their Article 10 right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR found that the aim of the 
French legislation, was to ‘protect the rights and reputation of others’, namely ‘the 
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direct or indirect victims of policy collaboration’.602 
 
The second element that should briefly be considered is the notion of proportionality. 
It is a generally accepted proposition that the phrase, ‘’necessary’’ in a democratic 
society’ introduces an additional requirement of proportionality into a court’s 
assessment of whether a given Article 10(2) interference is proportionate.603 The court 
in the Elloy de Freitas case held that proportionality in itself involved a three stage test 
asking whether: 
 
‘(i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative 
objective are rationally connected to it and (iii) the means used to 
impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective’.604 
 
Furthermore the interference is unlikely to be held proportionate ‘unless it “fulfils a 
pressing social need.”’605 Whilst the principle of proportionality may appear somewhat 
complex, Leigh asserted that one means of addressing proportionality is to focus on 
the ‘merits and effects of the decision rather than the process by which it was 
reached’.606 It is conceded that this approach seems to simplify the application of the 
proportionality somewhat. Further clarity can be gained via the use of the principle in 
the Spycatcher case: a leading example of where an Article 10 limitation was found not 
to be proportionate. The UK government applied for an injunction to prevent 
publication of the book Spycatcher, which contained confidential information, 
disclosed by a former Crown servant. However due to the book’s already widespread 
publication outside of the UK, the measure designed to protect public security, would 
have little effect. It was therefore not a proportionate limitation.607 
 
The third criterion is that the interference is ‘necessary’. The ECtHR stated: 
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‘[W]hilst the adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 
10(2) is not synonymous with “indispensable”, neither has it the 
flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, 
“reasonable” or “desirable” and that it implies the existence of a 
“pressing social need”’.608 
 
Additionally, it has been posited that social need will indicate a highly compelling or 
urgent cause such as protecting the public from prejudice, defeating terrorists or 
ensuing the right to a fair trial.609 The latter of these potentially ‘necessary’ limitations 
is of particular relevance to the right to a fair trial for a rape defendant.  
 
Case examples can be given to assist the reader of what ‘necessary’ means in practical 
terms. In Wingorve v UK, the ECtHR considered that preventing the publication of a 
blasphemous film was necessary in a democratic society. This was because the 
domestic blasphemy laws were designed to protect arbitrary interference with 
individual rights, of which freedom of religion was one. 610  In R (prolife Alliance) v 
British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] the ECtHR held that restrictions on the 
publication of a televised party political broadcast, showing images of aborted foetuses 
was necessary in a democratic society on the grounds that it would offend public 
feeling.611 
 
When assessing the necessity of restricting the limit to freedom of expression, the 
ECtHR has tended to group types of expression into three broad categories: political, 
artistic and commercial. It is asserted that these categories represent a hierarchy of 
importance, with political speech being most highly valued and commercial speech 
being the least.612 Furthermore, the ECtHR has defined political speech widely so as to 
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encompass a variety of circumstances. 613 Of particular importance for the anonymity 
debate is that political speech has specifically been held to encompass legal 
proceedings. 614  Thus prima facie political speech would extend to cover legal 
proceedings in a rape case. 
 
A final point to acknowledge in relation to the criterion of necessity is the margin of 
appreciation awarded to states when deliberating this component. The margin of 
appreciation in relation to freedom of expression was addressed more fully, earlier in 
this chapter.615 However there is one further comment that should be made, namely 
that the margin of appreciation awarded to states interpreting Article 10 human rights 
is at its most narrow when interpreting political speech.616 It is suggested that the 
reporting of proceedings in a rape case would be one such example of where the 
margin of appreciation would be employed narrowly. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis. The first is that 
theoretically, if limitations upon the media’s freedom of expression, by way of 
legislative provisions providing rape defendants with anonymity, this would meet the 
requirement of being ‘prescribed by law’ under Article 10(2). Secondly the criterion of 
‘necessity’ under Article 10(2) may potentially be met by the need to ensure rape 
defendants receive a fair trial. Thirdly that reporting on legal proceedings in a rape 
case amounts to ‘political speech’ for which the narrowest margin of appreciation is 
awarded to the state when considering whether to limit Article 10 rights. Therefore 
the final question to pose is whether a rape defendant’s Article 6 right to a fair trial 
would be outweighed by the media’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
5.2.3.3 The right to freedom of information and the right to a fair trial, a balancing 
act  
Constrains as to the ambit of this thesis have meant that a full analysis of the Article 6 
human right to a fair trial is outside the current range of discussion. However specific 
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components of the Article are introduced with some brevity at this juncture. This is for 
the purposes of assessing whether a defendant’s right to a fair trial may necessitate 
limiting the media’s freedom of expression to report on the legal proceedings of a rape 
trial. 
 
There are three aspects of the right to a fair trial, which are of importance in relation 
to the anonymity debate. These are that all defendants are entitled to a ‘fair and 
public hearing’, 617 to be considered innocent until proven guilty618 and that the press 
and public may be excluded from all of the trial ‘in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.619 
 
Perhaps the most striking element of Article 6 is that a public hearing is actually 
considered to be an aspect of a fair trial, ensuring that justice is administered publicly 
and correctly. Doing so ensures that the legal process is transparent and visible.620 By 
reporting on proceedings that a defendant in a rape case is involved in, the media 
performs its duty as public watchdog,621 checking that the rape defendant is not being 
subjected to an arbitrary or biased administration of justice. This is one example where 
lack of anonymity actually upholds the defendant’s right to a fair trial, rather than 
hinders it. As Zuckerman posits, an individual can’t accept the principle of open justice 
to aid their assurance of a fair trial whilst at the same time assisting that the trial takes 
place ‘behind closed doors’ or with anonymity.622 In this instance there is clearly no 
‘pressing social need’ to restrict the media’s freedom of expression under Article 10(2). 
 
A second key element of Article 6(2) is that a rape defendant has the right to a 
presumption of innocence until he is proven guilty. This is a guarantee to the 
defendant that the trial in court will not commence on the basis that the defendant 
has already committed the Act.623 The rape defendant may pose the question of how 
he can be assumed innocent until proven guilty, if publications regarding the charges, 
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or the preliminary legal proceedings of the rape case, are publicly disclosed by the 
media prior to trial.  
 
It is asserted that there are substantial merits to this question, particularly when taking 
into account the degree of provocation or exaggeration that is conceded when media 
publications are produced.624 The defendant may therefore argue that the general 
public and potential jurors in his forthcoming trial may form opinions regarding his 
guilt before it has been proven. Consequently the general public may assume he was 
guilty or rape as opposed to being a rape defendant, thus necessitating a pressing 
social need for his anonymity, and form limitations on the media’s freedom of 
expression. Indeed this argument was considered in the context of the defendant’s 
right to privacy in chapter 4. Reference was made to the case of Guardian News and 
Media Ltd, Re [2010] where, in response to a similar assertion by the application the 
Court held that the court were able to distinguish between suspects and convicted 
criminals.625 
 
The reader may recall the televised research involving mock jury deliberations in rape 
cases, discussed in chapter two.626 One juror noted that:   
 
‘[A] wrong decision would be more serious if found against the 
defendant as it would destroy a young man’s future, whereas if the 
decision was the wrong one and found him to be innocent, the wrong 
committed against the woman is already in her past and therefore 
somehow less of a consideration’.627 
 
Whilst this research only represents one individual view it confers a level of sympathy 
towards rape defendants, as opposed to an automatic assumption of guilt. This factor 
should be appreciated in tandem with the generally negative perception of rape 
victims, which is compounded by rape myths.628 Attention should also be given to the 
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desperately low current conviction rates in rape cases.629 It is not suggested that any of 
these factors taken alone proves that every rape defendant receives a fair trial. They 
do however suggest that the defendant, at the very least is not treated unfairly in the 
trial process. Therefore there lacks any firm evidence that a rape defendant’s current 
lack of anonymity during legal proceedings prejudice’s justice in a manner that would 
be incompatible with his Article 6 right to a fair trial. This also confirms that there is no 
pressing social need requiring a restriction of the media’s Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression. As a consequence blanket anonymity for rape defendants is not necessary 
in order to uphold their Article 6 human rights. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The media’s Article 10 human rights to freedom of expression are of fundamental 
importance in a democratic society. This is particularly so in light of their roles as a 
public watchdog and in furthering the principle of open justice. Prima facie if rape 
defendants were in receipt of anonymity during the legal process, the legislation 
enabling that anonymity would meet the criteria to be ‘prescribed by law’ for the 
purposes of an Article 10(2) limitation to freedom of expression. However, for the 
purposes of the current debate the freedom of information that the media would be 
imparting, is a form of political information, namely proceedings in a rape case. This is 
the form of expression that is most valued and limitations to such speech must meet a 
compelling pressing social need. It was questioned whether a rape defendant’s Article 
6 right to a fair trial would amount to such a pressing social need. However analysis 
has demonstrated that the media’s freedom of expression to report on legal 
proceedings in rape cases, actually supports a rape defendant’s trial to be both public 
and transparent. Finally the question of whether public identification by the media, 
prior to a rape trial could violate the rape defendant’s right to be deemed innocent 
until proven guilty. In answering this question it was noted that the court considers 
members of the public to be able to distinguish between a defendant and a convicted 
criminal and it was asserted that that was no evidence per se that a rape defendant’s 
right to a fair trial was being breached by virtue of his lack of anonymity. The final 
conclusions drawn were that a restriction of the media’s Article 10 human rights is 
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unnecessary in order to uphold the rape defendant’s Article 6 right to a fair trial, nor is 
it necessary to impose blanket anonymity to rape defendants in order to uphold those 
Article 6 human rights. 
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Chapter 6 Article 14 
6.1 Introduction 
Article 14 ECHR (Article 14), as enshrined into domestic law by the HRA 1998 states: 
 
‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status’.630 
 
Initial reading of Article 14 may confuse the reader somewhat as to its correct 
interpretation and application. on one hand, Article 14 establishes a specific 
prohibition of discrimination, whilst on the other hand, jurisprudence of the ECtHR has 
concluded that Article 14 is not a stand-alone right, it is a right that can only be 
invoked under the auspice of one of the other substantive convention rights. 
 
Article 14 is in fact both of these, as will be explained. However the ‘complementary’ 
function of Article 14 means that it is only necessary to introduce it with relative 
brevity. The intention of chapter 6, is to briefly consider how Article 14, in the context 
of the anonymity debate, would most likely be implemented in relation to other 
human rights. It is asserted that the increasing importance of Article 14, as reinforced 
by jurisprudence of the ECtHR and a limited degree of scholarly debate, has potential 
implications upon weight given to the competing arguments in the anonymity debate.  
 
6.2 The scope of Article 14 and its interaction with other rights 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination of individuals in relation to the effective application 
of the substantive rights under the ECHR.631 When assessing whether discrimination 
may have occurred the ECtHR will follow a two-stage analysis.632 It firstly considers 
whether there has been any difference or similarity in the treatment of individuals 
when placed in an analogous situation to others. If the first question is answered in the 
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affirmative then the court will move on to examine whether the state has an objective 
and reasonable justification for the similarity or difference in treatment employed633 
or of proportionality between the means employed and the ends sought.634 
 
To assist an understanding of how Article 14 is applied, an example can be given in 
relation to the anonymity debate. It is possible that a rape defendant could bring a 
case before the ECtHR on the basis that his Article 6 right to a fair trial was being 
breached by virtue of his lack of anonymity during criminal legal proceedings. In 
association with the alleged breach of an Article 6 right it may also be claimed that the 
defendant’s Article 14 right, not to be subject to discrimination has also been 
breached. It is submitted that the alleged breach of the Article 14 right would be 
brought on the basis that rape defendants, as a group, were being treated differently 
to an analogous group, namely rape complainants, and were therefore facing 
discrimination.635 Prima facie this approach is supported by the authority of Hugh 
Jordan v UK [2001]636 where it was held that a measure could be discriminatory even 
when that measure was not specifically aimed at that group, but amounted to indirect 
discrimination. Discussions in earlier chapters have demonstrated that the purpose of 
withholding rape defendant anonymity is closely linked with the principle of open and 
fair justice,637 as opposed to being aimed at discriminating against rape defendants. 
Thus it would be open for the ECtHR to conclude that rape defendants were being 
discriminated against, by virtue of their lack of anonymity, even if it were shown that 
the discrimination was not made on the basis that the group were rape defendants.638 
 
Equally, it would be possible for a rape complainant to argue that they were 
discriminated against contrary to Article 14. Earlier discussions have demonstrated 
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that rape complainants may still suffer severely throughout the legal process, despite 
their having been given anonymity.  Alternatively, consider the scenario where the UK 
Parliament revoked complainant anonymity in rape cases on the basis that it was no 
longer deemed necessary. In either instance an individual might take a case to the 
ECtHR, on the basis that the trauma, stigma and humiliation that they had to endure 
throughout the legal process, by virtue of being a rape complainant, amounted to 
inhuman and degrading behaviour, in breach of their Article 3 rights. It is submitted 
that the likelihood of an individual taking a case to the ECtHR would be far greater 
where a rape complainant was not protected by anonymity. This is because the 
likelihood of that individual experiencing extreme suffering would be greatly increased 
where they were publicly identified as being party to an alleged sexual offence. 
 
In the later example, in association with the substantive right, it may also be claimed 
that the complainant had suffered discrimination, contrary to Article 14 ECtHR, by 
virtue of their not being provided with anonymity. However, in this instance it would 
be on the basis that rape complainants were not being treated substantially differently 
from the analogous group, complainants in other crimes, where justice required it. The 
need for different treatment arising by virtue of the level of humiliation and trauma 
that is unique to complainants in rape cases. 639 
 
6.3 The limits of Article 14 
6.3.1 A provision without ‘bite’ 
As the aforementioned examples elicit, Article 14 is designed to complement other 
substantive rights.640 It is unsurprising that the provision has been criticised for being 
merely an accessory right641 that lacks ‘bite’,642 or is even ‘parasitic’.643 It is conceded 
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that the narrow scope of this Article, only enjoyable in the spheres in which the 
substantive rights are enjoyed, does severely restrict its scope. 644 Some scholars have 
therefore been highly critical of Article 14’s application. One such proponent is 
McColgan, whose argument has a direct impact on the anonymity debate whilst also 
raising questions as to the utility of the ECHR and HRA more generally.645 McColgan 
contends that the limiting application of Article 14 has been ‘less than satisfactory’ 
having had a particularly negative impact upon women.646 This is because the narrow 
ambit of the provision means that too often women are being discriminated against in 
a manner that would not fall within the ambit of Article 14, albeit in association with 
another substantive right.  
 
This line of argument raises three specific points in relation to the anonymity debate. 
Firstly it is possible to posit that if the scope of Article 14 was wider, or if it was 
transformed into a free standing right, then the state would be forced to put in place 
more effective measures to protect rape complainants throughout the legal process. In 
doing so it would theoretically mitigate the need for anonymity provisions to some 
degree. Secondly it remains possible that the need for anonymity would nevertheless 
remain because it would be arguable that rape complainants, as a group, face 
discrimination that is prima facie in breach of Article 14 and therefore require 
anonymity provisions to readdress that inequality. Thirdly it is plausible that a wider 
application of Article 14 could also require that rape defendant’s be provided with 
anonymity if it were held that they were being treated differently from an analogous 
group, where that analogous group was rape complainant’s. It is submitted however, 
following the consideration of the potential comparator groups in chapter 2, that the 
correct comparator group for rape defendants is actually defendants in other criminal 
cases rather than rape complainants.647  There is a practical reason behind this 
assertion, in that defendants and complainants (as witnesses) have very different roles 
in criminal legal proceedings and it is therefore not possible to directly compare one to 
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the other. Instead they should be compared to other individuals who are directly 
comparable, namely complainants or defendants in other criminal cases.   
 
6.3.2 The margin of appreciation  
A further   means by  which the  potential  scope  of Article 14  has  been constrained is  
through the margin of appreciation doctrine.648 The margin of appreciation doctrine 
has enabled the European Court to allow a greater degree of discretion to the state in 
circumstances where the court feels unable to second guess the national judgment.649 
The lack of common approach among member states has been the most prominent 
factor in influencing the level of scrutiny.650 In recent years the ECtHR has been less 
willing to construe the margin of appreciation widely.651 The margin of appreciation 
will vary depending on the scope, background and subject matter involved. 652 
Hypothetically this could be applied to the margin of appreciation that the ECtHR 
would afford to the UK if it decided to withhold anonymity from rape complaints and 
or rape defendants. 
 
It was noted in chapter 2 that the UK’s rape conviction rates were found to be the 
lowest in Europe.653 Thus if the UK were withholding complainant anonymity, taking 
into account the scope, subject-matter and background it is likely that it would 
construe the margin of appreciation narrowly in relation to Article 14 : because the 
ECtHR should conclude that rape convictions in the UK are lower than in other 
Member States. Thus, if lack of anonymity was being considered as a potential breach 
of another substantive right, thereby engaging Article 14, and it was considered that 
anonymity would help increase conviction rates then the margin would be construed 
narrowly.  
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By comparison it is suggested that there would be a wider margin of appreciation 
awarded to the UK in relation to a rape defendant’s Article 14 rights. Again this is 
because emphasis would be placed upon the background and subject matter of the 
supposed breach. Factors the ECtHR would take into consideration would likely include 
the principle of open justice and fulfilling the rape defendant’s need for a fair and open 
trial. Most importantly emphasis would be placed on the fact that to date, there lacks 
the evidence to demonstrate rape defendants suffer disproportionally during the legal 
process compared to defendants of other serious crimes:654 their comparator group. 
 
6.3.3 A provision of limited utility?  
Despite Article 14 having received substantial criticism, its potential utility for the 
purposes of the anonymity debate should not be underestimated. Firstly, despite the 
fact that Article 14 can only be engaged in association with another substantive Article, 
a breach of that Article does not need to found on the facts of the case for there to be 
a finding of an Article 14 breach.655 In these circumstances Article 14 may be engaged 
where a personal right close to the core of another substantive right has been 
breached. This ability could be of benefit for either rape complainants or 
defendants.656 
 
Furthermore, although the wording of Article 14 provides a list as to what grounds 
amount to discrimination, those grounds are not exclusive, but have a degree of 
flexibility.657 Finally it should be noted that potentially any instance of discrimination 
could be addressed under Article 14 regardless of whether it has previously been 
considered under international human rights law. Findings to date include sexual 
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orientation,658 distinction based on rank,659 birth out of wedlock 660 and difference in 
child benefits between aliens with residence permits and those without.661 
 
6.4 Substantive equality, Article 14 and its impact upon the anonymity debate 
Historically Article 14 has been limited in its ambit, to a formalistic interpretation662 
and as such, has only been effective in dealing with instances of direct 
discrimination.663 ‘Formal equality’ models look for a rationale or justification for any 
differences. By comparison, during the last decade, the ECtHR has begun to develop a 
substantive model of ‘equality’ that focuses on how ‘victims’ experience the reality of 
the discrimination, rather than whether the law makes a specific distinction or 
whether a specific wrongdoer can be identified.664 In particular, a substantive model 
provides the opportunity to address systematic oppression and disadvantage by taking 
as its starting point the understanding that some people, by virtue of their 
membership of a particular group are subject to discrimination, oppression, or 
exclusion.665 In the context of the anonymity debate this reference could be made to 
the aforementioned argument that women as a group are systematically 
disadvantaged.666 Therefore a substantive model of equality under Article 14 would 
most likely require that rape complainants received anonymity.667 In light of earlier 
discussions, the position in relation to rape defendants is somewhat different. At 
present there remains no substantial evidence to show that rape defendants as a 
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group,668 or indeed men as a group, are systematically disadvantaged. For this reason 
the development of substantive equality in relation to Article 14 is unlikely to benefit 
rape defendants at present. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Unlike the other Articles discussed in this thesis, this chapter has demonstrated that 
Article 14’s application is dependent upon it being considered in association with 
another substantive human right. This feature, in combination with the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, limits its scope. Nevertheless a breach of the substantive human 
right is not necessary in order for the ECtHR to find discrimination in breach of Article 
14. Therefore theoretically Article 14 has the potential to apply to applications brought 
by rape complainants and/or defendants, in relation to one of the substantive human 
rights discussed in chapters three to five. By reference to the popular arguments 
surrounding the anonymity debate it was suggested that rape complainants as a 
group, would face discrimination contrary to Article 14, if they lacked anonymity. This 
was especially so when considering their disadvantaged status as a group and in light 
of more recent ECtHR judgments relating to substantive equality. By comparison, it 
was also suggested that at present rape defendants who are withheld anonymity 
would not face discrimination contrary to Article 14, nor are they systematically 
disadvantaged as a group. However in light of recent high profile sexual offence cases 
there is the possibility that this position may alter in the future.  
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Chapter 7 Final conclusions 
 
 
In 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition proposed to extend anonymity in 
rape cases to rape defendants. These proposals reignited a long running, highly 
contentious debate over whether rape complainants and/or rape defendants should 
receive anonymity during the legal process. Currently only rape complainants receive 
anonymity. Anonymity provisions necessitate a circumvention of open justice, a 
cornerstone of the UK’s legal system. Any limitations to this principle must be imposed 
only in the most restricted circumstances. 
 
Arguments in favour of maintaining rape complainant anonymity fall broadly into two 
groups. Firstly, ‘historical arguments’ are premised on the idea that male power and 
dominance has resulted in a patriarchal legal system, made by men, in the interests of 
men. This reinforces gender inequality within the legal system and society. Kennedy 
contends that society assumes equality before the law requires a neutral set of rules. 
In truth, substantive equality entails treating people equally, whilst taking into account 
differences. The second group, ‘rape myths’, are widely held societal preconceptions 
which lay down unspoken criteria to be satisfied in order for a rape to be considered as 
‘real’: 
 
1. The  ‘real rape scenario’ encompassing the necessary circumstances 
and type of rape required before a rape is considered to be 
legitimate. 
 
2. ‘Preconceptions’ that woman commonly lie about being raped. 
 
3.  Women actually want to be raped. 
 
Deviation from these myths places doubt on the rape complainant’s credibility. 
Cumulatively these myths have led the legal process to be particularly distressing for 
rape victims, some viewing the legal process as a ‘second assault’ or experiencing rape 
trauma syndrome. Resultantly, rape complainants are reluctant to report offences or 
to endure the legal process, and so attrition during the legal process increases. Such 
144 
 
 
factors support the position of anonymity for rape complainants during the legal 
process. 
 
Arguments in favour of rape defendant anonymity are three-fold.  
 
1. Being accused of rape is more serious than being accused of other 
serious crimes such as murder. Difficulties in proving rape as a 
crime, leaves a blemish that is impossible to resolve, 
notwithstanding a subsequent acquittal. Furthermore defendants 
of other serious crimes receive less media coverage than rape 
defendants.  
 
2. Rape defendants deserve equality with rape complainants, which 
would be realised through both parties receiving anonymity. If 
both parties did have such equality however, women’s inequality 
generally, combined with the severe stigma that rape 
complainants face, means that formal equality, by anonymity for 
both parties would not suffice.  
 
3. Defendants should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
Given the stigma attached to being a rape defendant, the public 
would assume the rape defendant was guilty by his simply being a 
defendant in legal proceedings. The only means of remedying this 
would be to provide rape defendants with anonymity.   
 
Give the complexity of the rape anonymity debate this thesis suggested that a human 
rights perspective may address where the correct anonymity balance should lie. Whilst 
the same arguments would still be drawn, rephrasing in different terminology could 
allow a better understanding of competing arguments. 
 
Lack of anonymity in a rape case as a potential violation of either a rape complainant 
or rape defendant’s absolute Article 3 human right, not to be subjected to torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment was considered. Anonymity was not a factual 
scenario that had previously been deliberated before the ECtHR and as such 
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arguments made would be reliant upon established principles. Nonetheless Article 3 
ECHR can adapt to encompass new factual scenarios. 
 
Through analysis of the individual elements of Article 3 it is concluded that lack of 
anonymity in a rape case would not amount to torture due to the specific purpose and 
intensity required. The level of humiliation and debasement a rape complaint faces 
during the legal process however, is distinct from that experienced by complainants of 
other crimes. Were rape complainants to be withheld anonymity, it may amount to 
inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3. Even so, due to differences in 
how individual rape complainants react to legal proceedings, the necessary threshold 
to amount to a breach of Article 3 would not be met in many cases. Subsequently 
blanket anonymity for rape complainants would not be necessary in order to uphold 
their Article 3 human rights. However anonymity could still be adequately provided in 
individual circumstances, where the interests of justice required it under existing 
legislative provisions. 
 
Lack of anonymity for rape defendants would not be likely to violate their Article 3 
human rights. There lacks substantive evidence to demonstrate that, unlike rape 
complainants, rape defendants suffer a level of humiliation or debasement, distinct 
from that suffered by defendants of other crimes. However following a number of 
recent, highly publicised, historic sexual offence cases, public attitudes towards rape 
defendants could alter in the future. If this occurred further research could reassess 
whether the suffering experienced by rape defendants had altered and whether the 
lack of anonymity now violated their Article 3 human rights.  
 
Consideration has been given to whether lack of anonymity would be likely to breach a 
rape complainant and/or defendant’s Article 8 right to privacy. Initial analysis 
concluded that since legal proceedings in a rape case amounted to the highly personal 
topic of sexual intimacy, the Article 8 human rights of both parties in a rape case would 
be engaged.  Notwithstanding this finding the qualified nature of Article 8 meant that 
the UK could potentially impose limitations on the right to privacy. Two such 
limitations of relevance for the anonymity debate were the principle of open justice 
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and the need to balance the right to privacy against the media’s right to freedom of 
expression.  
 
Blanket anonymity to prevent violations of a rape defendant’s right to privacy is 
considered unnecessary because: 
 
1. On the basis of ‘public interest’ and the need to uphold open justice in all but 
the most limited of circumstances, the media’s right to freedom of expression 
would carry significant weighting when balanced against the privacy rights of 
parties in a rape case. 
 
2. Whilst rape defendants undoubtedly experience distress by virtue of their 
being a defendant, there is nothing per se to distinguish rape defendants from 
defendants of other serious crimes. 
 
3. Rape defendants are at least suspected of having committed a criminal offence, 
thus pushing the Article 8 and 10 balance further against their right to privacy.  
 
4. There is legitimate public interest in reporting on legal proceedings, and 
through doing so furthering the principle of open justice.  
 
Assessment of the balance of Article 8 and 10 human rights in regard to rape 
complainants lies more favorably towards rape complainants. Principally, complainants 
of other offences do not experience the same level of humiliation suffered by rape 
complainants. However, when considered solely in terms of the Article 8 and 10 
balancing exercise the media’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression would 
nevertheless prevail in most cases. However the specific difficulties of being a rape 
complainant, when balanced against the principle of open justice, necessitate 
derogation from that principle. It is concluded that a circumvention of the principle of 
open justice, through provision of blanket anonymity to rape complainants during legal 
proceedings, is necessary in order to uphold the rape complainant’s Article 8 right to 
privacy.   
 
Consideration has been given to a rape defendant’s Article 6 human right to a fair trial 
when balanced against the media’s Article 10 human rights. The media undertake a 
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vital role as public watchdog in a democratic society and in furthering the fundamental 
principle of open justice. Upholding the media’s right to freedom of expression is 
therefore of the upmost importance. Even so, Article 10 is a qualified right and it was 
argued that if rape defendants were in receipt of anonymity the enabling legal 
provisions would meet the criteria necessary to be ‘prescribed by law’, the first criteria 
to be met for the purposes of limiting freedom of expression under Article 10(2). 
 
However for the purposes of the anonymity debate, the media’s freedom of 
expression relates to reporting on legal proceedings during a rape trial. This form of 
expression amounts to the imparting of political information: the most valued form of 
speech that must be curtailed only when there is a pressing social need. It was 
considered whether the rape defendant’s Article 6 human rights to a fair trial 
represented a pressing social need. Overall conclusions were that rather than 
impeding the right to a fair a trial, the media’s ability to report on legal proceedings 
actually upholds an important aspect of a fair trial through legal proceedings being 
both public and transparent. 
 
Public identification by the media, prior to a rape trial was considered as a potential 
breach of a rape defendant’s right to be innocent until proven guilty. The court in 
Guardian News and Media Ltd, Re [2010] was of the opinion that the general public 
could distinguish between a defendant and a convicted criminal. Additionally, there is 
no evidence specifically proving that the lack of anonymity is causing a violation of a 
rape defendant’s Article 6 right to a fair trial. Restricting the media’s right to freedom 
of expression should not be mandated in order to preserve the rape defendant’s right 
to a fair trial. Neither is blanket anonymity necessary to protect the Article 6 rights of 
rape defendants. 
 
In addition to discussion of the substantive Articles, attention was focused on the 
Article 14 human right to be free from discrimination, which can only be invoked 
alongside another substantive human rights. This factor, when taken together with the 
margin of appreciation awarded to states in the interpretation of Article 14, does limit 
its potential reach. That said, a finding that a substantive Article has been breached is 
not necessary before there can be a finding that Article 14 has been violated. Article 14 
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could in theory apply to applications brought by rape complainants or defendants, that 
their Article 3 and 8, or the defendant’s Article 6 human rights had been breached. 
 
When considered in the context of the popular arguments surrounding the anonymity 
debate, rape complainants as a group would face discrimination in breach of their 
Article 14 human rights if they lacked anonymity. This is particularly so when taking 
into account ECtHR judgments focused on the need to implement substantive equality. 
 
Conversely the same considerations, when applied to rape defendants would not 
entail defendants facing discrimination contrary to Article 14, because as a group rape 
defendants are not systematically disadvantaged. It is conceded however that the 
recent rise of highly publicised historical sexual offence cases may see this position 
change in the future.  If this occurs a reassessment of the status of a rape defendant’s 
Article 14 human rights should be undertaken. 
 
The ultimate conclusions drawn from this thesis are that human rights do assist in a 
clearer understanding of how the competing arguments should be balanced with 
regards to party anonymity in rape cases. It is furthered that the current position, 
whereby rape complainants have anonymity during the legal process and rape 
defendants do not, is the correct position. This is on the basis that the specific 
humiliation and suffering that rape complainants face during the legal process engages 
their Article 8 human right to privacy. When balanced against the principle of open 
justice it is the rape complainant’s right to privacy that prevails. Furthermore, when 
taken in association with Article 8, a rape complainant’s Article 14 right to be free from 
discrimination is also engaged, because rape complainants as a group are systemically 
disadvantaged in the legal process and a lack of anonymity could breach their Article 
14 human rights. Rape complainants require the continuation of statutory anonymity 
provisions in order to prevent breaches of their Article 8 and 14 human rights. One 
limit of the current research is a failure to ascertain whether a rape complainant’s 
anonymity needed to be lifelong in order to uphold the aforementioned human rights. 
This aspect of her anonymity would benefit from some further research in order to 
clarify the matter. 
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By comparison there was no evidence produced by this research to support a finding 
that any of the human rights discussed would be violated if a rape defendant lacked 
anonymity. There is the possibility that this position may alter in the future following 
recent highly publicised historical sexual offence cases. If this occurs, further research 
should be undertaken to reassess the rape defendant’s experience of the legal process 
compared to defendants of other crimes. Also to reassess whether the balancing 
exercise, undertaken in relation to the rights considered in this research would still be 
balanced unfavorably against rape defendants. 
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